Propagation and suppression of gas and dust explosions. by Moore, P. E.
PROPAGATION AND SUPPRESSION 
OF GAS AND DUST EXPLOSIONS
P E Moore
ProQuest Number: 10804280
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10804280
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Explosion suppression system  design has relied historically on the validity 
of Hartmann apparatus explosibility test data, and on interpolation from  
available suppression system  test data. This research has identified im ­
proved methods of explosion hazard assessm ent and suppression system  
efficacy assessm ent, from a study of explosion propagation, suppressant 
action, and discharge of suppressors.
The controversy over the validity of Hartmann dust explosibility data was
resolved. It was found that the ignition methodology was responsible for
3the uncertain ly of Hartmann data. A 43dm spherical explosion test  
apparatus was developed which provided m ore useful explosibility data.
The influence of turbulence on explosion hazards was recognised and an 
em pirical m easure of turbulence level was defined.
Systematic tr ia ls with suppressed and unsuppressed explosions w ere under- 
3taken in a lm  apparatus. The results of these tr ia ls  provided the found­
ation for the development of a mathematical model of explosion suppression. 
3A 6.2m  explosion test facility was set up in alignment with the require­
ments of a proposed International Standard. Explosion and explosion
suppression tr ia ls in this apparatus substantiated the m odel. Certain
3artefacts were identified in 6.2m  quiescent gas explosions* An interactive  
computer program based on the model for explosion suppression was tested  
and proved.
The work has culminated in the establishm ent of a large scale explosion  
test facility in the UK. The effectiveness of three suppressants, Halon 
1011, water, and mono-ammonium phosphate powder, against both gas and 
dust explosions was established experim entally . The influence of
suppression system  detection pressure and explosion suppressor discharge 
characteristics on the resultant suppression system  effectiveness was 
determined experim entally. A computer model of explosion suppression  
has emerged which provides an improved level of confidence in adjudging 
the performance of explosion suppression m easures.
A reas for further work include larger scale explosion and explosion suppress­
ion tr ia ls  and a study of artefacts identified with large volume quiescent gas  
explosions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1. 1 .  General Background
This th esis  is  submitted for an industrial collaborative degree of PhD. The 
research was undertaken as part of a three year study programme at Graviner 
Ltd. in c lose  liaison with the University of Surrey. The author was respons­
ible for the whole study programme, which had both technical and com m ercial 
objectives. The author had lim ited a ccess to the following scien tists  and 
technologists in the Graviner Company:
(i) research chemist;
(ii) computer programmer;
(iii) e lectrica l engineer;
(iv) m echanical'engineer.
These scientists provided valuable advice and project support as and when 
necessary . Research technician support was available to the author through­
out the experimental programme.
' Explosion protection by suppression has been established as a com m ercial 
alternative to other explosion protection procedures for some 25 y e a rs . The 
constraints placed upon the designers and suppliers of explosion suppression  
system s have increased as a consequence of recent safety leg islation . The 
introduction shortly of a new International Standard (see section 1.3)  w ill in­
crease  the requirement of a supplier to demonstrate that active explosion  
protection m easures are designed with an assured operational e ffectiven ess. 
The work described in this th esis arose out of the need to establish a m ore  
fundamental foundation for the design of explosion suppression system s on 
industrial plant, than that based on an unquestioned dependence on interpolation  
and interpretation of the collation of available test resu lts.
1 . 2 .  Objectives
The research programme was started against a background of controversy  
and uncertainty regarding the validity of dust explosibility data obtained from  
UK and USA standard test procedures. In the United Kingdom, there was no 
large volume explosion test facility that would comply with the proposed 
International Standard requirem ents. The establishment and instrumentation 
of such an explosion test facility formed an important prim ary objective of 
the research programme. This objective had to be met within the lim ited  
financial resource available for the whole study.
An extensive review of all pertinent literature on gas and dust explosions, 
explosion suppressants, explosion suppressors, and explosion suppression  
was undertaken, both as a foundation for the research, and as a source of 
reference for other workers within this specific field of science and technology. 
The objectives of the study were:
1 . to resolve the uncertainty/controversy regarding explosibility  
measurement of dust;
2 . to establish a large volume explosion test facility in the United 
Kingdom in compliance with the proposals of ISO/TC21/SC5/WG3;
3 . to establish a theoretical foundation for explosion hazard a s s e s s ­
ment;
4 . to determine the performance characteristics of Graviner and 
Deugra industrial explosion suppressors;
5 . to establish an understanding and foundation for the observed  
effectiveness and lim itations of explosion suppressants;
6. to determ ine experimentally the performance characteristics of 
explosion suppression system s;
7. to establish sufficient understanding of explosion suppression to 
provide a basis for a mathematical model capable of experim ental 
verification;
8. to s etup,  as appropriate, a computer-aided explosion suppression  
system  design facility as a system  design aid for a manufacturing 
company of explosion suppression system s.
1 .3 .  Status of Proposed International Standard
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) Technical Committee 
TC21 ’’Equipment for fire protection and fire fighting”, Sub-Committee SC5 
’’Fixed fire extinguishing system s” established a Working Group WG3 
’’Explosion suppression system s” which first met in July 1975. The objectives 
of this working group were to appraise the status of explosion suppression  
technology.and to establish a foundation for a draft International Standard on 
explosion suppression system s. The UK is  represented by BSI and specific  
m em bers of the appropriate BSI Committee (F S B /-/4 /5 ) attend ISO/TC21/SC5/ 
WG3 m eetings. The author has represented Graviner Ltd. on F S B /- /4 /5  since  
1977 and has participated in the ISO/TC21/SC5/WG3 m eetings. A sm all group 
of technologists was established within this ISO working group to collaborate 
on experimental tr ia ls  of explosion suppression m easures, and to appraise the 
technical problems associated with the preparation of such a standard. The 
author has participated in this group, and part of the research reported in 
this th esis  reflects the activ ities and progress of this ISO Standard. Working 
drafts of the proposed standard are now available as d iscussion  documents 
within WG3 (1-3).
1 .3 .1 . Collaborative Trials
The ser ie s  of explosion suppression tria ls undertaken by participant delegat­
ions of ISO/TC21/SC5/WG3 are listed below:
ISO Delegation V essel Volume Suppression System
UK/W Germany lm 3 1 of 75mm diam eter single outlet suppressor
USA 3. 8m3 2 of 75mm diam eter single outlet suppressor
Switzerland lm 3 1 of 19mm diam eter double outlet suppressor
France lm 3 1 of 19mm diam eter double outlet suppressor
Explosion suppression experim ents in the lm  apparatus, described in 
section 5 . 4 . 2 ,  were conducted by Dr E.W. Scholl at Bergbau V ersuchsstrecke, 
Dortmund, in collaboration with the author, as part of UK/W Germany's 
contribution to ISO/TC21/SC5/WG3. The results of the other test program m es 
are summarised in Appendix 1.
1 . 4 .  Presentation of Material
It is  im plicit in such a research programme on explosion suppression that 
consideration must be given to explosions, suppressants, and suppressors  
to provide the necessary foundation for an understanding of explosion  
suppression. The m aterial is  presented in this th esis  using the conventional 
structure, theory, methods, resu lts, discussion and conclusions. However, 
it is  subdivided into the four research areas of explosions, suppressants, 
suppressors and suppression, which perm its the reader to follow one 
particular area of interest through the document without significant lo ss  of 
continuity.
" 1 .4 .1 . Explosions
Explosibility m easurem ents using a defined experimental procedure are a 
prerequisite of-industrial explosion hazard assessm en t. Quantification of 
the effectiveness of any proposed active explosion protection m easure re­
quires that the nature and severity of the explosion hazard is  defined. The 
validity and lim itations of established test procedures for gas and dust 
explosibility m easurem ents are appraised as part of this study and a basis  
established to provide meaningful explosion hazard assessm en t.
1 . 4 . 2 .  Suppressants
The effectiveness of suppressants against the range of explosion hazards 
is  quantified and a theoretical model evolved which establishes the criteria  
for effective suppression. The effectiveness of Halon, water, and 
ammonium phosphate powder suppressants are compared.
1 . 4 . 3 .  Suppressors
The influence of explosion suppressor param eters on their performance is  
evaluated, both theoretically and experim entally, and the discharge  
characteristics of explosion suppressors quantified to provide the necessary  
data to estim ate the performance of explosion suppression system s.
1 . 4 . 4 .  Suppression
The work on explosion hazard assessm ent, suppressant effectiveness, and 
suppressor performance establishes a foundation for the development of a 
computer model of explosion suppression. The predictions of th is model 
are compared with experimental data. The performance of different
suppressants on both gas and dust explosions is  determined experim entally
3 3in lm  and 6 .2m test v e s s e ls .
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature is  extensive, and numerous conflicting reports ex ist in 
important areas. This review provides a general introduction into explosion  
theory with particular emphasis on suppression, followed by a com prehensive 
appraisal of the literature in the four areas of explosions, suppressants, 
suppressors and suppression.
2 . 1 .  Introduction to Explosion Theory
An exothermic chem ical reaction liberates chem ical energy as heat. If the 
rate of heat release in a reaction is  greater than the rate of heat lo ss  from  
the reaction zone then an explosion can result. In the context of th is th esis , 
an explosion is  defined specifically as a freely propagating combustion wave 
through a p re-m ixed explosible fiie l/a ir  m ixture. When contained, the con­
sequence of such an explosion is  a rapid increase in pressure caused by the 
expansion of the hot combustion products* Explosions involving combustion 
(4,5) can be broadly c lassified  into two categories:- thermal explosions and 
chain reaction explosions.
2 . 1 . 1 .  Thermal Explosions
In th ese, reaction acceleration occurs only as a result of heat liberated from  
reactions. Auto-acceleration occurs because the rate of reaction of the fuel 
with the oxidant varies exponentially with tem perature, whereas heat transfer  
by conduction from the combustion zone depends linearly on tem perature.
This behaviour is  shown diagram atically below.
/
reaction rate 
Aexp AE  
RT
Heat release  vs tem per­
ature
Heat lo ss  v s  wall
tem peratur
At a wall tem perature T ,^ and heat release 4  H^, a stable combustion results  
at A . At a wall temperature T0 and heat release 4  H , a m etastable com - 
bustion results at B. The temperature T is  defined as the spontaneous 
minimum auto-ignition tem perature. At a wall tem perature T_t> T , an un-
o Z
controlled reaction (an explosion) occurs. The theory of therm al explosions 
was developed by Semenov (6). Suppression of such an explosion requires 
that the suppressant must cool the reaction zone, or dilute fuel and/or oxidant, 
or both.
2 . 1 . 2 .  Chain Reaction Explosions
Combustion reactions, once initiated, proceed by a chain reaction m echanism . 
The system  is  initiated by the generation of free radicals, which are short 
lived, highly reactive atomic or m olecular fragm ents. Each radical combines 
with a m olecule of reactant to produce a product m olecule, and another free  
radical, which then reacts with an adjacent reactant m olecule so propagating 
the chain of events. This process continues until the propagating radical is  
involved in a reaction which does not liberate a second radical (a chain 
termination step) or until reactants are consumed.
A chain reaction may include a chain branching step; th is i s  the production 
of m ore than one free radical, when a single radical reacts with a m olecule  
of reactant. If chain branching occurs, the reaction w ill accelerate until 
the reactants are consumed. The heat liberated from the rapidly increasing  
number of propagating reactions w ill further accelerate the p ro cess .
The H0/O 0 system  shown below is  an example of a branched chain reaction  
z z
which illu strates the complexity of ’sim ple’ combustion reaction system s.
2H2 + °2  2K2 °
Chain Initiation
Chain Propagation 
Chain Branching
Chain Termination
Additional reactions H +  ^ H^O + + OH
• •
which are of importance H + + N  H Q2 + N
under certain conditions HO  ^+ HgO^--------► H20  + 0 2 + OH
• •
of temperature and HOg + Hg -----------► H^Og + H
• wallpressure 2HO > H O. + Oz t1 z z zwall
2H2 ° 2 ---------------^ 2H20 + 0 2
H00 0 + N  > 2 OH + Nz z or •— > H00  + 0'+  Nz
(N -  inert catalytic m olecule)
H2 + °2  
H2 + °2  
H2 + °2
OH + H,
H + O,
i
o*+ H,
-> H2 o  + o* 
- > 26h
■> H + HO,
-» H O + H
Z
-» OH + o*
OH + H
H + O + N —* HO + N z z
>
BRANCHED
CHAIN
REACTION
Suppression of chain reaction explosions can be achieved using an agent 
which acts as a free radical scavenger, thus inhibiting the chain propagation 
and chain branching reactions.
2 .1 .3 . Actual Explosions
Most gaseous phase explosions propagate prim arily by chain reaction mechan­
ism s although thermal effects are important, whereas dust explosions are
thought to be thermally controlled. In dust explosions, the combustion of the 
particulates may occur via chain reaction m echanism s, but the transfer of 
energy across the inter-particle voids is  typically therm ally controlled.
Hence actual explosions cannot be categorised sim ply, and this must be taken 
into account when considering explosion suppression.
For a given system , the energy to activate the reaction AE and the therm al 
energy released A H can be represented as shown below:
activated com plex
Energy
AE
reactants
<—  stable p roducts
 *
Extent of reaction'
The thermodynamic param eter, A H , is  a m easure of the available chem ical 
energy which will be liberated during combustion but the reaction w ill not 
occur unless the system  is  activated with an energy source greater than 
A E . Systems with high activation energies, require energetic ignition 
sources to initiate an explosion. The thermodynamics of the reacting system  
define the energy released in an explosion, but the rate of propagation of the 
explosion is  determined by the physical and chem ical kinetics of the reacting 
system .
2 . 2 .  Explosions
2 . 2 . 1 .  Theory of Explosion P ressure Development
Campbell (7) demonstrated that it was possible to relate the burning velocity  
of a fu el/a ir  mixture to the rate of production of gaseous reaction products 
by combining an elem entary thermodynamic analysis with the velocity  
relationships at the combustion zone boundary. For a sphere with central 
ignition, he showed that the m ass fraction burned is  proportional to the cube 
of the elapsed tim e after the onset of combustion.
A detailed mathematical m odel of explosion development in a quiescent 
fu el/a ir  mixture was proposed by Nagy et a l. (8,9).  Both isotherm al and 
adiabatic conditions were considered. The model assum ed central ignition 
of the homogeneous fu el/a ir  m ixture. The explosion was considered to 
develop as a thin flame front, which represents the boundary between burned 
and unburned zones, and the pressure was assum ed uniform throughout the 
v e sse l. The isotherm al model assumed that the unburned and burned gas 
tem peratures, Tq and T^, remain essentially  constant, and resulted in an 
expression for the rate of pressure r ise , dP /dt, a s  a function of the in itial, 
P^, and maximum, P ^ , p ressu res and the fundamental burning velocity S^:
Extension of the model to adiabatic conditions required the introduction of a
factor which correlates S with P . Such an adiabatic m odel of explosionu
pressure development resulted in better agreem ent with experim ent than 
the isotherm al model, but its  increased complexity lim ited its  applicability 
to w ell documented fu el/a ir  system s. There are several other sim ilar  
treatm ents of explosion development which are applicable to the initial
-----------  Consequences of a secondary
PLATE I: dust explosion-5 lives lost
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stages of explosion development where pressure can be assum ed constant 
throughout the burned and unburned regions (4 ,10-12). One analysis (12) 
rem oves the requirement for an expression of the rate of flam e spread 
and g ives an equation which relates the pressure ratio in the explosion with 
the flam e radius. More detailed theoretical treatm ents of explosion  
development have led to m odels which provide the foundation for the-complete 
explosion history of a spatially homogeneous adiabatic system  (13,14). 
However, their general applicability is  lim ited because detailed experim ental 
data are not available for m ost fu el/a ir  system s.
Turbulence was shown to have a major influence on the explosion severity  
of a combustible fu el/a ir  mixture (15-17), but the mechanism by which 
turbulence significantly increases the rate of flam e propagation has not been 
fully elucidated. How (18) considered that the increased burning rates ob­
served in turbulent combustion system s involving particulate fuels are due 
to rapid mixing by eddy diffusion, and that the magnitude of the fluctuating 
velocity controlled the flame speed. Andrews et a l. (19) reviewed the 
theories of turbulence and concluded that the turbulent Reynolds number,
R  ^ ; of a combustible mixture is  an important controlling param eter in 
turbulent flam e propagation. He suggested that the ratio of the turbulent
burning velocity to the laminar burning velocity was correlated with R .A
Although comprehensive treatm ents of turbulent flam e propagation have not 
been reported, particular relationships are established and form the basis  
for quantitative predictions (20). Nagy’s treatm ent (9) is  probably the 
sim p lest. He considered that turbulence d istorts the spherical shell of the 
growing fireball and results in an increased burning velocity , c£.Su , 
relative to that of quiescent conditions. \
2 . 2 . 2 .  Explosibility Scaling
The scaling of explosibility measurem ents has been largely based on a 
’cube law’ relation which is  im plicit in the theories discussed above.
Hultmann (21) and Maisey (22) recognised that in theory the maximum  
explosion pressure is  essentially  v esse l volume independent, and that the 
maximum rate of pressure r ise  can be scaled theoretically using a cube 
law relationship:
( dp\ . V ®  /dP\ . V ®  ' „  , . ..
W J  1 = (dt ) 2 = K (constant)
' ' m ax- ' ' max
JL Z
where (dP/dt) is  the maximum rate of pressure r ise  measured in
volume V- and (dP/dt) is  the maximum rate of pressure r ise  that
would result in volume V . Bartknecht and Scholl (23-26) demonstrated
experim entally that this relation is  valid for gas explosions in volumes 
3 3ranging from 1 dm to 20m , and for dust explosions in volumes ranging 
3 3from lm  to 60m . However, these authors argue that dust explosibility
3m easurem ents in volumes le ss  than lm  give an underestimate of the 
actual explosion severity. Furthermore, work by Heinrich (27,28) suggested  
that in practice the measured final explosion pressure of dust explosions in 
sm all volum es is  lower than that measured in larger volum es.
2 . 2 . 3 .  Dust Explosion Propagation
Many factors govern the propagation of flame in d u st/a ir  suspensions (29) .
No comprehensive investigation into the relative importance of, and inter­
actions between, these factors has been reported; such evidence that ex ists  
i s  fragmentary and specific to particular dusts and experimental procedures. 
In consequence interpretation of data is  confused and there is  currently no 
unified understanding of combustion wave propagation in a dust/air suspension.
A com prehensive review of dust fire and explosion phenomena was published 
by Palm er in 1973 (30). The factors that influence flame propagation in a 
dust cloud were identified as:
(i) composition of dust and im purities;
(ii) homogeneity, mobility and turbulence of dust suspension;
(iii) concentration;
(iv) particle s ize  and particle shape distributions;
(v) ambient temperature;'
(vi) ambient pressure;
(vii) presence of inert and diluent gases;
(viii) m oisture content of particulates;
(ix) presence of flammable gases and volatile species;
(x) the size  and shape of the combustion chamber;
(xi) the nature and location of the ignition source.
The influence of both dust concentration and particle size  on the resultant 
explosibility of specific dusts, particularly coal, is  reported extensively  
(31-37). A definite lower explosibility lim it (LEL) can be specified for a 
dust. A s the dust concentration is  increased above the LEL, the flame 
velocity increases to a broad maximum and subsequently d ecreases as the 
upper concentration lim it is  approached. The maximum flame velocity  
m easured in du st/a ir  suspensions usually occurs w ell above the stoichio­
m etric concentration. There is  a general trend for the explosibility of a 
dust to increase with decreasing particle s iz e . However, an optimum 
particle s ize  ex ists below which the explosion severity no longer in creases  
as the particle size  is  reduced. This can be explained by postulating that 
sm aller particles form agglom erates which behave as larger p artic les. 
Explosions develop in dusts of large particle s ize s  (typically> lOOjim) only 
at high dust concentrations where the particle-particle  separation is  
relatively sm all. The thermal m ass of a larger particle acts to inhibit the
v
propagation of a combustion wave, thereby reducing the likelihood of an 
explosion. However, it i s  not possible to predict the maximum particle  
s ize s  of specific dusts at which explosions w ill or w ill not occur.
A theoretical model was developed for the prediction of the combustion rate 
of a cloud of dust with a defined particle s ize  distribution (38,39).  The 
model was verified experim entally for anthracite, whose combustion rate is  
thought to be controlled by surface chem ical reactivity. The mechanism by 
which a flame propagates through a dust suspension has not been established  
fully. Some dusts volatilise  com pletely in the combustion zone whereas 
others partially pyrolyse*. It is  considered that heat transfer between the 
suspended particles is  of fundamental importance to the mode of flame 
propagation.
Transfer of energy from the hot combustion wave surface to cold dust 
p articles can be by conduction, convection, and/or radiation. Assuming 
that no chem ical reaction occurs ahead of the combustion wave, a therm al 
model for the propagation of an explosion has been applied to dust suspensions 
(40,41). The dust particles were considered to be heated by radiation and 
the interparticle voids by conduction. Rapid transfer of heat between the 
dust particles and a ir was assum ed, thereby giving virtual temperature 
homogeneity. This theory related the burning velocity to tem perature in a 
dust explosion, and gave higher values of burning velocity and tem perature 
than were measured experim entally. The theory was extended (42) to 
account for a finite temperature difference between the p articles and a ir , 
and to include a finite pre-ignition zone. The resultant analysis specified  
flam e development by a pair of simultaneous differential equations. Since 
th is treatment applied only to a plane wavefront propagating through a mono- 
d isperse homogeneous quiescent d u st/a ir  suspension its  predictions cannot
v
be validated. However, the analysis was extended further by Bhadori. He 
included the influence of heat generated in the chem ical reaction (43,44).
It was found that experim ental data reported by Howard (45) agreed w ell 
with Bhadori's predictions for coal dust. C assel (46) has shown that 
radiative transfer of energy in dust flam es is  considerable, and Singer (47) 
has predicted the degree of radiant heating of coal dust particles ahead of 
the combustion wave from a numerical solution of approximate equations.
The influence of radiative transfer is  important to the course of a dust 
explosion.
The presence of inert particulates in a dust suspension was shown to reduce 
the burning velocity of the dust (48). Palm er (49,50) concluded that these  
inerts partially quench the combustion wave. He proposed a sim ple heat 
balance equation which enabled the amount of inert dust necessary  to prevent 
flam e propagation to be calculated. The validity of this approach supports 
the contention that flame propagation through a dust cloud is  therm ally  
controlled.
The criterion for ignition of dust suspensions is  defined by a therm al ignition 
theory (51-54). For a m onodisperse homogeneous system , the critica l 
condition for ignition was derived. The size  and energy density of a minimum  
ignition kernel for flam e propagation away from the ignition source was 
established. The minimum ignition temperature was predicted to increase  
with particle size  but to decrease with increasing dust concentration. The 
minimum ignition energies of dusts vary from 0.5m J to lOkJ (55). Pellm ont 
(56) has recently found that about 30% of dusts he tested have minimum  
ignition energies below lOmJ. The combustion of individual p articles and 
droplets has been considered by many workers (20,57-63).  For particulate 
combustion the first stage is  radiant heating, em ission and combustion of
volatiles, and the second stage is  combustion of the solid residues. In the 
fir st stage, the particle is  considered to be surrounded by a concentric 
diffusion flame and the rate controlling process is  the diffusion of oxygen 
against the counterflow of combustion products. In the second stage, 
combustion is  a reaction at the solid surface of the residue. This involves 
the following steps, any of which may be rate controlling:
(i) t'he transport of oxygen to the surface against the counterflow  
of combustion products;
(ii) chem ical reaction at the particle surface, governed either by 
the involved chem ical process or by adsorption kinetics;
(iii) transport of combustion products away from the surface.
The extent to which the two stages occur is  specific to the m aterial com­
position of the particle and to its  area/volum e ratio.
Although a basis for a theoretical understanding of gas explosions e x ists , the 
inherent problem with dust explosions is  that they involve the combustion of 
' a large number of particles which interact with each other. If the particular 
m echanism of flam e propagation could be established with reasonable certain­
ty for a specific dust then a theoretical analysis may be possib le and u s e f u l , 
for that dust type. However, its  usefulness w ill fall a long way short of 
describing a ’real dust explosion’ where the dust particles are of random 
geom etry, inhomogenously distributed, and subject to turbulence. Experi­
mental evidence of anomalous effects such as fragmentation of burning 
particles leading to burning solid or vapour being projected ahead of the 
combustion zone (64), further confounds fundamental modelling of explosion  
propagation in dust suspensions.
2 . 2 . 4 .  Dust Explosibility Measurement
The literature on the importance of dust explosibility characterisation is  
extensive (65-85).  The explosibility param eters m easured for dusts are:
(i) minimum ignition temperature;
(ii) minimum explosible concentration;
(iii) maximum explosion pressure , P ;max
(iv) maximum rate of pressure r ise ,
(v) minimum ignition energy;
(vi) maximum perm issib le oxygen concentration to prevent ignition.
The Hartmann vertical tube apparatus (86) was developed for dust explosibility  
m easurem ent. In the United Kingdom, this apparatus has been the accepted 
m eans for explosible dust hazard assessm ent (65), and Hartmann data have 
formed the basis for the design of active explosion protection m easures. 
D etails of this standard test have been published by the F ire R esearch Station 
(87-89) and the US Bureau of Mines (90). Modifications to the basic design  
w ere reported by other workers (91,92); however, the standard test is  
currently recognised by HM Factory Inspectorate as suitable for dust explos­
ib ility  determ inations.
The suitability of the Hartmann apparatus for meaningful dust explosibility  
m easurem ent was questioned by Bartknecht (23,24).  He showed that, in 
the sm all volume of this test apparatus, a considerable underestim ate of 
(dp/dt) was obtained and that scaling of test resu lts to larger volum es 
was not reliab le. Bartknecht proposed a lm  explosion te st apparatus, al­
though this was no longer a laboratory te st, and was thus very expensive.
A ll dust explosion test procedures require the formation of dust suspensions 
in closed  v e ss e ls . Alternative methods of generating an effective dust 
suspension have been reported by Brown (93-95). Most test procedures 
d isperse or eject the dust into the explosion v e sse l using com pressed a ir . 
Ishihama(96) described a novel technique for dust dispersion in a 10 litre  
cylindrical test apparatus using the ’ball m ill' principle.
The various alternative experimental test methods used to quantify dust 
explosibility have been reviewed (97). Beck (98) has summarised recently  
the current status of te st methods in the Federal Republic of Germany. He
states that in view of the difficulties in interpreting Hartmann test results
3 3a ll dusts must be evaluated in volum es ^  lm  . A standard lm  test
apparatus and test procedure has evolved in Germany (99) and is  now
accepted throughout Central Europe. Eckhoff (100,101) suggested that one
significant reason for the lower dust explosib ilities measured in the
Hartmann apparatus could be the lower turbulence lev e ls , and argued that it
would be advantageous to retain this apparatus as a standard because it was
widely available and economic to u se . He quantified the statistical scatter
of Hartmann data and established em pirical relations between recorded dust
explosibility and the physical and chem ical properties of a group of dusts.
Burgoyne (102) a lso  supported the retention of the Hartmann test procedure,
in the absence of a better laboratory scale te st method.
The fundamental lim itations of the Hartmann te s t  apparatus are appraised
in this th esis , the author (103) has demonstrated the suitability of an
alternative 43dm spherical test apparatus using a d iscrete  ignition procedure.
Lutoff (104) had described spherical explosion test apparatus a lso , but ex-
3
plosib ility  data commensurate with those achieved in volum es ^ lm  w ere not
3
dem onstrated. Bartknecht (105) and Siwek (106) have described a 20dm
spherical test apparatus that produced scalable dust explosibility data.
Spherical test apparatus are gaining a m easure of acceptance as alternatives
to the Hartmann apparatus (107). The question of standard dust explosibility
m easurem ents has been reviewed by ISO/TC21/SC5/WG3. It is  proposed  
3(1) that the lm  apparatus should be the accepted norm against which other
test apparatus must be compared. Hence laboratory testing of dusts in the 
3 320dm and 43dm apparatus, for example, w ill be acceptable; but the 
Hartmann test method w ill be rejected.
2 . 2 . 5 .  Explosion T est R esults
Reported explosibility data for gases and dusts which were pertinent to this 
research are listed in this section (108).
2 . 2 . 5 . 1 .  Gas Explosibility Data
Table 2 .1 .  presents the explosibility data of som e quiescent flammable g a s /  
a ir m ixtures.
FUEL VOLUME
3m
CONCENTRATION
vol%
Pmax
MPa
<d p /d tW
MPa m s " 1
1
K
MPa m s"1
1 10 0.75 5 .5 5 .5
CH4 1 9 0.73 5 .3 5 .3
0.001 4 0.70 7.2 7 ,2
C0H0
.11 4 0.70 7 .5 7 .5
3 8 20 4 0.70 2.7 7 .3
1 4 0 . 7 0 7.2 7 .2
70/30 CH4/H 2 1 15 0.70 8 .6 8 .6
Town Gas 1 25 0.73 .14.0 14.0
H2 1 35 0-70
50.4 50 .4
TABLE 2 .1
2 . 2 . 5 . 2 .  Dust Explosibility Data 
3Table 2 .2 .  presents lm  explosibility data of a range of industrial dusts.
FUEL DUST Pmax
MPa
K
MPa m s”1
PVC (particle s ize  ^ l ^ m ) 0.85 5 .0
Sugar , 0.80 8.0
Coal 0.77 8.5
Polythene (particle size  'vSO/im) 0.92 11.5
Starch 0.94 13.6
Polythene (particle size  ^  lOjim) 0.92 15.0
Cellulose 1.00 16 .0
Dextrin 0.87. 20 .0
Organic pigment 1.00 28 .6
Aluminium 1.15 55.4
TABLE 2 .2 .
The turbulent dust explosibility data cover a sim ilar range of K values to
those found for quiescent flammable g a s /a ir  m ixtures. The German VDI
3(99) provides for a classification  of dust explosion hazard based on lm  
explosibility data:
EXPLOSION CLASS K (MPa m s”1)
St 1 0 to 20 .0
St 2 20.0  to 30 .0
St 3 3 0 . 0 - *
It is  considered generally that explosion suppression can be only applied to 
St 1 and St 2 dusts. The author (109) has appraised the problem of dust 
explosion hazard assessm ent, and concludes that an explosibility m easure­
ment is  only one step towards hazard assessm ent, and that industrial 
processing conditions must be appraised in order that a m ore meaningful 
estim ate of the explosion hazard of the worst case explosion in an industrial 
application can be made. This is  discussed in m ore detail in section 6 . 1 . 5 .
2 .3 .  Explosion Suppressants
Literature pertaining to the suppression and extinguishment of flame was 
extensively reviewed by Fristrom  (110) in 1967 (196 references) who surmised, 
that despite the effort and ingenuity that had gone into research of th is area, a 
basic understanding of the action of suppressants was s till in its  formative 
stage. McHale (111) has published a survey of vapour phase chem ical agents 
used for suppression of flam e, which follows previous reviews by Friedman 
(112) and Skinner (113).
2 . 3 . 1 .  Modes of Suppression 
The action of suppressants can effect one, or m ore, of the following:
FUEL:- The fuel concentration can be lowered by dilution or
smothering, or alternatively it can be increased such 
that fuel rich conditions are approached.
The supply of oxygen to the combustion zone can be 
reduced by inerting, blanketing or smothering.
The transfer of therm al energy can be reduced by 
insulation or cooling. x
The rate of reaction can be reduced by the presence  
of chemical inhibitors.
OXIDANT:-
- TEMPERATURE:-
COMBUSTION ... 
PROCESS:-
Thus physical m echanism s of suppression include separation of fuel and 
oxidant, dilution or enrichment of the explosible fuel concentration, and 
heat abstraction. Chemical mechanisms of suppression involve interference 
in the combustion reactions. Typically, sm aller quantities of chemically 
active explosion suppressants are required, compared to physically active 
suppressants. Considerable controversy ex ists  regarding the relative 
contributions of physical and chem ical effects to the overall action of specific  
suppressants.
2 . 3 . 2 .  Halogenated Hydrocarbons (Halons)
Halons are used widely to inhibit and suppress combustion. The required 
minimum inhibiting concentration of various Halons are reported (114-120). 
The toxicity of unpyrolysed Halons has been the cause of much debate 
(121-123). The effectiveness and toxicity of some Halons are compared with 
a common inertisation agent, carbon dioxide, in Table 2 .3 .
SUPPBESSANT INHIBITING CONC. 
Vol %
............ . ........ -.......... -.....
TOXIC CONC. 
(onset of neurosis or cramp) 
Vol %
Carbon dioxide C°2  _ 30 10-13
Halon 1011 CC1 Br H2 8 0 .3
Halon 1202 CF2 Br2 4 1 .5
Halon 1211 CF2 Br Cl 4-6 5 .5
Halon 1301 CF3 Br 3-6 5-8
Halon 2402 C2 F4 Br2 .1-2
1 .4
TABLE 2 .3
Halons act on the body prim arily as anaesthetics, although some irreversib le  
effects have been identified with certain agents.
From studies of the effectiveness of Halons as inhibitors of combustion 
(124 -  127) certain general features are noted:
(i) Halons containing Br and I are m ore effective than those 
containing F and Cl;
(ii) the presence of one atom of active halogen in a compound 
gives a marked increase in extinguishing effectiveness over 
a sim ilar compound which contains none of that halogen. 
Adding a second atom of the sam e halogen produces only a 
marginal increase in effectiveness;
(iii) Halons are le s s  effective inhibitors when added to the fuel 
side of the flame;
(iv) the effectiveness of a Halon is  dependent on the fuel type 
and the Halon temperature.
2 . 3 . 2 . 1 .  Chemical Mechanisms
Most research has concentrated on comparative evaluations of the effective­
ness of the various Halons. Measurements of ignition lim its, flam e blow 
off lim its , and depression of burning velocity in the presence of low Halon 
concentrations have formed the basis of such studies.
Biordi’s detailed investigation of flame structure (128 -  131) indicate that 
inhibition is  a chem ical effect. Consider the introduction of an organic 
halide RX into the flame reaction zone. The following two reactions occur 
to different degrees:-
pyrolysis ■ •RX —^ ---- ---------»> R + X
H + RX — —— R + HX
Most opinion (132-140) supports a mechanism which involves the efficient 
competition of reactions such as:
H + RX 
H + HX
with the chain branching reaction:
H + 0   > OH + 0#
Creitz (141) considered that Halons inhibit combustion by promoting recom ­
bination of reactive oxygen, but this hypothesis is  largely disproved by 
Biordi’s (138) work.
Wilson et a l. (142,143) have demonstrated that the primary reaction zone of 
an inhibited flame is  narrower and hotter than an uninhibited flam e. The im ­
portant inhibition reactions are considered to occur in the cool part of the 
flam e prior to the primary combustion zone. Inhibition reactions have low er  
activation energies than the chain branching reactions and can effectively  
compete with the latter in the cooler portion of the flam e. However, at 
higher tem peratures the chain branching reactions w ill dominate resulting  
in rapid increase in radical concentrations. This interpretation suggests 
that:
(i) it is  necessary to get the Halon suppressant into the pre-flam e  
area;
(ii) the Halon must be sufficiently stable such that it acts faster  
than it decom poses.
+ R + HX
* h2 + x
It is  possible that agent decomposition can explain the known failure of Halon 
to extinguish 'deep seated’ fires although Fielding et. al (144) considered  
that this occurs because the Halon, whilst inhibiting the gas phase reaction, 
does not inhibit the g a s/so lid  reactions C —> CO, CO^within the solid residue. 
Such reactions act to rekindle the combustion as the local Halon concentration 
d ecreases.
Fristrom  proposed that a chem ical inhibition param eter, J  (110), should be 
used to enable com parisons between the various experimental test m ethods. 
For burning velocity (S ) m easurem ents it is  defined as:
[°2j g S u
[Halon] S^
where r ° j = oxygen concentration and jHalonJ= Halon concentration.
Inhibition effectiveness has been correlated with halogen content (134) and 
Fristrom  (145) has recently shown that it is  generally an additive function of 
the atomic composition of inhibitors:
X “**X
Since neither equilibrium, nor partial equilibrium changes in radical con­
centration and temperature were large enough to account for the effects of 
chem ical inhibition, he surm ised that inhibition is  kinetically controlled, and 
developed a model whose predictions are consistent with the available inhibit­
ion data.
The question of whether charged sp ecies, known to ex ist in flam es, are im ­
portant in flame inhibition is  unanswered. Spence and McHale (146) have 
calculated that the neutral inhibition reaction rates of Halon 1301 (CF Br)
u
on CH /a ir  flam es are m ore than two orders of magnitude larger than ionic 
4
inhibition rates, which suggests that ionic inhibition is  insignificant.
A s von T igge len , points out (147) homogeneous gaseous phase inhibition of 
the type appraised above is  not only by the substitution of the more reactive  
radicals by le s s  reactive halogen atoms; but also  by heat abstraction as a 
consequence of the presence of the inhibitor in the reaction system .
2 . 3 . 2 . 2 .  Physical Mechanisms
Larsen (148,149) proposed a physical interpretation of the m echanism of 
inhibition of Halons. W hilst accepting the evidence that halogenated agents 
enter into the chem istry of combustion, Larsen contended that this chem ical 
reactivity was not the prim e mechanism of inhibition. By conversion of the 
experimental data into a ’per weight’ basis he showed that the relative  
effectiveness of halogens is  in direct proportion to their atomic weights.
He postulated that the primary role of the halogenated agents is  sim ilar to 
that of inert gases; that is  they act as diluents and heat sinks without 
participating significantly in the exothermic combustion reactions. At very  
high tem peratures, there is  evidence that Halons can act as fuels (150), and 
it is  in this role that Larsen suggests they participate in the flam e chemistry.. 
Larsen’s observations can be interpreted as evidence for the existence of a 
lim iting adiabatic flame temperature below which combustion cannot occur.
A recent investigation by Tucker et. al (151) evaluated the relative import­
ance of chem ical inhibition and physical quenching in the extinction of diffus­
ion flam es by Halon 1301 (CF Br). Their resu lts showed that chem icalO
inhibition predominates only at low concentrations (<  JVol %) and that above 
th is the Halon acts increasingly through its  contribution to the heat capacity  
of the system .
2 .3 .3 .  Powders
Powders have gained increasing acceptance as alternatives to the established  
suppressants (152-154). Typical powder suppressants are based on:
sodium bicarbonate Na H CO
potassium  bicarbonate K H CO^
sodium chloride Na Cl
potassium  chloride K Cl
mono-ammonium phosphate H POT M t
potassium  sulphate K SO
T
potassium  cryolite K A1 .Fo o
substituted urea Monnex
The effectiveness of certain powders to suppress combustion has been known 
for many y ea rs . The practice of spreading rock dust in coal mine g a ller ies  
to render coal dust non explosible is  w ell established (155). The rock dust 
acts as an inert diluent and a heat sink. Dewitte et. al (156) points out that 
the inhibition mechanism of powders can be c lassified  a lso  as physical or 
chem ical. The extent to which the inhibition is  homogeneous or heterogeneous 
i s  dependent both on the type of combustion and the mode of application of the 
powder suppressant. The suppressant particles may scavenge chain propagat­
ing species by surface adsorption or reaction, or they may vaporise in the 
combustion zone to produce gaseous products which participate in homogeneous 
inhibition reactions.
2 . 3 . 3 . 1 .  Homogeneous Suppression
E o ssser , Inami and W ise (157) considered that the mechanism of inhibition by 
alkali metal salts involves the following steps:
heating of particles by radiation and conduction; 
evaporation of particles;
decomposition or reaction of the evaporated m aterial to 
provide m etal atoms;
inhibition of combustion by the m etal atom s.
ly a , Wollowitz and Kaskan (158) reported a good correlation between the 
concentration of Na evaporated from two sa lts of various particle s iz e s , and 
the degree of inhibition. Kaskan (159) concluded from this and other work 
that such inhibition is  predominately homogeneous. Friedman and .Levi 
(160,161) showed that the presence of vapour phase elem ental Na, alone, is  
insufficient to produce a detectable effect on a CH^ diffusion flam e. They 
suggest that reaction of chain propagating species (H,0,0H) with the elem ental 
alkali m etal would proceed only by a three body collision  process:
K + OH + M -------> KOH + M
and that the reaction with the hydroxide would be favoured.
KOH + H — —» H20 + K
KOH + OH  ----- > H20 + K0
A s a rule, compounds containing potassium atoms are m ore effective than 
compounds containing sodium atom s. The suggestion that the alkali m etal 
hydroxide is  the inhibiting species explains the observation by numerous 
workers that oxygenated sa lts are more effective flam e inhibitors than non­
oxygenated sa lts, such as KCl (162). T ests by McHale (163) have shown that 
K SO , KHCO , and K C O inhibit combustion whereas KBK does not.
a  4  o  Z  a  4  .
KOH is  absent as a reaction species when KBF^ is  used to inhibit combustion;
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
thus KOH is  the logical choice as the species largely responsible for homo­
geneous inhibition.
The high efficiency of the alkali oxalates is  thought to be consequential on their  
rapid decomposition in the flam e, and subsequent creation of submicron 
alkali carbonate p artic les. Birchall (164) postulates that inhibition by alkali 
m etal salts is  homogeneous, involving the volatilisation and reaction of these  
submicron particles to produce gaseous hydroxide as the inhibiting sp ecies . 
Monnex, a substituted urea, undergoes sim ilar decrepitation as it p a sses  into 
the hot combustion zone (165) although whether inhibition by these submicron 
p articles is  homogeneous or heterogeneous has not been resolved. However, 
this agent is  claimed to be at least five tim es m ore effective than sodium  
bicarbonate.
Ammonium phosphate based powder suppressants are considered to inhibit 
via endothermic de-ammoniation and de-hydration reactions which cool.the  
combustion zone:
<NH4)2 H P 04 ----  » (N H 4 ) H2 P 04 +  N H gt
NH4 H2 P° 4 ------------   H3 P04 + NH3t
.  2h 3 p o 4----------- ----- - -- - - h 4 p 2 o ?  +  h 2oT
2HP0--------------- -------- :— P„ 0C + II„0t
Such agents can also  act as chemical inhibitors:
2 . 3 . 3 . 2 .  Heterogeneous Suppression
Dolan et-al .  (165) showed that there was a direct relation between suppression  
efficiency and the surface area of powder suppressants, using CH^/air flam es, 
and thus concluded that chem ical specificity and specific surface determine 
the effectiveness of powder suppressants. If the powder p articles are 
sufficiently sm all, or exhibit a large specific surface they effect efficient 
heat abstraction. This conclusion was supported by Inami and W ise (166). 
Laffitte et a l. (167) have evaluated the inhibition effectiveness of fine powders 
against various combustion system s ranging from laminar deflagration to 
detonation. Their work indicated that there is  an optimum particle size  for 
each type of combustion.
In a comparison of different powders the cryolites Na_A1F„ and K-AIF^ wereo o o o
found to be m ost effective (168). Cryolite particles have a ragged surface 
with numerous protrusions, and the higher specific surface is  considered to 
account for the superior effectiveness of these agents. The observed influence 
of the physical characteristics of powder suppressant particles on the 
suppression effectiveness supports a significant heterogeneous m echanism .
\ Such heterogeneous suppression may be physical or chem ical.
2 . 3 . 4 .  Practical Applications
Experimental data can be m isleading if  referred to out of context, but it does 
provide a basis for adjudging the relative effectiveness of explosion suppress­
ants. Hayes (169) reported that dry powder NaHCO was about 20 tim es m ore
u
effective than Halon and Milne (170) concluded that m ost of the recognised  
powder suppressants were m ore effective, on a weight b a sis , than Halon 1301. 
Bartknecht (108) has demonstrated that Halon 1011 can make an explosion m ore 
violent if  it is  delivered late into the growing fireball.
In practice, suppressant effectiveness is  dependent on the nature of the explosion, 
the type of suppressant and the mode of application of the suppressant. Such 
factors as suppressant evaporation rate, suppressant decomposition rate, and 
thermal transfer efficiencies are dependent on the suppressor discharge  
characteristics and the residence tim e of the suppressant droplets/particles  
in the combustion zone. Hence the physical and chem ical kinetics associated  
with the suppressant mechanism(s) play an important role in the effectiveness of 
an explosion suppression system .
2 .4 .  Explosion Suppressors
An explosion suppressor is  a device designed to rapidly inject suppressant into 
an industrial plant. The following performance requirements are essentia l for 
an effective explosion suppressor:
(i) rapid activation of device (no inertia);
(ii) rapid discharge of contents;
(iii) effective suppressant throw and dispersion.
Three types of explosion suppressors have been developed: hem ispherical, 
cylindrical and high rate discharge (HRD) can isters. There is  little  published 
data on the discharge characteristics of explosion suppressors. Burgess (171) 
reports the measured spatial and temporal discharge profiles of a 76mm outlet 
diam eter high rate discharge suppressor. The performance claim s of the 
various manufacturers also  provide som e guide.
2 . 4 . 1 .  Hemispherical Suppressor
Plate Ila shows a sectioned hem ispherical type explosion suppressor which can 
deliver liquid suppressant within 2m s of activation with a discharge velocity in 
excess of 100 m s The hydraulic shock, which is  generated by an electrica lly
b) HRD Suppressor-sectioned a)Hemispherical Suppressor-
sectioned
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fired explosive charge in the centre of the liquid suppressant, 'petals' the
scored frangible dome and thrusts the suppressant into the plant. This
3type of suppressor is  marketed in capacities of 0 .5 ,  1 .0  and 5 .0  dm . It 
i s  mounted inside the plant, and is  therefore unsuited to high-temperature 
industrial p ro cesses . The hem ispherical suppressor is  exceptionally fast, 
but has a lim ited discharge range, typically fu 2 .5m .  It i s  particularly  
suited to ducting and sm all volume container applications.
2 . 4 . 2 .  Cylindrical Suppressor,
This suppressor is  based on a scored frangible cylinder which is  operated 
in a mode sim ilar to the hem ispherical suppressor. Cylindrical suppressors 
discharge a 'wall' of suppressant into the plant, and are used for specific  
applications which necessitate this particular suppressant discharge profile 
(e .g  filters and drying ovens).
2 . 4 . 3 .  High Rate Discharge (HRD) Suppressors
High rate discharge (HRD) suppressors consist of a charge of liquid or powder 
suppressant contained in cylindrical or spherical canisters under a high 
pressure (2-12 MPa) of nitrogen. The canisters are fitted with explosively  
activated or pyroteehnically activated valves. HED suppressors are marketed 
with outlet s izes  of 19mm (single and double exits) and 76mm (single ex its), 
and with suppressant capacities ranging from 3 .5  to 70kg. P late lib shows one 
of the range of 76mm outlet HRD suppressors designed for the ejection of 
liquid suppressant. A frangible disc across the outlet orifice i s  ruptured by 
the hydraulic shock generated by an electrica lly  fired detonator, and the 
suppressant is  ejected from the canister by the com pressed nitrogen. A 
'pepper pot' spreader d isperses the liquid as a fine m ist into the plant.
P late lie  shows a ruptured 76mm diam eter frangible disc .  For powder 
suppressant the disc is  replaced by a m etal plate which is  explosively cut 
using a shaped charge -  see  Plate lid .
2 .4 .4 .  Suppressor Manufacturers
There are four major manufacturers of industrial explosion suppression 
system s:
(i) Total Foerstner & Co -  BDR
(ii) Graviner Ltd -  UK
(iii) Fenwal Inc -  USA
(iv) Deugra Gmbh -  BDR
The Total Foerstner explosion suppression system s are based on double exit
(19mm diameter) HRD suppressors charged with ammonium phosphate powder
suppressant. Graviner Ltd manufacture a range of hem ispherical and HRD
suppressors charged with liquid suppressant -  water, Halon 1011 and Halon
1211. The range includes single and double exit 19mm diam eter outlet HRD
suppressors and single exit 76mm diam eter HRD suppressors. Fenwal Inc
originally manufactured Graviner type suppressors under licen se in the USA ,
and currently offer a sim ilar range of suppressors. Deugra, a subsidary of
Graviner Ltd, manufacture both double exit (19mm diameter) and single exit
*
(76mm diameter) HRD suppressors charged with ammonium phosphate powder 
suppressant.
2 .5 .  Explosion Suppression
2 . 5 . 1 .  H istorical Development of Explosion Suppression Techniques
In order to effectively suppress an explosion it is  necessary to detect the 
developing explosion very quickly and then to inject suppressant rapidly into 
the industrial plant to  suppress the enveloping fireball before destructive  
pressure is  developed in the plant. A patent by Finch (172) in 1944 envisaged
* Powder suppressant -  Furex 770
the explosion protection of grinders using photoelectric detection coupled 
with fast acting inerting and isolation. In 1948, Glendening and Maclennon 
(173) patented an explosion suppression procedure for the protection of both 
aircraft fuel tanks and industrial plant. Graviner Ltd received a develop­
ment contract in 1952 (174) and demonstrated that aircraft fuel tank explo­
sions could be suppressed effectively using either Halons or ithe fuel itse lf  
as the suppressant (175). A range of fast acting explosion suppression  
hardware was developed and was used to provide explosion protection of both 
fuel tanks and industrial plant. By 1959 (176), these system s had su ccess­
fully suppressed or controlled some 35 industrial explosions, and had there­
fore demonstrated their effectiveness and value to industry. It was estimated  
recently (177) that the current worldwide distribution of automatic explosion  
control equipment exceeds 3800 installations, of which about 30% are in the 
United Kingdom.
2 . 5 . 2 .  Principles of Explosion Protection
Manufacturing and processing industries are required (178,179) to take all 
practical steps to prevent or restrict the propagation of explosions in industrial 
plant. Where it is  not possible to prevent the formation of explosible dust or 
•vapour clouds protection m easures must be taken to m inim ise the consequence 
of an explosion incident. In principle, there are four alternative protection  
m easures (180).
1) CONTAINMENT -  Plant is  constructed such that it is  pressure
resistant to the maximum explosion p ressu re .
2) INERTING -  An inerting concentration of N^ or CO^  is  main­
tained such that explosible conditions cannot 
occur.
3) VENTING -  Weak vent panels are incorporated into the plant
w alls to relieve the explosion pressure into the 
environment.
4) SUPPRESSION— Explosion is  detected and suppressed within the
plant confines.
Venting is  the least expensive option (181), but a large safe area is  required 
adjacent to each and every vent since the full force of the explosion is  released  
into the environment. The currently accepted procedure for scaling vent areas 
is  provided by NFPA(182). Explosion suppression is  fitted when it is  
im practical or unsafe to fit vents. Inerting and containment are se lf selecting  
for certain specialised applications.
2 . 5 . 3 .  Explosion Suppression Systems
Explosion detection by radiation is  the preferred choice for solvent vapour 
and gaseous explosible hazards (183), whereas pressure detection is  the 
usual choice for dust explosion hazards, because radiation from an incipient 
explosion may be obscured by the dust cloud. Typically, threshold pressure  
detectors are used, but a ’rate of r ise ’ explosion detector is  chosen for plants 
in which the normal pressure fluctuations may tem porarily exceed the thres­
hold level at which system  activation is  required.
There are a range of explosion suppressors currently available, see  section
2 .3 .  The m ost widely used suppressant in the UK is  Halon 1011, although 
system s using Halon 1211, Halon 1301, water and ammonium phosphate 
powder suppressants are available. Descriptive details of explosion  
suppression equipment are provided by the various manufacturers, and 
numerous applications are described in the technical literature (184- 202).
2 . 5 . 4 .  Explosion Suppression Tests
Reported experimental work on explosion suppression system s divides into 
three categories:
1) Coal Mine T rials -  evaluation of the effectiveness of such
procedures against mine explosions.
2) Plant Simulation T ests -  determination of the viability of
explosion suppression m easures for 
specific industrial problem s.
3) System Efficacy T ests -  quantification of the performance lim its
of suppression system s in special test 
v e sse ls .
Since this research has concentrated on the effectiveness of explosion 
suppression m easures using hem ispherical suppressors and the single exit 
76mm diam eter HRD suppressors, test results of significance using this 
hardware are included in Appendix 1 and are reviewed, with other resu lts, 
below.
2 . 5 . 4 . 1 .  Coal Mine T ests
The major explosion hazard in coal m ines is  the ignition of methane at the 
coal cutting face,which can initiate a secondary coal dust explosion in the 
mine gallery. Krauchenko et a l. (203) recently reviewed all test data on the 
effectiveness of system s designed to suppress incipient methane explosions, 
and thus reduce the risk  of a subsequent dust explosion. This review  
indicated that powder suppressants, such as potassium  carbonate, are m ost
effective for this purpose. To suppress fully developed coal dust explosions 
in mine ga ller ies a ’triggered barrier’ explosion suppression system  has 
been developed. The propagating explosion is  sensed and a barrier of 
suppressant is  established in the mine gallery ahead of the flame front to 
inhibit the passage of the combustion wave. Triggered barriers using 
potassium  bicarbonate, ammonium phosphate and water suppressants have 
proved effective (204-207).
Rae and Thompson (208) have shown that one single exit ((76mm diametei) HRD 
suppressor charged with 1 . 75kg of Halon 1211 effectively inhibits a fully 
developed coal dust explosion in a 1 .2m  diam eter tube. T ests by Liebmann 
and Richmond (209) have shown that two such suppressors charged with water 
can contain an explosion in a mine gallery, but that potassium bicarbonate is  
not effective when discharged from such suppressors. Triggered barriers  
can provide protection against dust explosions in pipes and ducts.
2 . 5 . 4 . 2 .  Plant Simulation Experiments
The first reported tr ia ls  of explosion suppression system s refer to the
' original design aim of protecting explosions in aircraft fuel tanks (175). T ests
3with prototype 0 .5  dm hem ispherical suppressors charged with Halon 104
demonstrated that petrol vapour cloud explosions in volum es ranging from  
3 30.2m  to 2 .3m  could be effectively suppressed. The efficacy of 
explosion suppression in aircraft fuel tanks was a lso  demonstrated using 
Halon 1001, Halon 1011 and Halon 1202, although only the m ore volatile  
suppressants proved effective in low temperature tr ia ls . These early results  
provide evidence that the suppression of vapour phase explosions demands 
vapour phase inertisation of the unburned fu el/a ir  m ixture. The concept of 
aircraft fuel tank explosion protection was extended to provide protection of
3refuelling tankers of volum es up to 12.7 m . A range of cylindrical
suppressors was developed for this purpose, and their effectiveness
3 1demonstrated in a 3 .6  m v e sse l against stoichiom etric propane/air
explosions (210).
For m ost industrial applications, the effectiveness of explosion suppress­
ion m easures is  evaluated in experimental test v e sse ls  -  see  section
2 . 5 . 4 . 3 .  However, specific explosion suppression requirements have been 
evaluated using component parts of an industrial plant. Explosion 
suppression tr ia ls  on a bag filter unit (211) have shown that a m easure of 
protection is  possible with the correct choice and combination of 
explosion suppressors, although the filter bags do impede the distribution 
of suppressant. Centrifuges, like filter units, present particular
difficulties of suppressant dispersion. Containment of explosion pressure
3to below 20kPa has been demonstrated in a 0 .9  m centrifuge charged with
stoichiom etric butane/air mixture (212), and it is  accepted (213) that
explosion suppression is  one means of providing protection for centrifuges.
Explosion suppression in fluid bed driers having volum es ranging from  
3 30 .3  m to 6 .3  m has been demonstrated (214,215). T ests with the double
exit (19mm diameter) HRD suppressors, and with the single exit (76mm
3diameter) HRD suppressors in a 1 . 7 m  fluid bed drier demonstrated both 
system s to be equally effective using an ammonium phosphate powder 
suppressant. A more detailed appraisal (216) of the single exit (76 mm  
diameter) HRD suppression system  suggests that it can effectively contain 
dust explosions with an explosibility rate constant K <  30 MPa m s * in 
fluid bed d r iers. Explosion protection of flare stacks has been experiment­
ally demonstrated (217) using the principle of the triggered barrier described  
in 2 . 5 . 4 . 1 .  above. Such procedures have also  been developed and tested for 
explosion protection of ducts (218). Recent tests  indicate that large 
elevators can be adequately protected using the principle of explosion  
suppression (219).
Explosion Suppression tr ia ls  in large volum es have been lim ited. Hillerbrand
3(220) fitted ten 5 dm hem ispherical suppressors charged with Halon 1001 in 
3a 20 m room. This system  effectively suppressed a stiochiom etric propane/
+air explosion to a pressure of "lkPa using a detection pressure of 0 .8  kPa,
although the maximum recorded pressure was 6 .8  kPa as a consequence of the
final Halon vapour pressu re . Fenwal (221) have shown that methane explosions
3can be suppressed to «  0.74 kPa in an 85 m room using UV radiation detection  
3and 35 dm HRD suppressors charged with Halon 1211; it can be inferred (222)
that such a system  can be applied to aerosol filling rooms although the hazard
of such rapid suppressant release to the operators is  questionable. The US
Coastguard have evaluated explosion suppression system s in the forward
3pump .room of a tanker (223) . This 517 m room was partially filled (10% of 
total volume) with a propane/air m ixture, and it was argued that this 
represented a real test since flame propagation beyond 10% of the total volume 
would represent a failed suppression. T ests using pressure threshold 
detection (detection pressure ^ 3 . 4  kPa) failed to suppress the explosion, 
whereas effective suppression was achieved using radiation detection and 
single exit (76mm diameter) HRD suppressors charged with Halon. The 
relative effectiveness of three Halons were a ssessed  as: Halon 2402 >
Halon 1301 >  Halon 1211. Suppression of this large volume explosion was 
a lso  achieved using potassium bicarbonate, but water was found to be in­
effective.
2 . 5 . 4 . 3 .  Suppression System Efficacy T ests
The efficacy of explosion suppression m easures against dust explosions has
3 3been shown in 1 .9  m spherical (224) and 1.13 m cylindrical (225) v e sse ls
using pressure threshold detection and hem ispherical suppressors. The
original Graviner Halon explosion suppression system  was evaluated by both
+ the suppressed explosion pressure is  the maximum pressure that resu lts  
when an explosion is  effectively suppressed.
the Bundesanstalt fur Material Priifing (226) and the Physich Technish 
Bundesanstalt (227). Both testing stations concluded that, in principle, such 
m easures can provide protection against industrial explosions. The Deugra 
powder suppressant explosion suppression system s have been fully tested by 
the Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke, Dortmund (228). The efficacy of these  
system s was proven in these te s ts .
Bartknecht (23,24,108,229) has reported comprehensive determinations of
the efficacy of explosion suppression m easures against gas and dust 
3 3explosions in lm  and 20m test v e s se ls . He has reported that both the 
double outlet (19mm diameter) HRD suppression system s, and the single  
outlet (76mm diameter) HRD suppression system s can suppress gas explosion  
with explosibility ratings K < 7 .5  MPa m s *, and dust explosion with 
explosibility ratings K <  30 MPa m s *  using a specific ammonium phosphate 
powder suppressant. His tests  showed that there ex ists a wider margin of 
safety with the use of powder suppressants, as compared to that found with 
Halon suppressants. Furthermore, Bartknecht reports that m ore effective  
suppression is  achieved with a higher nitrogen propelling agent pressure in 
the HRD suppressors. A ll tests  were undertaken using relatively high 
detection pressure thresholds and Bartknecht’s criteria  of a successfu l 
suppression was a measured suppressed explosion overpressure of le s s  than 
0.1  MPa. In industrial practice, typical plant can only withstand over­
pressu res of 0.02 -  0.03 MPa without distortion and rupture.
The author has suggested (230) that the impact of Bartknecht’s thinking has 
led to two alternative philosophies of suppression system  design and 
application:
(i) strengthen all plant to withstand an overpressure of 0.1 MPa and 
fit a ’standard’ suppression system ;
, (ii) design an explosion suppression system  for each application such 
that effective suppression is  assured with all due consideration  
for processing param eters and plant component strengths.
H istorically explosion suppression system s were tested against dust explosions 
of markedly lower turbulence than is  currently the practice. The second 
philosophy of suppression system  design requires that a m ore meaningful 
assessm ent of explosion hazard should be made than that based on an un­
questioned dependence on some arbitrary test procedure * and the necessity  - 
to take account of the industrial processing conditions when designing explosion  
protection m easures is  being increasingly recognised (230 -  232).
A comparison of the relative performance of the double exit (19mm diameter) 
HRD suppression system  and the single exit (76mm diameter) HRD suppression  
system  has been completed and reported by Scholl (233) and Wiemann (234). 
They concluded that the single exit (76mm diameter) HRD suppression system  
provides a larger margin of safety for suppression system  design. Compara­
tive te s ts  on a range of powder suppressants have shown that specific brands 
of ammonium phosphate based suppressants are the m ost effective (235,236).
The recent work of ISO/TC21/SC5/WG3 (see section 1.3) has determined the 
efficacy of explosion suppression m easures based on both the double exit 
(19mm diameter) HRD suppression system  and the single exit (76mm 
diameter) HRD suppression system  against defined gas and dust explosions 
with the alternative suppressants: Halon 1011, water and ammonium  
phosphate powder (236 -  241).
3. THEORY
3 .1 .  Explosions
An objective of this study of explosions was to define an unequivocal means of
*
assessin g  an explosion‘hazard based on an explosibility measurement in a
test apparatus. Hazard assessm ent is  seen as the prediction of the pressure
*
and fireball growth characteristics of the most explosible grade and con­
centration of m aterial being processed in a particular industrial environment 
(specific conditions of tem perature, pressure, humidity, turbulence, etc).
3 . 1 . 1 .  Explosion Development
After consideration of the published theories of explosion development, see  
section 2 . 2 . 1 . ,  it was concluded that the sim ple isotherm al model proposed 
by Nagy et. al (8,9) could provide a foundation for the development of a 
mathematical model of explosion suppression.
Consider an explosion, centrally ignited and developing in a homogeneous 
fu el/a ir  mixture within a closed vesse l .  Assuming isotherm al equilibriated 
conditions, the explosion can be represented as a thin spherical combustion 
wave shell which separates the burned (b) and unburned (u) zones. At any 
tim e, t, the following quasi-static equations of state are assumed valid:
p W !Tb (1>
P V = n B T (2)u u u
- m = n M + n 'M, (3)u u b b
where m is  the total m ass of gas in the v e sse l and n and M are the number of 
m oles and the mean m olecular weight respectively. n
* The term s ’explosible’ and ’explosibility’ refer to combustible m aterials 
which are liable to explode when dispersed as a m ist or cloud in a ir . 
Explosive m aterials are specifically excluded.
The initial (o) and final (m) explosion states are therefore:
P V = H -  B T (4)o M o wu
P V = f = -  E T (5)m M, mb
' P .M, T M, Tand o _ . b __o _ _ b   u_
P “ M T M T.m u m u b
Differentiating equation (2) gives:
(6)
dV dnp   u ___  u
dt u dt
dVu -— A, dr —A, S (8)
d T  = dT =
where r is  the flame radius at tim e t, A. is  the flam e area at tim e t and Sb u
is  the fundamental burning velocity.
Note ithat the unconfined explosion flame speed is  given by:
Th
s  E S =-=r- S (9)f u T u . 7u
where E is  the thermal expansion factor of an ideal gas.
Differentiating equation (3) gives:
Adding equations (1) and (2) and differentiating gives:
dP R I d“b T, d“u T
dF  = r  '  l " d T  * b  + d r  * u
Substituting equations (6) and (10) into equation (11) gives:
dP j  R_ . / Mu T ^ u  T ,
dt I V |  M, ’ dt ’ dt ' Ui
dP = R dtlu T [1 -  ja i '  
dt V dt U * I P Oi
d P  A p s
dt P V o
The flame radius, r, can be calculated from equations (1-3) and (6)
P
3 3 1 -r  = a P
P
1 -  - 2 -  
Pm
where a is  the radius of a v e sse l of volume V
P
1  2 -
P
hence V. = Vb v P
1 -
P m
* . ■ 2 , 4  3Since A, = 4 t t  r and V, = ~  TT r b b 3
Ab = 4tt[ ” ' u l  ®
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where A is  the surface area of the test v e sse l.
Substitution of equations (14) and (15) into equation (12) yields the general 
expression:
P 32dP _ A J m 
dt u V P o f )  § P <16)
2
Note that a plot of dP/dt against (1- P q/P ) 3P should give a straight line with 
a defined slope:
p  —A -r 3m (pm - Po) "slope = Su -  - -----  (17)o
Since P , A and V are known and P can be calculated from the therm o- o m
dynamics of the system , the burning velocity, S^, can be determ ined. The
measured maximum explosion pressure, P , is  typically 10-20% lowermax
than the theoretically predicted maximum p ressu re, P f as a consequence of 
heat transfer to the test apparatus w alls.
A cpmputer programme was developed to perm it the prediction of pressure
and fireball radius as a function of time; this was for explosions of any fu e l/
a ir  mixture with defined burning velocities and theoretical maximum p ressu res
in v e sse ls  of known geom etry and working pressure P .. Since the flam e speed,
S ,^ is  slow relative to the speed of sound, pressure w ill equilibiate and the
expansion of hot gases w ill ensure that the fireball assum es the approximate
*
geom etry of the v e sse l as it grows. Hence equation (16) is  valid for both 
spherical and sm all aspect ratio v e s s e ls . For large aspect ratio v e sse ls  (ducts) 
wall quenching and pressure piling invalidates the application of the above 
arguments.
* The analysis neglects the influence of bouyancy which w ill d istort the 
fireball shape.
The assumption of isotherm aliy equilibriated conditions is  obviously not 
strictly  valid for an explosion event. However, agreement between theory 
and experiment, see section 6 .1 .6 ,  is  sufficiently good for the intended 
use of th is m odel. The extension of the above theory to incorporate adiabatic 
term s, and perturbations on the fundamental burning velocity as pressure  
in creases, may result in better agreement with experiment, but would con­
found the general applicability of the approach to essentially  undefined fu els.
1
3 . 1 . 2 .  Turbulence
Although the exact influence of turbulence on explosion propagation is  unknown, 
fu el/a ir  perturbations with velocities greater than the flame speed must 
distort the flame front, and hence increase the rate of reaction. A sim ple 
conceptual explanation is  that a turbulent burning velocity, » is  defined 
as the sum of the quiescent burning velocity and the average a ir perturb­
ation velocity S^.
<*S = S + S (18)u u g '
The turbulence factor, oC , is  an em pirical m easure of the influence of
turbulence on the course of explosion propagation and S is  a fundamental
S
turbulence param eter representing some average of the combustion wave 
perturbations.
The explosion p ressure, P , at any tim e t is  defined by the integral of 
equation (18), where is  replaced by oC S^.
Since th is simple model does not attempt to take account of the quenching
influence of the v e sse l w alls, the theoretical maximum rate of pressure
r ise , (dP/dt) occurs at P .m m
Rearrangement of equation (6) shows that the maximum explosion pressure  
should increase linearly with an increase in the initial p ressure, P ■.
M T.
p  = ^ P > .  (20)
m M, T o  v
b u
Substitution of equation (20) into equation (16) gives:
( § ) OC P Q (21)m
Hence both P and (dP/dt) are linear functions of the initial p ressure, P .m v 'm o
Published data (108) supports this theoretical prediction.
An approximate estim ate of the turbulence factor, inasmuch as it affects the 
measured explosibility param eter, an explosible fu el/a ir
mixture can be defined thus: / Turbulent conditions
f i£ .)  _L
\  d t /  Pv 'max o
T = r--------------;----- (22)
max
u I dP\ J_
V dt /  P* /  nv r
Quiescent conditions
3 . 1 .3 .  Scaling and Interpretation of Explosion Data
The explosibility of a particular m aterial i s  conventionally defined by the
*
maximum pressure, Pm ax> ant  ^ the maximum rate of pressure r ise ,
(dP/dt) , measured with the m ost explosible fu el/a ir  concentration in max
a standard test apparatus. The maximum pressure is  essentially  v e sse l  
volume independent whereas the maximum rate of pressure r ise  is  a cubic 
function of v e sse l volume, see section 2 . 2 . 2 .
i
V3 = K (23]
where K is  the explosibility rate constant. Sim ilarly, from a measurement
of the tim e., t, required to attain a certain pressure in a test volume, V,
the tim e, t , required to attain the same pressure in a volume, V , is  x x
given by :
i
V 3
t = - 2 j -  . t (24)
V 3
Equations (16), (23) and (24) are self consistent.
In practice, non-central ignition and non-spherical geom etry may result in a
lower measurement of (dP/dt) because of the increased influence ofmax
wall quenching. Multiple ignition, however, w ill result in a m ore violent 
explosion. For a defined explosion hazard in a sm all aspect ratio v e sse l, 
the early part of the pressu re/tim e characteristic is  only influenced by the 
container geom etry, whereas the later part of the p ressu re /tim e character­
istic  is  influenced also by the surface topography and thermal characteristics  
of the v e sse l w alls. From equation (16) the theoretical maximum rate of
* Note that Pmax is  conventionally recorded as gauge p ressure.
max
pressure r ise , (dP/dt)^  occurs at the maximum pressure, P ^ . The experi-
mentaly m easured maximum rate of pressure r ise , (dP/dt) , is  dependentmax
on the v e sse l wall quenching efficiency since it is  related to the absolute 
pressure at which the slope of the pressure/tim e curve is  m easured, see  
diagram below:
p  High Wall Quenching
theoretical *
dP
experimental max
t
P Low Wall Quenching
theoretical
dP
experim ental max
t
Wall quenching w ill have le ss  influence on a m ore violent explosion and m ore
influence on a le ss  violent explosion. Since a measurement of P ismax
dependent on the relative rates of thermal energy released into the system  
and absorbed by the surroundings, it is  influenced also  by the explosion 
propagation and the wall quenching efficiency.
In conclusion, it must be recognised that the conventionally measured  
explosibility param eters, ]?m ax> and, ( d P / d t ) a r e  not absolute but 
dependent on the test apparatus. For a given explosible m aterial, m ore 
meaningful explosibility param eters are the theoretical maximum explosion  
pressu re , P , and the fundamental burning velocity S^. The param eter, P ^ ,  
can be calculated from the thermodynamics of the combustion system , see  
Appendix 2, and can be determined from the early part of an experimental 
p ressu re/tim e record using equations (16) and (17). x
Turbulence has a very significant influence on explosion severity, and must 
be taken account of when scaling explosibility data from test conditions to 
environmental conditions. The argument within section 3 . 1 . 2 .  supports the 
introduction of a turbulence factor, o t ,  into the cube law:
1
where Kq is  defined as the explosibility rate constant specific to quiescent 
conditions. In practice, the turbulence factor, Tu, can be used as an 
approximation for cC .
3 . 1 . 4 .  Ignition Criteria
The criteria  for the ignition of explosible fu el/a ir  m ixtures does not form  
part of this research. It is  recognised that there ex ists a minimum size  of 
ignition kernal for combustion to be self-sustaining, and thus for explosion  
to occur, and that a minimum ignition energy can be defined for each 
explosible m aterial. The use of a high energy ignition source has the effect 
of truncating the theoretical p ressu re/tim e and fireball radius/tim e curves, 
see diagram below:
P
_  low energy ignition 
• -  high energy ignitionradius of 
ignition^  
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In a study of explosion suppression, the requirement is  for reliable  
ignition with an ignition energy which is  low relative to the explosion energy 
at detection of the incipient explosion.
3.2.  Explosion Suppressants
It is  evident from the literature, see section 2 . 3 . ,  that considerable 
controversy ex ists regarding the relative contributions of the physical and 
chem ical aspects of inhibition, suppression and extinguishment by liquid 
and powder suppressants.
In industrial applications the choice of suppressant is  influenced, not only by 
the effectiveness of the agent, but by such other factors as:
(i) toxicity;
(ii) contamination of the production line;
(iii) adverse reaction with product;
(iv) corrosiveness;
(v) post explosion inerting to restrict fire  spread
(Vi) suitability of available suppressors;
(viii) cost.
The m ost widely used explosion suppressants are Halon 1011, Halon 1211, 
water and ammonium phosphate based powders.
3 . 2 . 1 .  Halons
Figure 1 presents published (114) peak flammability concentration data 
(defined as the minimum suppressant concentration required to inhibit 
combustion), against m olecular weight for various vapour phase inhibitors in 
explosible n-heptane/air. The halogen based inhibitors have been broadly 
classified  according to the largest halogen atom present in the m olecule. It 
can be seen that:
(i) inhibition efficiency increases with m olecular weight;
(ii) compounds containing Br and I are m ore effective than 
compounds containing Cl, which are them selves m ore . 
effective than fluorocarbons and inorganic compounds;
(iii) differences between c la sses  of compounds diminish with 
increasing m olecular weight.
Figure 2 presents the same data plotted against the heat capacities (300°K) 
of the agents. The essential features of Figure 1 are reproduced which 
suggests two m echanism s of inhibition. A therm al heat sink effect, and 
superimposed over this is  a chem ical inhibition influence which is  demon­
strated by B r/I containing compounds, and to a le sse r  extent Cl containing 
compounds. Beplotting the same data as a weight percent of agent b asis , 
see Figure 3, shows that the weight effectiveness decreases with increasing  
m olecular weight; the chem ical influence of B r/I  containing compounds still 
being in evidence. This analysis supports Larsen's contention (148,149) 
that Halons act as suppressants prim arily through their contribution to the 
heat capacity of the system .
Thermal decomposition of the Halon is  a conceivable first step towards
chem ical inhibition. From the kinetics of organic halide B -X  bond fission
(139) it can be inferred that the temperature requirement for significant
Halon decomposition remote from the combustion wave exceeds the Halon
autoignition temperature in the tim e scale appropriate to explosion
suppression, see  Figure 4 . In the combustion zone Halon w ill be removed
faster by reactions with H*, OH’ , 0 0 and 6* , since activation energies are£
typically 10-20 k j, compared to ^ 300 k j for B -X  fission . Hence, therm al 
decomposition is  unlikely to be a significant factor in explosion suppression. 
An evaluation of the kinetics of chem ical inhibition of CH^/air explosions by
Halon (242) has indicated that radical generation rates exceed radical 
destruction rates by a large factor in the combustion wave. Hence the 
suppression mechanism is  not that of chemical inhibition of active radicals 
in the combustion zone, although such a mechanism is  m ore viable in the 
case  of turbulent explosions because of the increased flame area.
A ll evidence leads to the hypothesis that the suppression mechanism of 
Halons is  predominantly physical. The experimental evidence for chem ical 
inhibition is  based on quasi-static experimental methods. In practice, the 
dynamic situation of a suppressed explosion event w ill enhance the relative  
importance of thermal quenching, indeed this must be the first step when a 
cold Halon spray enters the fireball. In consequence, chem ical inhibition 
has been considered insignificant in the development of the mathematical 
model of suppression by Halons described in section 3 .4 .
The physical characteristics of some of the Halon suppressants are given in 
Table 3 .1 .  Data for water are also included in this Table.
. • Param eter Water Halon Halon Halon Halon
1011 1211 1301 2402
M olecular weight O 18 129 165 149 260
Density (kg m ) 1000 1930 1830 1570 2180
Boiling ’.temperature
t b <K) 373 341 269 215
321
Autoignition temperature T (K) CX> 760 - 980 1000 840
Heat capacity -  liquid
Gi
< v
(J g"1 K_1) :4.2 0.84 0.76 .0 .84 0.69
Heat capacity -  vapour (J g’ 1 k"1) 180. 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.59
Latent heat of vaporisation L (J g~ ) 2260 , 197 134 117 103
TABLE 3 .1 .
Since Halons can burn in air (150), their physical action as explosion  
suppressants must require that the Halon is  not heated above its  autoignition 
tem perature. The maximum heat abstraction capability of a Halon is  given 
by:
. H = C) (T -  T ) + L + e I B o'
(see section
If the fuel autoignition temperature is  below the Halon autoignition temperature, 
a lower value of heat abstraction is  attained. The relative thermal effectiveness  
of Halons 1211, 1301 and 2402, compared to Halon 1011, as suppressants of 
fuels with defined autoignition tem peratures of 500°K and 1000°K respectively  
are summarised in Table 3 .2 .
H ratio e ©= 500 K ‘ © = 1000 K
1211 : 1011 0.77 1.12
1301 : 1011 0.74 "1.15
2402 : 1011 0.70 0.93
TABLE 3 .2 .
Note that Halon 1011 is  m ost effective against fuels with low autoignition 
tem peratures, whereas Halon 1301 is  most effective against fuels with high 
autoignition tem peratures.
3 . 2 . 2 .  Water
The suppression mechanism of a water spray cloud can only be that of thermal 
quenching. Suppression is  achieved if the rate of heat abstraction by the water 
suppressant exceeds the rate of heat generated by the exothermic combustion 
reactions. Thermodynamically, water is  potentially the most effective liquid 
suppressant because of its  very high latent heat of vaporisation, L = 2260Jg S  
but in practice the physical kinetics of heat transfer reduces the relative  
effectiveness of this suppressant, see section 3 .4 .
3 . 2 . 3 .  Powders
The literature identifies the following contributory m echanism s to suppresssion  
of combustion by powders:
Physical (i) cooling of combustion products;
(ii) heat abstraction from combustion wave;
(iii) dilution and inertisation;
Chemical (i) homogeneous inhibition;
(ii) heterogeneous inhibition.
This research considers only the suppression effectiveness of a mono­
ammonium phosphate based powder suppressant (Fiirex 770). Spring (242) 
concluded from a study of the chem ical kinetics of powder suppression that 
the maximum rate of surface radical recombination is  always le s s  than the 
rate of radical generation, and it i s  therefore unlikely that a chem ical hetero­
geneous mechanism is  dominant in powder suppression. Spring (242) further 
showed that homogeneous chem ical inhibition is  even le s s  likely to contribute 
significantly to the suppression of explosions with powder . Since the inherent 
kinetic lim itations of the chem ical inhibition m echanism s are dependent on
radical generation and destruction rates, physical effects such as enhanced 
turbulence w ill not significantly affect these conclusions. The reported 
evidence (165) that the suppression effectiveness of powders is  dependent 
critically  upon the specific surface of the powder suppressant is  not 
n ecessarily  an argument for heterogeneous chem ical inhibition since heat 
transfer rates w ill be dependent on the specific surface of the suppressant 
as w ell. The mechanism by which any powder suppresses combustion, 
therefore, is  not established.
The minimum influence of the powder suppressant on a developing explosion  
must reflect its  contribution to the thermal capacity of the system . Thus, 
the mathematical model of explosion suppression described in section 3 .4  
assum es that a powder suppressant acts only as a thermal quenching agent. 
In practice, any chem ical inhibition w ill reflect an added benefit of this 
suppressant.
•
3 .3 .  Explosion Suppressors
Hemispherical and High Hate Discharge (HRD) suppressors form the basis of 
m ost explosion suppression system s. This section considers the theory of 
suppressant discharge from such units. Plate II shows exam ples of sectioned  
suppressors used with liquid suppressant.
3 . 3 . 1 .  Hemispherical Suppressors 
Consider the representation of a hem ispherical suppressor shown below:
nb. suppressor is  charged with 
liquid suppressant
scored hemisphe] 
dome
detonator
When the explosive charge of the detonator is  activated a com pression wave 
propagates through the liquid suppressant to the scored hem ispherical dom e. 
The resultant stress  concentration causes the dome to split along the scored  
lin es, and thus petal out releasing the suppressant. The hydraulic pressure  
resulting from the explosive device causes the liquid to break up into fine 
droplets as it is  propelled into the plant.
The design of a hem ispherical suppressor requires that the detonator(s) 
explosive energy should be m ore than sufficient to petal effectively the 
scored hem ispherical dome, but should not cause fragments of the dome to 
tear off as it peta ls. Therefore, hem ispherical suppressor design is  a com­
prom ise between detonator energy, mechanical properties of the scored dome, 
and suppressor s ize . A higher explosive energy is  required to discharge  
effectively suppressant from the larger hem ispherical suppressors.
3 . 3 . 2 .  High Rate Discharge (HEP) Suppressors
The construction of a cylindrical high rate discharge (HRD) suppressor is  
shown below:
.Volume V
Area A
q1 flow rate
suppressant
z
detonator q0 flow rate
diaphragm 
Area A
Volume v
spreader
Rupture of the diaphragm results in the release of the liquid suppressant, 
which is  propelled through the spreader assem bly, and thus dispersed into 
the plant. Hydraulic shock created by the detonator causes the frangible 
diaphragm to rupture. This type of suppressor is  only suitable for liquid 
suppressants. For powder suppressants the diaphragm is  opened using a 
linear shaped explosive charge which is  located around the periphery of the 
diaphragm.
The discharge characteristics of HRD type suppressors can be estimated  
using Bernouilli’s equations of fluid flow, provided that the assumptions 
im plicit in such an analysis remain valid.
Assumptions:
(i) suppressant is  frictionless;
(ii) negligible turbulence occurs during discharge and flow can 
be considered streamline;
(iii) no significant 'punch through' of the propelling agent occurs;
(iv) the dynamic behaviour of fluid flow can be considered  
identical to that in the static case , i .  e . constant head 
condition ex ists .
Assumptions (ii) and (iii), particularly, can only be considered reasonable 
for the initial stages of the discharge event. However, it is  instructive to 
progress the analysis and compare with m easurem ent.
Bernouilli's equation of stream line flow (243):
where /O is  the density of the suppressant.
since
2P_1
/<?
/O
/ °
-  gz
P i
/O
%
■+ qx ^  q2
qx ^  q. (since q2 » q x) (27)
Hence, to a first approximation, the initial discharge velocity is  given by
q l o '  (2P //o  )2, which is  independent of the outlet orifice area A . Note 2 1 2
that the ullage, v, of the spreader (and elbow where appropriate) w ill re­
sult in a corresponding reduction in P^:
N2
V Y
. V = P , (V + v) (28)
where P is  the suppressant propelling agent pressu re . Consider theMu ■
adiabatic expansion of the propelling agent as the suppressant is  discharged:
P N2 (d " Z< /  = P i  (d ” z >ii (where H = - ^ )
(d -  z /
P = P .  TT1 N2 (d -  z f (29)
Also q2 = A.
1 dz /A . . xq_ = —  * —  (A. > A_)2 A„ dt ' 1  2' (30)
Substitution of equations (29) and (30) into equation (27) gives:
dz
dt
P N2 ~ 2o) 
< °  (d -  z)
-  I
2
(31)
and the suppressant m ass discharge rate is:
dm . d z A
dt " I*0  dt 2 q2 (32)
note dependence on outlet orifice area  A .z
The area, A , is  defined as the sum of the hole areas in the spreader. Figure 
 ^ *
5 shows the theoretical and experimental depressurisation characteristics of
a 76 mm diam eter HRD suppressor with 76 mm spreader. It is  evident that the 
theoretical and experimental curves are in good agreement for discharge tim es  
le s s  than 15m s. However, beyond 70% depressurisation the theory predicts a 
m ore rapid discharge than is  experimentally observed, and the predicted 
discharge tim e is  grossly  optim istic. This discrepancy reflects the break­
down of stream line flow conditions as the discharge event p rogresses.
Figure 6 shows the corresponding theoretical and experimental m ass discharge  
characteristics, confirming that the above theory is  only valid in the early  
stages of suppressant discharge.
'• 3 . 3 . 3 .  Performance Analogues
From the results of suppressor discharge experim ents described in section
5 .3 ,  a sim ple analogue of a HRD suppressor discharge characteristic can be 
defined, see section 6 .3 .  The analogue has the form:
M ass
Discharge
Rate
and is  used as a basis for the model of suppression system  perform ance 
described in secftion 3 .4 .
* Mensuration details are described in section 4 . 3 . 3 .
3.4.  Explosion Suppression
The experimental explosion suppression work reported in the thesis has 
concentrated on the four suppressants: Halon 1011, Halon 1211, water 
and mono-ammonium phosphate powder.. The mathematical model of 
explosion suppression described below was developed to aid the design of 
suppression system s using the above suppressants. Its applicability to other 
suppressants has not been evaluated.
3 . 4 . 1 .  A Thermal Model of Suppression Effectiveness
In considering particular liquids as explosion suppressants, the first effect 
must be that of a cold finely dispersed liquid spray entering the combustion 
zone and extracting heat from the system . The observation, see  section
3 . 2 . 1 . ,  that the Halon concentration required to render a flammable vapour/ 
air mixture non-flammable is  proportional to the Halon heat capacity, can be
c -
interpreted as evidence for the existence of a limiting adiabatic flame 
temperature, below which combustion reactions cannot se lf propagate. Hence, 
a thermal model of explosion suppression would require that the suppressant 
must cool the combustion zone to below this lim iting tem perature. Note that a 
particular property of Halons is  that they w ill burn.if they are heated 
sufficiently, see 3 .2 .2 .  above, and thus w ill compete with the fuel for the 
available oxygen. Hence for explosion suppression by Halon the suppressant 
must cool the combustion zone to below the fuel or Halon autoignition 
temperature, whichever is  the lower.
This hypothesis identifies the need to deliver greater than a critica l m ass of 
suppressant into a given fireball of a developing explosion for it to be 
suppressed. The assumption im plicit within this argument is  that a ll of the 
suppressant droplets which enter the combustion zone effectively vo latilise
and attain equilibrium temperature, i . e .  the droplet residence time in the 
combustion zone is  long relative to the rate of heat transfer. Failure of 
Halon droplets to extract sufficient energy from the combustion zone w ill 
result in an unsuppressed explosion in which the Halon may participate in 
the combustion chem istry.
The fractional consumption of fuel at tim e t is  given by P -P  /P ^ - P  . Hence
the heat energy released at tim e t is:
Q p - pt .  -------- —  . Q (33)
P -  P m ' ;m o
where Q is  the total heat energy released during the explosion. The energy m
that is  consumed in cooling the combustion products to below the autoignition
temperature, T , of the fuel or of the Halon, whichever is  the low er, is  e
Q -  Q where Q„ is  the energy required to heat the system  to a tem per- m e w
ature T . Therefore the critical m ass of suppressant, M ,, required in the 
© t
fireball to  lower the temperature of the reacting system  to below T , and 
hence to quench the explosion is  given by:
Q - Q  /  P - P
Mt =  -S L h - 2 -  p - ^ V  I ™e \  m o
Q and Q are determined from the thermodynamics of the reacting system  m 0
and Hq is  the energy absorbed by the suppressant in increasing from its  
initial temperature to T^ at constant volume.
where C and C are the specific heats of liquid and gaseous phase 
1 g
suppressant respectively, L is  the latent heat of vaporisation, T
' ' o
is  the initial temperature and T is  the liquid suppressant boiling point.B
This sim ple thermal model assum es that all of the suppressant droplets 
that enter the combustion zone are usefully ’consumed’. In practice, an 
efficiency term must be introduced which is  a function of the suppressant 
evaporation rate, in the combustion zone, see section 3 .4 .4 .
3 .4 .2 .  Advanced Inerting
The thermal model described in 3 .4 .1 .  considers only the effect of a 
suppressant spray that has entered the fireball. However, suppressant in 
the unburned explosible mixture w ill have an influence on flame propagation. 
It is  apparent from the reported peak flammability data that there ex ists a 
specific suppressant concentration that w ill render a particular explosible 
mixture non-flammable. Hence a suppressant has two effects, each of 
which must be satisfied if  successful explosion suppression is  to be achieved
(i) extraction of thermal energy from the burned volume as  
described in 3 . 4 . 1 .  above;
(ii) advanced inerting, in which sufficient suppressant surrounds 
the combustion wave and inhibits further flame propagation.
Advanced inerting can be chem ical or therm al, however, m ost evidence 
indicates that the predominant mechanism with both liquid and powder 
suppressants is  thermal.
3 . 4 . 2 . 1 .  Gaseous Phase Combustion
For a gaseous explosible mixture advanced inerting can only be effective if  
the suppressant exists in the vapour phase as a homogeneous mixture with 
the unburned explosible constituents. Consider a combustion wave of radius
propagation, albeit mom em tarily, can be calculated assuming that the vapour 
phase suppressant has only to inhibit combustion at the combustion wave 
surface, but not extract energy from the burned volum e.
w here. H i s  th e  heat, ahst.ra.et/ion ean ah ilit.v  o f  th e  sn n n ressa n t. v a n o n r  and
unburned explosible m ixture. Calculations indicate evaporation rates of
respectively, when discharged into the unburned m ixture, see Appendix 3. 
These calculations take account of the droplet size  "distribution of the 
suppressant spray discharge and forced convection, which results from the 
high discharge velocity of explosion suppressors.
3 . 4 . 2 . 2 .  Particulate Combustion
Flam e propagation in m ost two phase du st/a ir  explosible m ixtures is  
dependent upon heat transfer between dust partic les. Inerting is  effected by 
both the liquid droplets/powder particles and the gaseous phase suppressant 
in the unburned explosible m ixture. The liquid droplets/powder p articles  
interfere with the propagation of the combustion wave because the dispersed  
droplets/particles, which are of sim ilar s ize  to the dust p artic les, occupy
r and thickness Sr. The m ass of suppressant required to inhibit flame
4frr^ Sr  
4 /3  TTr3
(36)
V represents the proportion of liquid phase suppressant evaporated in the
^  1.5% and -v 0.1% per 5ms for Halon 1011 and water suppressants
interstitial positions between particles in the dust cloud. Hence, they inter­
fere with the mechanism of flame propagation by absorbing energy from the 
combustion wave. Furthermore liquid suppressants may wet significantly 
the dust particles, and thus increase the requirement for thermal energy 
transfer, if  a combustion wave is  to be sustained. In a ll particulate combus­
tion, where the mechanism of flame propagation is  by heat transfer across  
the interparticle voids, the limiting condition for suppression is  defined by 
equation 34.
3 . 4 . 3 .  Development of a Mathematical Model
The thermal model of suppression described above identifies both heat 
abstraction from the combustion zone and advanced inerting as complement­
ary m echanism s of suppression. In fact, effective explosion suppression  
demands both sufficient heat abstraction and advanced inerting. In the absence 
of inerting, the explosion pressure w ill be reduced by the cooling of the 
gaseous products of combustion behind the combustion wave, but the flame 
w ill not be extinguished. If heat abstraction from the fireball is  insufficient, 
the effectiveness of any inerting suppressant concentration is  reduced and 
combustion may not be extinguished; higher inerting concentrations are  
required at elevated temperatures and p ressu res. In the particular case of 
Halon suppression this can result in complete failure to contain the explosion  
because the Halon c a n ’burn’.
A mathematical model of suppression has been developed, based on the
theory described in 3 .4 .1 .  and 3 . 4 . 2 .  above. It uses a suppressant constant
M as the basis for suppression criterion. For a given system , both heat
abstraction and advanced inerting efficiencies can be compared on the basis
-3of the concentration of suppressant, in kg m , required to contain effectively
a defined combustion wave of surface area A, and volume V .
b  b
M (thermal) (37)
M (inerting)
Q -  © 
m &
H
e(g) b
(38)
The larger the numerical value of M, the le ss  effective is  the chosen 
suppressant. Hence, for the given system , the larger value of M(thermal) 
or M(inerting) is  used in the model since this larger value represents the 
lim it of suppression effectiveness. Note that ^  , A^ and are all 
functions of p ressure. The pressu re/tim e curve of an unsuppressed  
explosion of a specific explosible mixture in a defined volume can be 
calculated from equation (19). Hence the m ass requirement of suppressant
as a function of tim e, M^ . is  given by:
P -  P
Mj. = M (thermal)
= M (inerting)
P -  P m o
P -  P o
P -  P m o
M(thermal) ^  M(inerting)
(39)
M (inerting)> M(thermal)
(40)
Superposition of the suppressant discharge characteristic onto the suppress­
ant requirement characteristic enables the suppressed explosion tim e, tp g jy
and hence the suppressed explosion p ressure, P——^ , to be estim ated. ItRFD
is  possib le to envisage three alternative outcomes from such an analysis, 
see  diagram below.
M Reliable Suppression M ., Unreliable Suppression M Failed Suppression
t* - tr* t
delivered
required
ttt
A failed suppression w ill be predicted, if  the suppressant is  delivered into 
the fireball too late, too slowly, or in insufficient quantity. These three 
inodes of failure are illustrated below:
TTOO SLOW'M Mt t
required
delivered
’INSUFFICIENTMt
Note that the above analysis.refers to the conditions prevailing within and 
at the surface of the fireball. The suppressant delivery characteristic of 
each type of explosion suppressor is  defined by its  theoretical analogue, 
see  section 3 . 3 . 3 .  However, the m ass influx of suppressant into the grow­
ing fireball is  dependent on fireball location and its  capture cross-section  
in relation to the suppressor(s) location(s). In real situations, the loca­
tion of a developing explosion is  unknown. A lso m ost explosions are 
turbulent, localised air flow velocities exceed the flam e speed and the 
calculated fireball radius has no direct physical significance.
Since the prim e objective of developing a mathematical model of suppress­
ion effectiveness is  to provide a ’tool’ to a ss is t  in the design of explosion 
suppression system s, the model must relate to the real industrial problem . 
A propagating explosion ex ists at some location within the defined volum e, 
either, as a fireball or as tongues of flame propagating away from the 
source of ignition. The suppressant m ass requirement can be redefined 
so that the total suppressant concentration within the container is  such that 
the critical m ass requirement M^_, is  available at the combustion zone -  
see  below:
^  V_ / f  Required suppressant
t * concentration = M. . —
1 b
This assum es that the suppressant is  effectively and evenly dispersed  
throughout the total container volume.
3 . 4 . 4 .  The Model
The values of the suppressant constants, M(thermal) and M(inerting), are  
calculated. The value of is  chosen as that corresponding to the detection  
pressure P ■, see Appendix 3. This choice of H w ill result in a sm all 
underestimate of the effectiveness of the suppressant as an advanced inert­
ing agent. The largest value of ]y[(thermal) or M(inerting) is  assigned as  
the suppressant constant M in the model.
Figure 7 shows a nomogram which outlines the log istics of this model of
3explosion suppression for a specific suppression system  (V = 1 m , one 3 
3dm capacity HRD suppressor). The pressu re/tim e curve of an unsuppress­
ed explosion of the specific explosible mixture in the defined volume is  
calculated from equation (19). The suppressant m ass requirement in the
\  ■ <V °’> <41>m o b
The detection pressure of the explosion suppression system , P ^ , defines
a corresponding tim e from ignition, t . However, since pressure equal-
-1is e s  at the speed of sound (330m s ) a sm all delay w ill occur between the 
attainment of the pressure P^ at the combustion wave surface and detect­
ion of this pressure at the v e sse l w all. This delay, t^ , is  estim ated by:
at = --------  \fr 330
where a is  the nominal radius of the v e sse l in m etres. Hence, in effect, 
the explosion is  detected after tim e = *A + V  *
volume V is  given by:
VM, . -  = M.
1 Vb
The discharge characteristic of each suppressor in the explosion suppression  
installation being modelled is  defined by its  corresponding theoretical 
analogue, see section 3 . 3 . 3 .  For multiple suppressor system s, the discharge 
characteristics are considered additive on their appropriate tim e b ases.
Suppressant arrives at the spreader(s) after tim e interval, t (see Figure 7).Jd
The tim e interval, t . , is  defined as the tim e necessary for the fireball to 
be completely enveloped in suppressant, and is  determined from the approp­
riate suppressor discharge characteristics as follows:
(i) for experim ents, in which central ignition of quiescent
explosible m ixtures is  assum ed, t ■ is  determined by
superposition of the suppressant discharge characteristic
onto the fireball growth characteristic as shown in the
example of Figure 7. Here, t , is  defined as the tim ec
taken for the front lobe of the suppressant to reach the 
extrem ity of the fireball surface ;
(ii) for experim ents and applications using only a single
suppressor involving turbulent explosions and/or non -
central ignition t is  defined as the tim e interval necessay  c
for the suppressant front lobe to reach the extrem ity of the 
container;
. (iii) for experiments and applications in which two or m ore
suppressors are fitted to the container, and turbulent 
explosions are assum ed, t Q is  defined as the tim e interval 
necessary for the suppressant front lobe to reach the 
geom etric centre of the container. (Note that criterion (ii) 
is  applied if  all suppressors are located on only one side 
of the container).
Hence, the tim e at which the suppressant is  assumed to have started just 
to influence the growing fireball in this model is  given by t^ + + t + t^ .
This worst case tim e is  taken as the starting tim e for the m ass influx of 
suppressant into the combustion zone. The intersection of the suppressor(s) 
m ass discharge characteristic with the calculated suppressant m ass require­
ment characteristic, as determined by equation 41, defines a suppressed 
explosion tim e, t , and hence the suppressed explosion p ressure, P ,
X V  XV
for the system . ( "
/  -
This quasistatic thermodynamic model takes no account of the physical 
kinetics of the explosion suppression event. It contains the im plicit assump­
tion that the rate of thermal transfer of energy as the liquid suppressant 
droplets penetrate the fireball is  fast, relative to the suppressed explosion 
event. Droplet vaporisation rates, based on the theoretical droplet s ize  
distribution of standard HRD suppressors, determine the suppressant thermal 
transfer efficiency see Appendix 3. increases with increasing v e sse l  
volume because of the increased residence tim e of suppressant droplets in 
the combustion zone. Increased suppressant discharge velocity ( i . e .  higher 
suppressant propelling agent pressure) has only a sm all influence on /  
because the increase in evaporation rate which results from the higher 
level of forced convection is  offset by the reduced residence tim e in the
combustion zone. Typical thermal transfer efficiencies of Halon 1011 and
3water suppressant in a lm  container are 90% and 50% respectively.
The effective suppressor discharge characteristic, as defined by the 
suppressor theoretical analogue , see section 3 . 3 . 3 ,  i s  attenuated by the 
calculated thermal transfer efficiency / ,  Droplet vaporisation rate is  
considered to be the rate determining step in the kinetics of the action of 
liquid suppressants, and therefore a ’worst c a se ’ prediction of suppression  
system  effectiveness must include a meaningful estim ate of the therm al 
transfer e f f ic ie n c y ,/ ' , for the system  in question.
To facilitate a routine evaluation of suppression system  applications, this 
model was structured into*a computer program m e. The programme was 
structured as a versatile  tool for both continuing explosion suppression  
research, and for system  evaluation.
3 . 4 . 5 .  The Computer Programme
The following input data are required for the computer assessm ent of an 
explosion suppression system .
V essel volume -  V
V essel surface area -  A
Theoretical maximum explosion pressure -
Initial pressure -  P q
Fundamental burning velocity -  S^
Nature of process -  turbulence estim ate or Tu
%
Number and type of explosion suppressors 
Type of suppressant
Charge and propelling agent pressure of suppressors
Suppressant constant -  M (thermal) or M (inerting), whichever is  the largest
Detection pressure threshold -
Suppression system  thermal transfer efficiency -  /
Optionally it is  possible to ’override1 the calculated value of suppressant 
throw or tim e interval t with input data. Multiple suppressor configur- 
ations can be accessed , providing that a ll suppressors contain the sam e 
suppressant.
v
The assumptions of the mathematical model all err on the side of safety. 
However, it is  essential that a system  which is  borderline between suppress­
ing and failing to suppress the explosion is  readily identified. As an ’ a 
priori1 judgement of safety a suppression system  is  only considered viable 
if  the following conditions are satisfied.
(i) the . suppressant delivery rate exceeds the suppressant
requirement rate, at suppression, by a factor 
greater than two;
(ii) the m ass of suppressant delivered exceeds the m ass of
suppressant required, at suppression, by m ore than 50%.
The programme provides a prediction of the system  suppressed explosion  
overpressure, together with an assessm ent of the reliability of the proposed 
suppression system . Optionally the programme can provide graphical out­
put of pressure versus tim e, fireball radius versus tim e, suppressant ' 
requirement versus tim e and suppressant delivery versus tim e for the 
modelled system . An example of the computer output is  shown in Figure 8.
\
4. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
4 .1 .  Explosions
4 . 1 . 1 .  Explosion T est Apparatus
M easurements of the explosion violence of combustible g a s /a ir  and du st/a ir
m ixtures were undertaken in both laboratory and large scale test v e sse ls .
3T ests in a Bartknecht lm  apparatus were carried out at Bergbau 
V ersuchsstrecke, Dortmund in collaboration with Dr Scholl (see section  
1 .3 .1 ) .  A standard Hartmann vertical tube apparatus, and experimental 
explosion test apparatus w ere constructed specifically for this research .
'Standard' T est Apparatus:
3(i) Bartknecht lm  vessel;
(ii) Hartmann Tube.
E xperim ental1 T est Apparatus:
I
(i) 1:1 aspect ratio vertical tube apparatus;
3
(ii) 43 dm spherical apparatus;
3(iii) 6 .2  m IEP test apparatus.
34 . 1 . 1 . 1 .  'Standard' Bartknecht lm  V essel
The Bartknecht apparatus is  shown in Plate IH. The explosion chamber has
3a nominal volume of lm  and a 1:1 aspect ratio.
To determine the explosibility of gases the fu el/a ir  mixture is  m etered into 
the chamber, sampled and analysed to ensure that the required fuel con­
centration has been attained. The explosion is  initiated by an induction coil 
spark across a 4mm spark gap in the centre of the chamber and the resultant
P L A T E  III: Bartknecht lm^ Explosion Test Vessel
p ressu re/tim e history monitored using a pressure transducer and U. V. 
oscillograph recorder.
To determine the explosibility of dusts, a known weight of the dust sample
3is  placed into a 5 .4  dm canister, which is  pressurised  to 2MPa with com­
pressed a ir . The canister is  fitted with an electrically  activated pyrotechnic 
valve. When the valve is  activated the dust sample is  transported by the 
com pressed air and dispersed uniformly in the chamber by a spray ring. The 
resultant turbulent dust suspension is  ignited centrally with a 10 kJ pyro­
technic igniter, which is  activated 0 .6s after the pyrotechnic valve has been 
activated. This ignition delay is  chosen because 0 .6 s  is  the tim e required 
to d isperse effectively a ll of the dust sample into the explosion chamber.
4 .1 .1 .2 .  'Standard* Hartmann Vertical Tube Apparatus
A Hartmann vertical tube apparatus was constructed to the specification
given in drawings supplied by the Fire Research Station, Borehamwood.
3This apparatus, see  Plate IV, has an internal volume of 1 .23  dm and an 
aspect ratio of 4 .6 :1 .
A weighed sample of dust is  heaped into the bottom cup and the sm all a ir  
3reservoir (0.05 dm ) is  charged with com pressed a ir to a pressure of 
0.82 MPa. A solenoid valve releases this com pressed a ir charge, via a 
mushroom deflector, onto the dust, which is  itse lf  then effectively dispersed  
upwards onto the ignition source. Two alternative ignition sources can be 
used:
(i) train of induction coil sparks -  100 Hz;
(ii) electrically  heated co il. X
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The accepted mode of operation requires that the ignition source should be 
switched on before the solenoid valve is  activated.
4 .1 .1 .3 .  E xperim ental1 1:1 Aspect Ratio Vertical Tube Apparatus
This apparatus was designed and constructed to investigate the influence of
aspect ratio on the measured explosion param eters in the Hartmann tube.
3It consists of a 1.75 dm 1:1 aspect ratio explosion tube which was mounted 
on the standard Hartmann dust dispersion system , see Plate V. Provision  
was made for spark ignition across central electrodes.
34 .1 .1 .4 .  Experimental* 43 dm Spherical Test Apparatus
This apparatus, see Plate VI, was designed with the specific objective of
seeking to establish a laboratory scale test procedure that would produce
dust explosibility results comparable with results obtained in the Bartknecht 
3lm  apparatus. It was designed around an available stainless steel pressure  
v esse l which had a hydraulic test pressure of 4 MPa.
3A 1 .8  dm dust dispersion canister was fitted to the prototype apparatus.
This represented the same air reservoir to explosion chamber volume ratio
as that used in the Hartmann apparatus. However, the final design of the 43
3 3dm apparatus used a 0 .9  dm dust dispersion canister pressurised  to
1 .64  MPa, because this higher pressure reduced the tim e required to effect­
ively disperse the dust into the explosion chamber. The experimental 
apparatus had the facility to spray the dust into the chamber using either a 
pepper pot spreader or  ^ hem ispherical spray ring. The pepper pot spreader 
was an 18mm diam eter hemisphere drilled with seven 4mm diam eter holes.
It was located in the top of the spherical explosion chamber. The h em i­
spherical spray ring was constructed from 12mm diam eter copper pipe.
P L A T E  VI 43 dm^ Spherical Explosion Test Apparatus
It was drilled with three rows of 2mm diam eter holes staggered within a 120° 
segment. The spray ring, which was also mounted from the top of the 
v esse l had a radius of 180mm.
Provision was made for two alternative ignition sources:
(i) train of induction coil sparks -  100 Hz;
(ii) high energy capacitive discharge.
3—All te sts  were undertaken with central ignition. Since the 43 dm test  
apparatus was not constructed to rigorous pressure v e sse l standards it was 
tested hydraulically only to a pressure of 2 MPa and was located within a 
thick walled concrete block house. A ll explosion tests  were undertaken 
rem otely, and safety interlocks ensured that the block house could not be 
entered whilst the ignition source was enabled.
34 .1 .1 .5 .  fExperimental* 6 .2 m IEP Test Facility  
3
A 6.2  m explosion suppression test facility was set up as part of the project. 
This had an aspect ratio of 1.75:1 and could also  be used for unsuppressed  
gas and dust explosion tr ia ls . Provision was made for central ignition by 
either induction or high energy capacitive spark. A detailed description of 
th is test facility is  provided in section 4 .5 .
4 .1 .2 .  Ignition Sources
4 .1 .2 .1 .  Standard Ignition Procedures 
The standard ignition procedures divide into two categories:
x
(i) sustained -  a) hot coil;
b) train of induction sparks;
(these are typically used with the Hartmann Apparatus)
(ii) d iscrete -  lOkJ pyrotechnic igniter;
3(this is  used with the lm  test apparatus).
The standard hot coil is  five turns (8mm dia) of 18SWG N i/C r wire heated to 
a surface temperature which exceeds 750°C by a 10V, 8A power supply. The 
train of induction coil sparks are obtained using a Eiihmkoff coil which has an 
80W input energy. An 8mm spark gap between pointed electrodes is  used 
typically. This apparatus provides one * J j induction coil spark every 10m s.
The standard lOkJ pyrotechnic igniter consists of two 1.2£jg pellets of the 
following composition:
zirconium metal powder 
barium nitrate 
barium peroxide
► manufactured by Sobbe, W. Germany
It produces a dumb-bell shaped ignition kernel which extends some 200mm  
from the p ellets . The burning tim e of this ignition source is  v40m s.
4 .1 .2 .2 .  Experimental Ignition Procedures
In addition to the standard ignition procedures described above, experimental 
work reported in this thesis was undertaken using the following ignition 
procedures:
(i) a train of induction coil sparks provided by a Ruhmkoff coil 
activated after a preset ignition delay;
(ii) an induction coil spark (3 OmJ) provided by a vehicle  
ignition coil (This was used as an alternative to the Ruhmkoff
3
coil in the 6 .2  m v esse l because the latter was intolerant 
of atmospheric humidity);
(iii) a high energy capacitive spark specifically developed for 
this research, see section 4 .1 .2 .3 . ;
(iv) a standard fuse head igniter;
(v) a lkJ  pyrotechnic igniter (1:1 aluminium powder : potassium  
percholorate).
!
For turbulent gas and dust explosion experiments the igniting sources were 
all activated at a predetermined tim e delay, t* , after the activation of the 
gas or dust dispersion procedure. It can happen that the actual ignition 
delay, t^, is  greater than this preset ignition delay with ignition using the 
train of induction coil sparks. The actual ignition delay, t^, corresponds 
to a particular level of turbulence at which ignition resu lts.
4 .1 .2 .3 .  Development of a High Energy Capacitive Discharge 
Ignition Source
3The lOkJ pyrotechnic igniter used in the lm  Bartknecht apparatus has
proved an effective igniter of dust clouds. However, the extensive fireball
produced by the pyrotechnic, could m ask the effectiveness of an explosion
suppression system . It has been suggested (244) that the ignition energy of
such a device represents a significant proportion of the total system  energy
in an explosion suppression tria l with a sensitive suppression system .
3Indeed it is  possible to detect and contain an explosion in the lm  v e sse l  
before the explosion energy exceeds 40kJ. For this reason the development 
of an alternative high energy d iscrete ignition source was considered  
essentia l.
The chosen ignition source was a capacitive discharge between electrodes
of defined geometry and separation. Since it was a pre-requisite that this
capacitive discharge could be triggered at a defined instant in tim e, a
three electrode configuration was developed. A spark from a standard .
motor vehicle induction coil was used to trigger the discharge across the
main electrode spark gap. This triggered discharge was particularly
attractive because it avoided the use of very high voltage lev e ls , and the
requirement to switch high current lev e ls . The ’a priori1 aim of the de-
*
signed ignition source was to deliver an ignition energy of 100J. A 40jiF 
rapid discharge capacitor charged to 2 .25  kV was chosen. This type of 
ignition procedure is  not suitable for metal dusts, or any highly conductive 
dust clouds. The experimental apparatus, see Plate VII, was constructed 
so that capacitive discharge energies (J CV ) of 50 -  500J could be achieved 
using the 40pF capacitor, and provision was made to substitute alternative 
capacitors to extend its  working range. The leads between the capacitor 
and the electrodes were kept as short as possible and constructed from  
high current low lo ss  cable. An analysis of the discharge characteristics  
of a 100J capacitive spark energy using a high resolution storage oscillo ­
scope shows that the discharge is  oscillatory with /v 50% of the net energy 
being released in the first cycle of duration ** lj is . The oscillatory d is­
charge is  sustained fo r /^ S O jis .
* It i s  accepted that a significant proportion of this calculated energy w ill 
be quenched by the electrodes.
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PL A T E  VIII: Control Unit
4 . 1 .3 .  Control Unit
The design of the control electronics for the unsuppressed explosion experi­
m ents undertaken in the various test v esse ls  was conditioned by two specific  
requirements:
the control unit should be sufficiently versatile  to accom m­
odate tests  of quiescent gas explosions and turbulent gas 
and dust explosions for the different ignition procedures 
described above in both sm all and large test v esse ls;
explosion testing should be undertaken in a safe, foolproof,, 
and approved+ manner.
v It was required further that the control unit could be used, together with 
auxiliary circuitry, for explosion suppression tr ia ls . The control unit was 
required to start and stop the chart drive of the U. V. recorder, which pro­
vided the pressure/tim e history of the explosion event, and to provide 
’event’ signals to the recorder as appropriate. The following control 
' sequence was defined:
+ It was necessary to satisfy the Company safety officer that sufficient 
consideration had been given to safety before explosion te sts  were 
authorised.
(i)
(ii)
START -?»----- U .V . recorder chart drive switched on
P reset tim e delay 
(0.1 -  Is)
<
Dust dispersion system  activate 
Event signal sent to recorder
P reset ignition 
delay t ' (0.01 -  2s)
Ignition source activated
Event signal sent to recorder
Preset tim e delay 
(0.1 -  2s)
Dust dispersion system  isolated
U .V . recorder chart drive switched off
Ignition circuit isolated  
(capacitor discharged)
Since it was essential to operate the explosion event rem otely, the control 
unit also  activated the high energy discharge capacitor charging circuit.
Safety was a major consideration throughout the design and construction of 
all explosion test apparatus; the design philosophy being to prevent in­
correct operation and forseeable m istakes that could result from forgetful­
n ess. . The following safety features were incorporated into the design of 
the control unit and capacitor discharge unit:
(i) key switch -  the single key must be carried by the
operator when he is  working on/in  
the explosion test, vessel;
(ii) sonic alarm -  two buzzers, one on the control unit
and one on the capacitor unit provide 
audible alarm s whilst the system  is  
enabled;
( ii i) . plugs and leads -  connectors were chosen such that it
was im possible to incorrectly 'plug upT 
the apparatus and safety interlocks 
ensured that the system  could not be 
enabled until a ll interconnecting leads 
were plugged in;
(iv) mains trip -  in the event of m ains failure the 
Ignition circuit was isolated and the 
capacitor discharged;
(v) safety interlock -  a trip w ire was installed at the entry
to both the concrete block house for 
343 dm tests  and the test s ite  used  
3for 6 .2  m te sts  -  neither danger 
zones could be approached without 
automatically inhibiting the ignition 
circuits and discharging the capacitor;
(vi) ignition circuit
isolation -  the ignition circuit was automatically
isolated and the capacitor unit d is­
charged within 10s of each explosion  
experim ent.
The control unit is  shown in Plate VIII.
4 . 1 . 4 .  Mensuration
K istler p e izo -resistiv e  transducers (Type 2045.20A) coupled to K istler bridge
am plifiers (Type 4601) were used to monitor the explosion pressure in all test
3apparatus, except the lm  v e sse l, which was instrumented with K istler piezo­
electric transducers. The output from each bridge am plifier was fed to 
Southern Instrument galvanometer am plifiers (Type 40502), which drove SMI J 
type galvanom eters fitted in a Southern Instrument ser ie s  4500 U. V. O scillo­
graph recorder. The frequency response of the recording system  was lim ited  
by the natural frequency of the chosen galvanometer torsion wire; for SMU 
type galvanom eters this is  <v3.3 kHz. The U.V.  recorder had a maximum  
chart speed of 5m s * and an internal tim ebase which could superimpose 
timing lines on the record at 2, 10 or 100ms intervals. Two galvanom eter
drive am plifiers were connected to each transducer in order to provide both
a high sensitivity (1mm = 0.002 MPa) and a low sensitivity (1mm = 0 . 0 1  MPa)
3record of the pressure at each measuring location. Experiments in the lm  
3and 6 .2m v e sse ls  used two transducers, whereas tests  in the sm aller  
v e sse ls  relied on a single transducer.
The K istler bridge am plifiers were calibrated to provide an output of 0.5V,  
MPa * and each galvanometer am plifier was calibrated to provide the re­
quired mm V  ^ deflection. The calibration of each pressure measuring 
system  was checked at the beginning of each dayTs work using a comparator 
hydraulic pump and a standard pressure test gauge, or using a ’dead weight’ 
te ster . The pressure transducer output(s) were also  optionally recorded  
onto magnetic tape using a Philips EL1020FM data recorder. Calibration 
of this record was provided by d iscrete voltage stops.
Figure 9 shows a schematic diagram of the experimental layout and a 
typical explosion record is  shown in Figure 10. The following data were ob­
tained from the experimental trace, as appropriate:
' -  preset ignition delay
t -  actual ignition delay
E -  capacitor discharge voltage
P q -  initial pressure (gauge)
P -  maximum explosion pressure (gauge)max
-  maximum rate of pressure r ise
The event signals provided by the control electronics define the preset 
ignition delay t^ . Note that the actual ignition delay t may be greater  
than the preset value with ignition using a train of induction coil sparks.
4 . 1 . 5 .  T est Procedures
The experimental procedures were essentially  the same in the five explosion
test apparatus. Note that some of the test procedures used differ from the
3
’standard’ test methodology described above for the lm  and Hartmann 
apparatus.
4 . 1 . 5 . 1 .  Quiescent Gas Explosions
a) Hartmann Apparatus, 1:1 Aspect Ratio Vertical Tube .
3Apparatus, and 43 dm Spherical Apparatus .
Daltons law of partial p ressu res was used to calculate the concentration of 
fuel gas prepared. The following procedure was found to reproducibly pre­
pare the required g a s /a ir  concentration:
(i) the explosion v esse l was flushed with com pressed a ir . A 
cylinder of 21% oxygen in. nitrogen was used as a ir  sub­
stitute in these experiments;
(ii) fuel gas was released into the explosion v e sse l until a pre­
determined pressure was attained;
(iii) the explosion v esse l was pressurised  rapidly to 0.15 MPa 
with com pressed a ir . Injection was usually through a spray 
pipe to improve mixing. The resultant overpressure was 
released slowly, and a sample of the prepared gas m ixture 
collected in an IR absorption spectrophotometer gas cell;
(v) the v e sse l outlet valve was shut, the gas cell taps were
shut and the explosion initiated using induction coil or 
capacitive discharge sparkj
(vi) the gas concentration was measured by the IR absorbance
of the CH^ peak at 6 .6  -  7.1jim wavelength (CH  ^ scissor)
using a Pye Unicam SP2000 IR spectrophotometer. The
volume % of CEL was determined from a calibration of IR 4
absorbance using known g a s /a ir  sam ples. This procedure 
was accurate to within + |  volume %;
(vii) the gas concentration was calculated using Daltons law of 
partial p ressu res. In general, agreement between m easured  
and calculated concentration levels  was better than 1 volume 
%.
3b) Bartknecht lm  V essel
The required gas concentration was prepared by the method of partial 
■' p ressu res using a sim ilar procedure to that described in (a) above. The 
prepared g a s /a ir  mixture was sampled and analysed using IR absorption 
spectroscopy. The overpressure was released , the v e sse l valves closed , 
and the combustible mixture ignited by an induction coil spark across a 4mm  
spark gap.
3c) The 6 .2  m IEP T est Facility
The following experimental procedure was found to give reproducible quies­
cent gas explosibility results in this test apparatus (see also  section 4 .5 .7 ) .
(i) the v esse l was purged with com pressed air;
3
(ii) a 45 dm fuel gas reservoir was charged with the fuel gas 
to a predetermined pressure;
(iii) this combustible gas was rapidly released through a spray 
pipe into the explosion chamber;
(iv) a 200mm diam eter safety fan was used to stir  the g a s /a ir  
mixture for 10 minutes;
(v) the fan was switched off and the overpressure released;
(vi) the explosion was initiated by a spark across central e lec­
trodes;
*
(vii) the gas concentration was estimated by calculation using 
Daltons law of partial p ressu res.
4 . 1 . 5 . 2 .  Turbulent Gas Explosions
Turbulent gas explosions were undertaken using experimental procedures 
which were sim ilar to those used to produce dust explosions in the various 
test apparatus. The explosion chambers were filled with the required con­
centration of combustible mixture, and com pressed premixed g a s /a ir  was 
injected into the chamber to induce turbulence.
* It was im practical to m easure the prepared gas concentrations in these  
te sts  because the test apparatus was sited som e 80 m iles from available 
laboratory facilities.
a.) Hartmann Apparatus, 1:1 Aspect Ratio Vertical Tube Apparatus
The sm all 'air reservoir' was charged with a defined concentration of fuel 
g a s/a ir  to 0.82 MPa. The explosion tube was charged with the same fuel 
g a s/a ir  mixture at atmospheric p ressure. The com pressed combustible 
charge was released into the explosion chamber, thus producing a turbulent 
fuel g a s /a ir  mixture which was ignited after a predetermined ignition delay- 
using a d iscrete ignition source.
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b) 43 dm Spherical Apparatus, Bartknecht lm  V essel
The 'dust dispersion canister’ was charged with a defined concentration of 
fuel gas/a ir by the method of partial pressures to a pressure commensurate 
with the air pressure used to d isperse dust in the test apparatus. The 
explosion chamber was charged with the same fuel g a s /a ir  mixture at 
atmospheric p ressure. The com pressed combustible charge was released  
into the explosion chamber through the spray ring d isperser, thus creating 
a turbulent g a s /a ir  m ixture. The explosion was initiated after a pre­
determined ignition delay using a d iscrete spark ignition source.
4 . 1 . 5 . 3 .  Dust Explosions
a) Hartmann Apparatus, 1:1 Aspect Batio Vertical Tube Apparatus
The following experimental sequences were used with these test apparatus:
(i) ~ dust sample was dispersed onto a hot coil ignition source
-  STANDARD METHODOLOGY;
(ii) dust sample was dispersed onto a train of induction coil
sparks as an ignition source -  STANDARD METHODOLOGY;
(iii) dust sample was dispersed into the explosion tube and a
train of induction coil sparks was initiated after a preset 
ignition delay t^ •;
(iv) dust sample was dispersed into the explosion tube and the
explosion initiated, after a preset ignition delay, with a 
fuse head igniter;
(v) dust sample was dispersed into the explosion tube and the
explosion initiated, after a preset ignition delay, with a 
100J capacitive spark.
3b) 43 dm Spherical Apparatus
A weighed dust sample was loaded into the dust dispersion canister, which 
was subsequently pressurised with com pressed a ir . The following experi­
mental sequences were used with this apparatus:
(i) dust sample was dispersed, via pepper pot spreader, onto
a train of induction coil sparks as an ignition source;
(ii) dust sample was dispersed, via a pepper pot spreader, and
a train of induction coil sparks was initiated after a preset 
ignition delay t^ ;
(iii) dust sample was dispersed, via a pepper pot spreader, and
the explosion was initiated after a preset ignition delay by a 
capacitive discharge ignition source;
(iv) dust sample was dispersed, via a spray ring, and the
explosion was initiated after a preset ignition delay by a 
capacitive discharge ignition source.
3c) Bartknecht lm  V essel
A ll of the reported dust explosibility test results in this apparatus were ob­
tained using the standard test procedure described in 4 . 1 . 1 , 1 .  above.
d) 6 . 2 m 3 IEP Test Facility
Weighed dust sam ples were loaded into three dust dispersion canisters  
which were subsequently pressurised to 2 MPa with com pressed a ir . The 
dust was dispersed into the explosion chamber through three sem i-circu lar  
spray rings, and the dust cloud was ignited by a 100J capacitive spark after 
a preset ignition delay. Full details of the test apparatus and test procedures 
are given in section 4 .5 .
4 . 1 . 6 .  Selection of Test Explosible Fuels
The following fuels were chosen by the ISO Committee for explosion suppress­
ion experim ents.
1) CH4
'  2) C_H_ or 70/30 C H /H , 3 8 4
3) Coal Dust
4) Cellulose Dust
4 . 1 . 6 . 1 . Gases
Experimental work on combustible gases was restricted to CH^, 70/30
CH./H- and CcH . The gases were supplied by British O xygen Company as: 
4 2 3 8
Methane CP -  Commercial product grade 
*
70/30 CH ./H  -  prepared to order -  assay certified
ft
Propane CP -  Commercial product grade
* 70/30 CH./H0 was claimed by ISO delegates to represent the same 4 Z
explosion hazard as C H .
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4 . 1 . 6 . 2 .  Dusts
Experimental work was undertaken on a range of industrial dusts. However, 
cellu lose dust was chosen as the main test dust. Its explosibility is  sim ilar  
to that of many dusts commonly encountered in industry. A large batch of 
cellu lose dust, type BOOX, was supplied by:
J . Rettenmainer & Sohne,
Fullstoffwerke,
7091, Holzmuhle,
W. Germany.
This batch (WM) was compared with the batch (BVS) of cellu lose dust from  
the same supplier used in the lm  test work in Dortmund. ••***«*
T ests in the Hartmann apparatus, using hot coil ignition, identified the most
-3
explosible concentration of the WM batch as 0 . 8kg m . This concentration 
was used in comparative tests between BVS and WM cellu lose batches.
Results of tests  in the standard Hartmann apparatus are shown in Table 4 .1 .
CELLULOSE BATCH IGNITION SOURCE n_ Pmax
MPa
( f )max 
MPa s“
BVS Induction coil sparks 10 0.81 25.3
WM. 10 0.83 26.4
BVS Hot coil 25 0.77 34.2
WM 25 v 0.74 33.4
TABLE 4 .1 .
where n is  the number of experimental m easurem ents.
These test results demonstrated that the BVS and WM batches of cellu lose  
dust type BOOX were not significantly different in term s of their explosible 
characteristics. The observed difference between hot coil and induction 
spark ignition is  typical of that found for most industrial dusts. A sample 
of the WM batch was dried in an oven for 4 hours at 110°C, and subsequently 
characterised in the standard Hartmann apparatus see Table 4 .2 .
CELLULOSE BATCH IGNITION SOURCE n Pmax
MPa
f )x max r 
MPa s *
Induction coil sparks 5 0.79 40.2
WM -  Dried
Hot coil 5 0.72 45.7
TABLE 4 .2 .
The explosion violence of the dried sample was a/ 30% greater than the ’as  
received’ cellu lose dust. Both the BVS and WM batches had a nominal 
m oisture content of 8 weight % in the 'as received' condition. Since m oisture 
content has such an influence on the explosible characteristics of cellu lose  
dust, it was necessary to monitor this parameter throughout the programme 
of experiments to ensure that it remained essentially  invariant. Cellulose 
dust explosion tests  reported in this thesis were a ll undertaken using 
cellu lose, type BOOX, with a nominal m oisture content of 8 weight %. A 
scanning electron micrograph, Plate IX, shows the fibrous nature of the 
cellu lose particulates. A particle size  analysis of the WM batch identified 
the median particle dimension as 56 x 22p n . v
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PLATE IX: Cellulose Dust Particle Size Analysis
4.2 .  Explosion Suppressants
A sm all test programme was carried out to compare the inhibiting effective­
ness of vapour phase Halon suppressants, inerting gases and powder suppress­
ants. The influence of each of these agents on the explosion violence of cellu­
lose dust was determined in the standard Hartmann vertical tube apparatus.
In all te s ts , ignition was by a single induction coil spark at t = 100m s.
To elim inate any system atic error a ’TEST vs CONTROL' experimental pro-
. * ■ ( ~
cedure was used. A minimum of five m easurem ents at each concentration of 
each suppressant were completed. After each group of five 'TEST' experi­
m ents, the test apparatus was purged of any residual agent and five ’CONTROL’ 
experim ents were undertaken -  in which the cellu lose dust sample was ignited 
in the absence of any suppressant agent. The percentage deviation between the 
’TEST' and the corresponding ’CONTROL’ explosibility param eters provides 
data on the influence of the agent on the explosion characteristics of cellu lose dust.
4 . 2 . 1 .  Halons
The, Halon vapour was added to the air inside the explosion tube using a ca li­
brated syringe. After the cellu lose dust sample had been loaded into the 
apparatus the syringe needle was inserted through a rubber septum and an 
open valve, into the centre of the explosion tube. The Halon was injected  
into the a ir , the syringe needle withdrawn and the valve closed . The explosion  
test was completed using a d iscrete induction spark ignition procedure.
T ests were carried out with Halon 1211 and Halon 1301 vapours.
4 . 2 . 2 .  Inert G ases
The cellu lose dust sample was loaded into the test apparatus, and the 
apparatus sealed tight. A predetermined pressure of inerting gas was 
released into the explosion tube. The pressure was measured with a water
m anom eter. The overpressure inside the explosion tube was released , the 
valves closed and the explosion test undertaken. The two inerting gases  
studied were carbon dioxide and nitrogen.
4 . 2 . 3 .  Powders
A weighed sample of agent was thoroughly mixed with the cellu lose dust 
sample in the bottom cup of the Hartmann apparatus. The apparatus was 
assem bled, and the explosion test undertaken. The two powders studied 
were china clay (essentially an inert powder) and a monoammonium phos­
phate based suppressant.
4 .3 .  Explosion Suppressors
4 . 3 . 1 .  Experimental Arrangement
The discharge characteristics of hem ispherical and HRD suppressors w ere  
m easured on an open test range. The experimental arrangements used for 
these m easurem ents are shown in Figure 11. The spatial and temporal 
discharge profiles were filmed with’Fastax’ and ’Hyspeed* cam eras at 2000pps. 
A Bolex cam era was used to provide a colour record of the discharge (64pps). 
HRD suppressors were instrumented so as to m easure their depressurisation  
and m ass discharge characteristics.
4 . 3 . 2 .  Preparation of HRD Suppressors
The frangible diaphragm of the 7Smm outlet diam eter HRD suppressor used  
for liquid suppressant was pre-stressed  and the canister"and diaphragm  
hydraulically tested before final assem bly. To ensure complete safety HRD 
suppressors were not pressurised with nitrogen until they had been mounted 
in their final firing position. The detonator was fitted and connected to the 
firing circuit, which was then enabled using a key switch.
4 . 3 . 3 .  Mensuration
When a HRD suppressor is  discharged the force acting on the spreader head 
is  a m easure of the momentum exchanged as  the suppressant is  dispersed  
by the spreader. Measurement of this thrust provides an estim ate of the 
m ass discharge rate of suppressant. Strain gauge networks were mounted 
on the spreader surface to m easure this force -  although meaningful calibra­
tion was confounded by the spreader geom etry. Canister depressurisation  
was monitored using a p iezo-re  si stive pressure transducer fitted to the 
canister w all.
The !FastaxT high speed cam era had a slower film acceleration than the 
’Hyspeed' cam era. Hence it was necessary to provision a delay circuit 
between the two cam eras to ensure that both were running at their selected  
film  speeds when the discharge was initiated. A 1kHz oscillator driving 
LEDs provided timing marks on the film s’ edges. An ’event in itiate’ switch 
was triggered by the 'Hyspeed’ camera after a preset film  footage, and 
.activated the detonator firing circuit, and event signals to LEDs which pro­
vided an 'event initiate’ reference on the other edges of the two film s.
Hence, the exact film speed, and the precise  point in tim e that the suppress­
or was fired could be determined from the high speed film records.
The depressurisation and m ass discharge characteristics of the HRD 
suppressors were recorded using a U.V.  oscillograph record. An 'event 
in itiate’ signal was also provided to this recording system .
4.4 .  Explosion Suppression
34 . 4 . 1 .  Collaborative Trials Using The Bartknecht lm  V essel
Section 4.1. describes the experimental procedure used to produce and
3monitor unsuppressed gas and dust explosions in the lm  v e sse l. The
suppression system  evaluated in the collaborative trials was based on a
single 76mm outlet diam eter HRD suppressor. The suppressor canister
3had a free volume of 5 .4  dm , and was filled with a measured quantity of
suppressant. The HRD suppressor was mounted centrally on the top of the 
3lm  v e sse l, and was pressurised  with nitrogen gas. A ’pepper pot’ hemi­
spherical spreader was used to d isperse the contents into the test volum e.
An electronic discrim inator was set to activate the suppressors when a pre­
determined threshold voltage was recorded at the output of a pressure  
transducer. The pressure transducers were re-calibrated each day, and 
unsuppressed explosion te sts  were periodically undertaken to ensure that 
fully developed explosions were being achieved in the test v e sse l. Between 
each experiment the test chamber was hosed down with water and allowed 
to cpol to ambient temperature.
4 . 4 . 2 .  Explosion Suppression T rials Using The IEP Test Facility  
3The 6 .2 m IEP test facility was set up and instrumented as part of this 
study. D etails of the test apparatus and of the experimental test procedures 
are described fully in section 4 .5 .  below.
A range of explosion suppression tr ia ls were undertaken against both quies-
3cent gas and turbulent dust explosions in the 6 .2  m test facility . The ex-
3plosion suppression hardware used in these tr ia ls  included 5 dm hemi­
spherical suppressors and 76mm outlet diam eter HRD suppressors with
 ^ 3 3 3 3suppressant capacities of 3 dm , 4 dm , 10 dm and 30 dm . All HRD
suppressors were fitted with ’pepperpot’ spreaders to effectively d isperse
the suppressant into the explosion chamber. The five alternative locations
3for explosion suppressors on the 6 .2  m test v esse l are identified as A -  E 
in Figure 12. The combinations of explosion suppressors used in these  
tr ia ls  are summarised in Table 4 .3  below.
No. of Suppressors Type of Suppressor Suppressant Capacity 
(dm3)
Suppressor
Location
2 Hemispherical 5 A, C
3 HRD 3 A, B, C
4 HRD 3 A, B, C, D
*3 HRD 4 A, B, C
1 HRD 10 D
3 HRD 10 A , B, C
1 HRD 30 D
- r 2 Hemispheres 5 A, c \
4 \ 2 H R D s 3 B , D /
TABLE 4 .3 .
Note that HRD suppressors fitted to position D or E are fitted with 90° 
elbows.
The pressure transducers were calibrated before each explosion suppression  
tr ia l. The explosion chamber was thoroughly cleaned and hosed down with 
water after each experiment. In practice, it was not possib le to undertake 
m ore than one test on any day.
* the apparent density of monoammonium phosphate powder was ^1 kg dm , 
hence a suppressant charge of 4kg corresponds to a suppressant
o
capacity of 4 dm #
4 .5 .  The IEP T est Facility
A major objective of this study was to set up a large volume explosion test 
facility in the UK in accordance with the recommendations of ISO/TC21/ 
SC5/WG3. Such a test v e sse l must be capable of containing unsuppressed 
gas and dust explosions, and must be sited and operated in accordance 
with the mandatory requirements for such work.
4 . 5 . 1 .  The Chosen Strategy
Graviner Ltd. offered some finance for this venture, and sought collaborat­
ive funding of a UK test facility. However, there was insufficient interest 
in such a venture and the ideal option of establishing a purpose built stain­
le ss  steel large volume explosion test v e sse l was out of the question. It 
was therefore chosen to seek to set up a ’Graviner’ IEP (Industrial Explosion 
Protection) test facility with the limited financial resource available.
After an extensive search, a second hand mild steel pressure v e sse l was
3located at a disused gas manufacturing plant. This v e sse l was a 6 .2  m LPG 
vaporiser which had a certified working pressure of 2 MPa and a hydraulic 
test pressure of 3 MPa. The intention of modifying this pressure v e sse l to 
an explosion test chamber was discussed with pressure v e sse l experts, and 
it was chosen to risk  the necessary investment and seek to use this pressure  
v esse l as the basis of the IEP test facility .
Since explosion research on this scale must be insured and licensed such a 
test facility must be suitably located. The only appropriate Wilkinson Match 
site  for such test work was Pains-W essex pyrotechnic manufacturing and 
testing centre at High P ost, Salisbury. The storage and handling of explosives  
was approved on this s ite , and 24 hour security was assured.
4 .5 .2 .  Modifications to LPG Vaporiser 
3Plate X shows the 6 .2 m pressure v e sse l as purchased from British Gas. 
After purchase, the pressure v e sse l was hydraulically tested and examined . 
No signs of d istress were noted. The following modifications w ere, there­
fore, progressed by sub-contractors:
(i) flame cut a 0 . 6  m diam eter hole in one of the dished ends of 
the v e sse l to perm it entry;
(ii) cut out and remove all internal steam pipes;
(iii) machine and weld into place a 0.45 m internal diam eter
annulus to form a manhole entry point at one end of the 
vessel;
(iv) machine and fit a steel door to this manhole;
(v) machine three 0 . 1 1  m internal diam eter annuli; ‘and three
0.03 m internal diam eter annuli;
cut out holes and weld the six  annuli into place to form  
additional ports in the v e sse l wall;
s tress  relieve all welds by heat treatment in a large furnace
(viii) hydraulically pressure test the modified pressure v e sse l to
3 MPa.
(vi)
(vii)
9 9 a
P L A T E  X: Disused LPG Vaporiser
These modifications provided the pressure v esse l with alternative locations 
for explosion suppression hardware, and with sufficient other ports to 
facilitate fuel injection, a ir  purge, drainage and fitting of measuring 
devices; see  Figure 12.
4 .5 .3 .  Site Preparations 
3The 6 .2  m pressure v e sse l was installed on a 4m x 4m concrete pad in a 
3 m deep pit which was adjacent to an earth mounded building. The pit was 
surrounded by 2 m high earth mounds. Concrete steps provided a ccess  
onto the explosion test s ite . A steel ’cat walk’ was fabricated around two 
sides of the explosion test v e sse l and an open shelter was constructed over 
the test site  to provide a m easure of weather protection. An RSJ was 
fitted longitudinally 2  m above the pressure v e sse l as part of the shelter  
structure. Lifting tackle was fitted to this RSJ to a ss is t  in the installation  
of the larger HRD suppressors on the test v e sse l. A soak-away was pre­
pared in one corner of the test site and water, electricity  and com pressed
air supplies installed. Since a large quantity of a ir  was essentia l to purge
3the v e sse l after an explosion test a 1 . 2  m air reservoir  was installed on the 
test s ite . „
A ll control and measuring equipment was set up in the earth mounded build­
ing. A ll cable runs between this building and the test site  were permanently 
installed in armoured sheaths. Weather proof term inal boxes w ere fitted 
to these cable runs and were mounted under the weather shelter.
4 .5 .4 . The IEP Test Facility
Plate XI shows the IEP test facility set up at High P ost, Salisbury. It was 
designed to facilitate gas, flammable liquid and dust explosion and explosion  
suppression research. A diagram of the final installation is  shown in 
Figure 12.
3Gas injection was achieved through a single 12mm diam eter valve. A 45 dm 
reservoir was charged with the fuel gas, and this charge released , via the 
manual valve, into the v e sse l. A long spray pipe inside the v e sse l helped 
to improve mixing of the combustible gas. Provision was made for a 
circulating fan to be fitted inside the pressure v e sse l to ensure complete 
mixing of the combustible gas. The early stages of gas explosion te sts  
could be filmed through a sight g la ss, which could be optionally fitted to any 
one of the 0 . 1 1  m diam eter ports.
Dust dispersion was achieved using three identical system s, each consisting  
3of a 5 .4  dm dust reservoir , a fast acting valve and a perforated sem i­
circular spray ring. The fast acting ball valve was pneumatically operated 
and specifically developed for this purpose. High speed film records have 
shown that the pneumatically operated valve opens in ^ 8 0 m s, and that the 
subsequent dispersion tim e of l |  kg of dust was ** 780m s. The spray rings 
% were constructed of 19mm diam eter steel tube, which was formed and 
drilled with an array of nineteen 4mm diam eter holes. They w ere detachable 
for cleaning.
A rem otely operated ’exhaust’ valve was fitted to the v e sse l. After an 
experiment this valve would be opened to purge the v e sse l of noxious g a ses . 
The combustion products were passed through a crude water scrubber
P L A T E  XI: 6.2m^ IEP Test Facility
before being released into the environment. For final air purge after a 
test a venturi 'air mover' was used. This provided a large airflow through 
the explosion chamber. Complete depressurisation of the air reservoir  via 
the venturi was equivalent to four air changes in the explosion chamber.
A multiprobe flame proximity detector was designed to enable the course
3
of flam e propagation to be monitored inside the 6 .2  m v e sse l, see Plate
XII. Each measuring location consisted of a sim ple ionization probe set
up to monitor the increased air conductivity as the flame front sweeps the
probe gap. This device was specifically developed to study the flame speed
3characteristics of quiescent g a s /a ir  explosions in the 6 . 2  m v e sse l.
4 .5 .5 .  Licensing, Insurance and Safety
A red flag was displayed outside the mounded building to warn other work­
ers  on the Pains W essex site that experimental work involving explosions 
and/or explosives was in progress; a flashing beacon was placed across  
the path between the mounded building and the test s ite . An audible alarm  
was sounded immediately prior to an explosion or explosion suppression  
te s t . l
The pressure v e sse l was insured for the purpose of explosion and explosion  
suppression research against a ll third party liab ility . It was periodically  
inspected and hydraulically tested . The insurers required that the p ress ­
ure v e sse l was fitted with a 75mm diam eter rupture disc for a ll un­
suppressed explosion te s ts . This disc was rated to rupture at an over­
pressure of 1 .2  MPa.
P I  A * r p  YTT. Multiprobe Flame
L M  I L. All . Proximity Detector
Annexes licensed by HMIE to store c lass six  division two and c la ss  six  
division three explosives were installed adjacent to the mounded building.
This building, and the test s ite , were licensed for the assem bly of
appropriate explosive devices and the author was certified to handle and 
transport such explosives in accordance with Home Office regulations.
Entry of the pressure v esse l was only allowed in accordance with the HSE 
regulations for the entry of confined spaces. In particular:
(i) the atmospheric conditions shall not be flammable;
(ii) the atmospheric conditions shall not be toxic;
(iii) ventilation shall be provided corresponding to a minimum
of five air changes per hour;
(iv) entry shall be supervised by an able bodied person who
shall monitor the progress of the person inside the v e sse l.
' - c \
A minimum of two personnel were required for a ll explosion test work.
Such personnel were required to wear protective clothing (e .g . boiler . 
suits, rubber boots and safety helm ets). Draeger gas detection kits were  
available for CE^, HC1, HBr, Br2 ,C l2  and CO g a ses , and a LEL m eter was 
provided for flammable gas detection. Through-flow canister gas m asks 
were always available to protect against toxic concentrations'of combustion 
products, Halon pyrolysis products, and/or dusts.
An operational safety manual was prepared and used for all test work on 
this s ite .
4 .5 .6 . Test Facility Instrumentation
3Details of the control and sequencing unit used with the 6 .2  m test facility  
are described in section 4 .1 .3 .  Modifications to it were made to perm it 
the necessary synchro nisation for the remote operation of a high speed 
cine'cam era, which was occasionally used to film the explosion in the 
v esse l. The control and sequencing unit was interfaced with a discrim inat­
or and suppressor firing circuit for explosion suppression te sts .
The discrim inator was used to simulate an explosion pressure detector.
When the output from the central pressure transducer attained a predeter­
mined voltage (corresponding to a detection p ressure, P ) a thyristor
A
triggered the suppressor firing circuit, Since the experimental procedure 
used to d isperse dust into the test apparatus resulted in an overpressure,
P^, at ignition, it was necessary for the discrim inator to superimpose the 
predetermined detection pressure, P ^ , on the overpressure P Q to provide 
the correct detection pressure for the te st. The discrim inator also  provid­
ed an event signal corresponding to ’detection’ for recorders. A 'test’ 
switch enables the discrim inator to be set to operate at the required voltage 
(pressure threshold) without charging the suppressor firing circuit.
The suppressor firing circuit was thyristor triggered, and proved particular­
ly troublesom e during com m issioning. It was found that the thyristor was 
momentarily switched on by ’pick up’ when the high energy capacitive spark 
ignition circuit was activated. Hence the suppressors w ere ’fired' coincid­
ent with ignition of the explosion. This fault could not be eliminated by 
screening, or capacitive filtering. The final solution to the problem was to 
use a relay to isolate the detonator circuit from the suppressor firing 
circu it. ^This relay was energised coincident with ignition of the explosion.
The finite operating time of the relay ( n/10ms) ensured that the suppressors 
would not be activated by extraneous ’p ickup’ because they were isolated  
until after the ignition source had been operated.
Safety was a major consideration in the design of the suppressor firing 
system . The following safety features were incorporated into the design:
(i) th e  discrim inator and suppressor firing circuits w ere '
fully interlocked with the control system;
(ii) the key switch and ’enable’ switch provided on the control 
unit also  'armed’ the suppressor firing circuit;
(iii) a sm all bleed current was used to monitor the detonator 
circuit. A ll detonators were ser ie s  wired. If an open 
circuit, or earth fault condition, occurred the complete 
system  would not ’enable’;
(iv) rem otely operated valves were interlocked such that the 
system  could not be ’enabled’ i f  any one valve was open;
(v) the suppressor firing circuit was automatically isolated, 
and the capacitor used to provide the firing current d is­
charged within 2 s of each te s t .
4 .5 .7 .  T est Procedures
The experimental procedures used for gas and dust explosion and explosion
3suppression tr ia ls  in the 6 . 2  m test v e sse l are summarised briefly below.
4 .5 .7 .1 .  Uasuppressed Quiescent Gas Explosions 
Ensure that the red flag and flashing beacon are displayed.
Purge explosion chamber with com pressed a ir .
Check integrity of control electronics, ignition circuit and m easuring 
equipment.
Close and seal explosion chamber.
Check that all inlet and outlet valves are closed .
3F ill the 45 dm fuel gas reservoir with the required pressure of 
flammable gas.
✓
R elease this gas charge into the explosion chamber and c lose  gas inlet 
valve.
Vacate test site and attach ftrip wire* across entrance.
*
Allow gas to mix for 15 minutes (or use circulating fan to m ix gas).
R elease any excess pressure using the rem otely operated exhaust 
valve. Close valve.
Ensure that a ll personnel are in mounded building.
* Most tests  were undertaken using the circulating fan to ensure 
* complete mixing, however it was proven that te sts  without
using the circulating fan gave identical explosion resu lts.
12. Enable system s and sound alarm .
13. Undertake te st.
14. Switch off all c ircu its.
15. Open remotely operated exhaust valve and purge combustion products
through water scrubber.
16. Ensure that there is  no residual pressure in v e sse l.
17. Open v esse l door and remove top plate A.
18. Insert venturi a ir m over in port A and purge v e sse l.
4 .5 .7 .2 .  Unsuppressed Dust Explosions
1. Ensure that red flag and flashing beacon are displayed.
2 . Purge explosion chamber with com pressed a ir .
3 . Check integrity of control electronics, ignition circuit and measuring
equipment.
4; Ensure that dust dispersion pneumatic valves are closed .
5 . Charge dust dispersion system s with m easured quantities of the fuel
dust.
6 . C lose and seal explosion chamber.
7. Check that all inlet and outlet valves are closed .
8 . P ressu r ise  dust dispersion canisters with com pressed air to 2 MPa.
9 . P ressu r ise  dust dispersion pneumatics to 1 .6  MPa.
10. Vacate test site and attach ’trip w ire’ across entrance.
11. Ensure that a ll personnel are in mounded building.
12. Enable system s and sound alarm .
13. Undertake te st.
14. Switch off all c ircu its.
x 15. ' Open rem otely operated exhaust valve and purge combustion products 
through water scrubber.
16. Ensure that ,there is  no residual pressure in v e sse l.
17. Open v e sse l door and remove top plate A.
18. Insert venturi air m over in port A and purge v e sse l.
19. Hose down v esse l with water. x
20. Clean out dust dispersion system s.
4 .5 .7 .3 .  Explosion Suppression Trials
1. Mount explosion suppressors (unpressurised)on/in the test v e sse l  
as appropriate.
2 . Check the integrity of the discrim inator and suppressor firing circu its.
3 . For gas tr ia ls  undertake 4 .5 .7 .1 .  instructions 1 - 5 .  For dust tr ia ls  
undertake 4 .5 .7 .2 .  instructions !  -  7 .
4 . P ressu r ise  explosion suppressors with nitrogen as appropriate.
5 . Fit explosive detonators as appropriate.
6 . Connect up suppressor firing circuit and check integrity of wiring.
7 . For gas tr ia ls  undertake 4 .5 .7 .1 .  instructions 6 - 1 8 .  For dust tr ia ls  
undertake 4 .5 .7 .2 .  instructions 8  -  20.
Note that a large quantity of noxious gases can be produced if  a ’P oor’
suppression or ’Failed* suppression resu lts. Personnel must wear protect­
ive m asks and these gases must be slowly purged through the water scrubber
before the v e sse l can be opened.
5. RESULTS
5 .1 . Explosions
The results of unsuppressed gas and dust explosion experim ents in the five 
test apparatus described in section 4 .1 . are presented below. D etails of 
the m easurem ents taken from pressure/tim e records of the explosion events 
are identified in Figure 10 (see section 4 .1 .4 . ) .  The burning ve locities, S^, 
were calculated from the early part of the pressure/tim e records, as  
described in section 3 .1 .1 .  The turbulence param eters and Tu were  
calculated using equations defined in section 3 .1 .2 .
35 .1 .1 .  The Bartknecht lm  V essel
5 .1 .1 .1 .  Gas Explosion T ests
Explosibility m easurem ents of quiescent CH^ and 70/30 CH^/H^ combustible 
ga ses , mixed with a ir , are presented graphically in Figures 13 and 14.
Table 5 .1 . sum m arises the measured explosibility param eters of the m ost 
explosible concentrations of these combustible g a ses .
GAS CONCENTRATION Pmax (dP/dt)' 'max
— 1
Su
- 1
Vol % -MPa MPa s m s
CH.4 9 0.74
5 .8 0.31
70/30 CH4 /H 2 15 0.72 10.3 0.52
TABLE 5.1
The effect of induced turbulence on the explosion param eters of the m ost 
explosible flammable gas concentrations was studied. These resu lts are 
presented in Table 5 .2 .
GAS t
V
s
P
0
kPa
Pmax
MPa
<dP/dt>max 
MPa s
oiSu
- 1m s
oC Tu
0.3 1 0 0.85 54.9 2 .55 7 .7 8 . 6
9 Vol % CH ’4
0 . 6 14 0 . 8 8 28.2 1.33 4 .0 4 .3
0 .9 14 0.90 25 .0 0.93 2 . 8 3 .8
1 .5 1 0 0 .90  \ 15.5 0.72 2 . 2 2 .3
0 .3 1 2 0 . 8 8 76.0 3 .79 7 .3 7 .1
15 Vol % 0 . 6 15 0 . 8 8 41.9 1 . 8 8 3 .6 3 .8
70/30 CH4 /H 2 0 .9 14 0 . 8 6 , 28 .7 1 . 1 0 2 . 1 2 . 6
1 .5 2 0 0.87 19.1 0.98 1 .9 1 .7
 ^ TABLE 5 .2 .
5 .1 .1 .2 .  Dust Explosion T ests
Explosibility data of cellu lose dust and bituminous coal dust dispersions in the 
3lm  v e sse l, measured using the standard test procedure (t^ = 0 . 6 s), are 
presented graphically in Figures 15 and 16. Table 5 .3 . sum m arises the 
measured explosibility param eters of the m ost explosible concentrations of 
the two combustible dusts.
DUST CONCENTRATION
-3
Pmax (dP/dt)' 'max
- 1
Su
- 1
kg m MPa MPa s m s
Cellulose . 0.75 0.92 15.5 0 .78
Coal 0.25 0.84 7 .5 0 .36
TABLE 5 .3
)
This standard dust explosion test methodology resulted in a large variation  
in (dP/dt) values at the m ost explosible dust concentrations. Cellulose  
dust (dP/dt) m easurem ents varied from 8 . 6  to 16 .3  MPa s , the average 
of seven m easurem ents being 12 .8  MPa s . The average calculated burning 
velocity data for cellu lose and coal dust explosions were 0.59 m s * and .
0.29 m s * respectively.
5 .1 .2 .  The Hartmann Vertical Tube Apparatus
Gas and dust explosion experim ents were undertaken in this apparatus using 
the standard test procedures. Additional experim ents were carried out 
using increased ignition delays, and using d iscrete  ignition procedures.
5 .1 .2 .1 .  Gas Explosion T ests
Explosibility m easurem ents of quiescent CH  ^ -  a ir  m ixtures are presented  
in Figure 17. Table 5 .4 . sum m arises the explosion param eters of the m ost 
explosible concentration of this fuel.
GAS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
Pmax
MPa
<dP /dt>max
M P a s" 1
Su
- 1m s
CH4 9 .5 0.60 27 .5
0.33
TABLE 5 .4 .
A typical pressure/tim e record for the explosion of a quiescent combustible 
gas in the Hartmann apparatuses shown in Figure 18. It is  evident that a 
fully developed quiescent gas explosion is  not attained in this apparatus,
and that the maximum rate of pressure r ise  occurs early in the explosion
■ \  
pressure development.
The effect of induced turbulence on the explosion param eters of 9 .5  Vol % 
CH^ -  air explosions in the Hartmann apparatus is  demonstrated by the 
results summarised in Table 5 .5 .
GAS t
V
m s
P
0
kPa
Pmax
MPa
(dP/dt) v 'max
MPa s" 1
Tu
81 36 0.81 81.4 2 .3
9 .5  Vol % 1 0 0 42 0 . 8 6 63.5 .1.7
CH4 1 2 0 46 0 . 8 6 55.1 1 .5
143 49 0 . 8 6 39.1 1 . 1
2 2 0 47 0.80 39.1 1 . 1
TABLE 5.5
5 .1 .2 .2 .  Characterisation of Dust D ispersion
The steel explosion tube of the Hartmann apparatus was replaced by a 
perspex tube with a sealed top end. A high speed cine camera was used to 
film  the dust dispersion characteristics of the Hartmann apparatus. An 
’event mark' on the edge of the film was synchronised with the activation 
of the dust dispersion solenoid valve. It was established that the dust 
cloud reaches the ignition source within 60m s, and that dust dispersion is  
complete in le ss  than 100m s, see Plate XHI.
5 .1 .2 .3 .  Dust Explosion T ests
Cellulose dust explosions were undertaken in the Hartmann apparatus using
the standard ’hot co il’ and ’train of induction coil sparks’ ignition procedures
described in section 4 .1 .2 .1 .  The results of these te sts  identified the m ost
- 3explosible cellu lose dust concentration as 0.85 kg m , see Figures 19 and
20. This concentration was used in a ll subsequent cellu lose dust explosion 
experim ents in the Hartmann apparatus.
54ms 144ms
P L A T E  XIII: Dust Dispersion in the Hartmann Tube
The measured explosion param eters of cellu lose dust explosions initiated 
by a train of induction coil sparks after preset ignition delays, t^ , are  
summarised in Table 5 .6 . The actual ignition delays, t^, were measured  
from the explosion pressure/tim e records, see Figure 10.
DUST n t '
V
t
V
P
0
Pmax (dP/dt)' 'max
m s m s kPa MPa MPa s" 1
5 9 1 0 2 34 0 . 8 6 34.6
6 32 107 39 0.85 32.1
9 50 1 1 0 37 0.83 31.7
_3
0.85  kg m 5 75 . 1 1 0 37 0 . 8 8 31.1
Cellulose 6 95 113 39 0.81 28 .8
5 119 133 40 0.85 27.5
5 151 166 43 0.76 13.3
5 185 196 45 0.72 1 1 . 1
2 228 .250 47 0.51 3 .3
TABLE 5 .6 .
The influence of ignition delay, t , on the measured explosion param eters 
i s  shown in Figure 21. Note that no ignition occured at t <  100m s, using 
th is ignition procedure.
The explosibility characteristics of cellu lose dust dispersed into the 
Hartmann tube were measured using d iscrete ignition sources. The 
results of te sts  using 200mJ fuse head ignition, and using 100J capacitive 
spark ignition are presented in Figures 22 and 23 respectively. No ignition 
occured at t <r 45ms using these d iscrete ignition procedures. An ignition 
delay of  ^ 70ms resulted in the moist severe explosion.
Comparative cellu lose dust explosibility m easurem ents obtained using 
sustained and discrete ignition procedures are summarised in Table 5 .7 .
IGNITION SOURCE n t
V
m s
Pmax
MPa
(dP/dt)■' 'max
- 1MPa s
i
S !u  i
m  s |
Hot Coil 25 80+ 0.77 34.2 0 . 2 0  J
100J Capacitor Spark : 5 80 0.78 36 .6 0 .24  1
■ i
Induction Coil Sparks 1 0 1 0 0 + 0.79 29.2 0 . 2 0  j
100J Capacitpr Spark 1 0 1 0 0 0.78 31 .6 °*21 j
+ t was estimated from the pressu re/tim e record 
v
‘  ^ ' TABLE 5 .7 .
Comparative tests  on a range of industrial dusts were undertaken in the 
Hartmann apparatus using two alternative ignition procedures:
(i) the ’standard’ continuous hot coil;
(ii) a d iscrete 100J capacitor spark activated at t = 80m s.
(dP/dt) measurements at the m ost explosible dust concentrations, as max
determined by the hot coil ignition te s ts , are presented in Table 5 .8 .
EXPLOSIBLE DUST \  (ms) 
Hot Coil
(dP/dt)max <MPa s_1) €
Hot Coil 100J Spark
Sodium Stearate 163 11 .5 20 .4 1.77
Industrial Dust A 155 1 .5 4 .9 3.27
Industrial Dust B 132 4 .0 6 .7 1 . 6 8
Soya Flour 1 1 0 2 . 8 4 .2 1 .5 0
Cornflour < 85 22 .7 18 .9 -0 ,8 3
Benzene Sulphonamide 83 7 .9 8 .5 1.07
Maize Starch 81 30.8 28.5 0.92
C ellulose 80 34.2 36 .6 1.07
Saccharin 69 19 .2 13 .6 0.71
Pharm aceutical Dust A 6 8 19 .7 1 2 . 1 0.61
Pharm aceutical Dust B 63 13 .8 8 . 2 0.59
Stearic Acid 58 32.2 1.8 . 2 0.56
Industrial Dust C 50 • 31 .6 24 .2 .0.77
Sulphur 45 2 1 . 2 11 .5 0.54
TABLE 5 .8 .
Note that & is  defined as the ratio of the m easured (dP/dt) values:-' 'max
(dP/dt)  ----------100J spark ignition^ _ max
<dP /dtW x hot coil ignition
Figure 24 shows the relation between (dP/dt)max> £  and t (hot coil
ignition). During these experiments it was established that certain granular
s
dusts could not be effectively ignited in the Hartmann Apparatus using a 
1 0 0 J spark, even at long ignition delays, whereas they would ignite and
explode using the hot coil ignition procedure. Ignition of such dusts appear­
ed to result from the flam es produced when the combustible dust settled on 
the hot co il.
5 .1 .3 .  The 1;1 Aspect Ratio Vertical Tube Apparatus
A ser ie s  of gas and cellu lose dust explosion te sts  sim ilar to those reported 
in section 5 .1 .2 .  above were undertaken in the 1:1 aspect ratio vertical 
tube apparatus.
5 .1 .3 .1 .  Gas Explosion T ests
Explosibility m easurem ents of quiescent CH and 70/30 GH /H  combustible 
ga ses  mixed with air are presented in Figures 25 and 26, and the determ in­
ed explosion param eters at the m ost explosible combustible gas concentrat­
ions are summarised in Table 5 .9 .
GAS CONCENTRATION Pmax <dP /dt>max
- 1
S.u
- 1
Vol % MPa MPa s m s
GH.4 9 .5 0.69 50 0.35
70/30 CH4 /H 2 14.5 0.74 74 0.44
TABLE 5 .9 .
A typical p ressu re/tim e record of a quiescent combustible g a s /a ir  explos­
ion in this 1 : 1  aspect ratio tube is  compared with the corresponding record  
obtained in the Hartmann tube in Figure 18. A fully developed explosion  
i s  attained in this apparatus.
The resu lts of turbulent 9 .5  Vol % CH and 14 .5  Vol % 70/30 CH ./H_4 4 2
explosions are presented in Table 5 .10 .
GAS t
V
m s
n P o
kPa
Pmax
MPa
(dP/dt)max 
MPa s" 1
Tu
70 2 30 0.78 207 3.51
80 i 5 31 0.85 150 2.51
CH4 115 4 31 0 . 8 8 175 2 .94
(9.5 Vol %) 135 5 34 0.89 130 2 .14
190 6 34 0.90 108 1.77
75 1 25 0.91 342 4 .32
90 3 28 0.83 274 3 .38
70:30 CH *.H0  4 2 1 1 2 3 28 0.87 182 2 .24
(14.5 Vol %) 138 4 31 0.87 234 2 . 6 8
165 3 31 0.87 174 2 . 1 1
TABLE 5 .1 0 .
5 .1 .3 .2 .  Dust Explosion T ests
Cellulose du st/a ir  explosions were undertaken in this apparatus using
induction spark ignition, see Figure 27. The m ost explosible concentration
- 3
identified ,  0 . 8 kg m 7 was used in a ll subsequent cellu lose dust tests  in 
th is apparatus. The measured explosibility of cellu lose dust d ispersions, 
ignited by a train of induction coil sparks after preset ignition delays, are  
presented in Table 5 .1 1 .
DUST tV
m s
n P o
kPa
Pmax
MPa
<dP /dt>max 
MPa s“X
1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0.77 37 .8
1 2 1 5 2 2 0 . 8 6 37.9
135 5 24 0 . 8 6 32.9
144 3 2 1 0.84 34.9
-30 .80kg m 00 00 5 30 0.67 10 .5
193 5 38 0.69 a. 7
Cellulose 254 5 38 0.51 6 . 2
301 5 39 0.39 4 .2
373 5 39 0.16 1 . 0
TABLE 5 .1 1 .
Figure 28 shows the influence of ignition delay on explosion param eters in 
this test apparatus.
Comparative results of cellu lose dust explosion param eters determined with 
the alternative ignition procedures, a) the standard train of induction coil 
sparks, and b) the d iscrete 100J capacitive spark, are presented in Table 
5 .1 2 .
IGNITION SOURCE n v
m s
max
MPa
(dP/dt) 
MPa s
max
-1
u
m s
Induction Coil Sparks 
100J Capacitor Spark. 
100J Capacitor Spark
10
6
9
100
100
70
0.77
0.83
0.83
37 .8  0 .25
38 .7  0 .23
52 .1  0 .33
TABLE 5 .1 2 .
35 .1 .4 . The 43 dm Spherical Apparatus
5 .1 .4 .1 .  Gas Explosions
Explosibility m easurem ents of quiescent CH^, 70/30 CH^/H^ and C^Hg 
combustible g a ses , mixed with air, are presented graphically in Figures 
29 -  31. Table 5 .1 3 . sum m arises the measured explosibility param eters 
of the m ost explosible concentrations of these g a ses .
GAS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
P max
MPa
(dP/dt)■ ' 'max
MPa s *
Su
- 1m s
CH . 10 .5 0.69 17 .6 0.29
70/30 CH4 /H 2 14 .0 0.69 25 .6 0.45
C3H8
4 .5 0.80 34 .0 0.46
TABLE 5 .1 3 .
Comparable unsuppressed quiescent gas explosion experim ents w ere under­
taken at the m ost explosible gas concentrations with capacitive spark ignition 
with spark energies ranging from 1 .7 J to 320J. These results are presented  
in Table 5 .1 4 .
\
GAS IGNITION SOURCE IGNITION ENERGY n P max (dP /dt>maX
J MPa MPa s *
Induction coil 0 .03 7 0.69 17 .6
10 .5  Vol % 40pF capacitor 1 0 0 5 0.69 15 .2
CH4 40pF capacitor
320 3 0 . 6 6 13 .3
Induction coil 0.03 13 0.69 2 5 .6
ljiF  capacitor 1 .7 2 0.73 25 .5
14 Vol % lp F  capacitor 6 . 8 2 0.74 26 .8
70/30 CH4 /H 2 40pF capacitor 6 . 8 1 0 . 6 6 20 .4
40pF capacitor . 1 0 0 1 0 .70 21 .5
40jiF capacitor 180 2 0 . 6 8 17 .7
40/iF capacitor 320 2 0 . 6 8 17 .7
4 .5  Vol % Induction coil 0 .03 2 0.75 34 .0
C3H8 40pF capacitor 1 0 0 2 0.80 2 5 .0
TABLE 5 .1 4 .
There is  an observed inverse correlation between the ignition energy and 
the measured (dPAft)max values. The early part of the explosion p ressu re / 
tim e curves were influenced by the energy of the capacitive spark ignition 
source, see Figure 32.
The effect of induced turbulence on the explosion param eters of combustible
3gas concentrations in the 43 dm apparatus is  demonstrated by the resu lts  
summarised in Table 5 .1 5 . These experim ents were undertaken using the 
perforated spray ring dispersion procedure and induction coil spark ignition.
GAS tV n P o Pmax (dP/dt)' 'max od.Su oC Tu
m s kPa MPa MPa s" 1 - 1m s
2 1 0 4 33 0 . 8 6 144 2 .24 7 .7 6 . 2
264 6 39 0.93 123 2 .08 7 .2 5 .0
10 .5  Vol % 320 3 40 0.95 95 1.85 6 .4 3 .8
CH4 396 1 41 0.90 84 1 .34 4 .6 3 .4
488 1 40 0.91 60 0.93 3 .2 2 .4
538 1 44 0.91 60 0.82 2 . 8 2 .3
600 1 43 0 . 8 6 41 0.65 2 . 2 1 . 6
2 1 0 3 37 0.89 169 3.07 6 . 8 4 .8
263 4 39 0 . 8 6 143 2 .06 4 .6 4 .0
320 3 41 0.89 109 1.83 4 .1 3 .0
14 Vol % 375 44 0.85 . 1 0 4 1.82 4 .0 2 . 8
70/30 CH /H  4 Z 435 1 43 0.85 83 1 .5 6 3 .5 2 .3
473 1 44 0.90 78 1 .38 3 .1 2 . 1
593 1 48 0.85 69 1 .14 2 .5 1 . 8
745 1 47 0.90 60 0.95 2 . 1 1 . 6
TABLE 5 .1 5 .
5 .1 .4 .2 .  Dust Explosion T ests
The explosibility param eters of cellu lose dust were measured in the proto-
3 3type 43 dm apparatus (1.8 dm canister with 0 .82 MPa dispersion p ress­
ure and pepper pot spreader disperser) using a train of induction coil sparks
as the ignition source. The most explosible dust concentration was found to 
- 3be 0.9kg m , see  Figure 33. The resultant ignition delay with this dust 
dispersion procedure proved to be very long. Subsequent te sts  used a
30 .9  dm dust dispersion canister pressurised  to 1 .6 4  MPa. Table 5 .16  
sum m arises the measured explosibility data with the two test procedures.
DISPERSION PROCEDURE n t
V
m s
Pmax
MPa
(dP/dt)' 'max
MPa s" 1
A
3
: 1 .8  dm canister, 0.82 MPa, 
pepper pot spreader 1 0 570 0.89 10 .3
B
3
: 0 .9  dm canister, 1 .64  MPa, 
. pepper pot spreader 7 285 0.93 10 .5
TABLE 5 .1 6 .
T ests were undertaken using dispersion procedure B and 100J capacitor
-3  3spark ignition and a cellu lose dust concentration of 0.9kg m in the 43 dm 
apparatus. The explosion param eters measured at several preset ignition 
delay tim es are summarised in Table 5 .1 7 .
DUST n t
V
m s
P o
kPa
P max
MPa
(dP/dt)' 'max
MPa s’”1
% no 
ignition
5 194 - - 1 0 0
-3
9 250 27 0.95 27 .4  , 45
0.9kg m 7 300 28 0.96 23.9 30
Cellulose 6 372 30 0.99 23 .7 17
7 420 35 1 .03 17 .4 14
5 622 .35 0.99 1 1 . 0 0
5 820 34 0.90 9 .9 0
TABLE 5.17.
With the shorter ignition delay tim es some tests  resulted in no igifiition of 
the dust dispersion. Figure 34 shows the relation between the explosion 
param eters and the ignition delay, t .
A few experiments were undertaken to appraise the influence of the capacitor 
discharge ignition energy on the explosion severity of turbulent cellu lose  
d u st/a ir  d ispersions. The results obtained are presented in Table 5 .1 8 .
DUST IGNITION ENERGY 
J
Pmax
MPa
(dP/dt)■ max
_  - 1  MPa s
% no 
ignition
A -3  0.9kg m 50 1 .04 17.5 70
Cellulose 1 0 0 0.98 19.5 15
(t^ = 400ms) 500 1 . 0 1 2 0 . 1 0
TABLE 5 .1 8 .
Sim ilarly a few experiments were undertaken with a higher dust dispersion  
pressure of 20 .5  MPa using the same ’pepper pot’ dust dispersion system , 
see  Table 5 .1 9 .
DUST t P (dP/dt) .% no v max max , . ... ^ ignition
m s MPa MPa s
0.9kg m 3  
Cellulose
(100J Spark Ignition)
300 . -  100 
400 1 .05  23 .3  0 
500 1 .0 8  1 4 .2  0
TABLE 5.19 .
A high speed film of the 'pepper pot' dust dispersion procedure, obtained 
3using a 40 dm spherical g la ss  flask to simulate the test v e sse l, showed 
that all of the dust was effectively ejected in le s s  than 2 0 0 ms; but that the 
'pepper pot’ did not d isperse the dust sample homogeneously into the 
sphere. The sem i-circu lar perforated spray pipe produced a m ore homo­
geneous dust dispersion in the test v e sse l. The dust sample was dispersed  
through this spray pipe in ~ 210m s. The influence of ignition delay tim e, *
_3
t , on the measured explosibility of 0.9kg m cellu lose dust was evaluated 
using th is sem i-circu lar spray ring dispersion procedure and 1 0 0 J 
capacitor spark ignition, see  Table 5 .2 0 .
DUST t
V
m s
n Pmax
MPa
(dP/dt)■ 'max
' ™  ■ - 1  ■,MPa s
o^S
u
- 1m s
90 3 0 . 8 6 46.1 1 .04
115 1 0.93 54.1 1.43
-30.9kg m 170 3 0.99 59.5 1 .46
Cellulose 2 1 0 6 0.98 45 .5 1 .26
265 4 0.98 36.7 1 .05
i 320 2 0.93 36.1 0.93
• 437 3 0.97 24.7 0.79
TABLE 5 .2 0 .
Effective ignition was achieved for .all t^ >  90ms with this spray ring dust 
dispersion procedure. The relations between t and both an(*
S are shown in Figure 35. Cellulose dust explosion te sts  were under-
U 3taken with an ignition delay equal to the dust dispersion tim e in the 43 dm
apparatus (t = 210ms) over a range of dust concentrations. These te s ts ,
v -3
see  Figure 36, verified that 0.9kg m was the m ost explosible concentrat­
ion of cellu lose dust in this test apparatus.
3The spray ring dust dispersion methodology described for the 43 dm
apparatus generates an initial overpressure in the v e sse l, at ignition of
28 kPa, which is  comparable with that produced in the Hartmann
3apparatus. T est results in the 43 dm apparatus using spray ring d ispers­
ion with a lower dust dispersion pressure, and also with partial evacuation 
of the explosion chamber, such that the dust explosion was initiated at 
atmospheric pressure, are presented in Table 5 .2 1 . These te sts  were 
undertaken with the optimum ignition delay of 2 1 0 m s and 1 0 0 J capacitive spark 
ignition.
DUST CONCENTRATION
i “ 3kg m
DISPERSION
PRESSURE
MPa
n
!
P o
kPa
P max
MPa
(dP/dt) x ma
MPa s *
0 .9 1 .64 6 28 0 .98 45 .5
* 0 .9 0.82 5 14 0.89 36 .6
C ellulose 0 .9 1 .64 5 0 0 . 8 6 34 .3
0.78 1 .6 4 4 t). 0 .82 33 .7
0 . 6 6 1 .64 4 0 0.83 3 2 .0
TABLE 5 .2 1 .
The explosion param eters of five dusts, determined at their m ost explosible
3concentrations in the 43 dm apparatus using the spray ring dispersion  
procedure and 100J spark ignition are summarised in Table 5 .2 2 . These 
te sts  were undertaken at three d iscrete ignition delays (turbulence lev e ls). 
Each result is  an average of five m easurem ents.
DUST (dP/dt)max (MPa s”1)
t = 2 1 0 m s
V
t = 265ms
V
t = 320ms
V
Gum Arabic 35.8 27.2 16 .9
Magnesium Stearate 90.4 77.6 53.5
Phenolic Resin 64.3 56.4 44 .7
Fenclofenac 31.6 30.2 16 .5
Cellulose 45 .5 36 .6 28 .2
TABLE 5 .2 2 .
35 .1 .5 .  The 6.2m  IEP Test V essel
5 .1 .5 .1 .  Gas Explosion T ests
Quiescent CH , 70/30 C H ,/H 0, and CcH gas explosions were undertaken 
4 4 Z 3 o
in this large volume chamber using spark ignition.
It was noted that the pressure/tim e curves of quiescent CH^ -  a ir explosions 
exhibited a doublet of the form shown below:
P
max
/(d P /d t) max
This doublet was more distinct at specific CH^ concentrations and the p ress-
+
ure record had an imposed oscillation. In general, (dP/dt) (dP/dt) .max max
The results of quiescent CH^ -  air explosions ignited with a 30mJ induction 
coil spark are summarised in Table 5 .2 3 .
GAS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
Pmax
MPa
(dP/dt)■ 'max
MPa s 1
(dP/dt) +' 'max
MPa sT1
■.............  T
S i u j
m s  ^ 1
..  . _ _ -  t
6 .7 0 .4 0.5 - 0 .08
0,61 1 .60 — 0.18
0.65 - 2 .90 0.19
V.64 — 4.50 0.16
7 .6 0.64 - 2 .95 0.16
0.60 - 3 .15 0.09
8 .5 0.65 - 2 .40 0 . 2 2
CH4 0.63 S 1 7 5 2.95 0 .26
9 .4 0 . 6 8 2.35 2 .50 0 .30
1 0 . 0 0.71 2 .6 0 - 0.32
1 0 . 2 0.71 2 .70 - 0.37
0.72 2 .7 0 0.32
0.73 2 .73 3 .70 0 .34
1 1 . 1  , 0.65 2 . 0 0 2 . 1 0 0.30
11 .5 0 . 6 8 1.98 2 .7 0 0.28
11.9 0.67 2 .04 3.72 0.27
TABLE 5.23.
The results of comparable quiescent CH^ -  a ir explosions ignited with a 
100J capacitive spark are summarised in Table 5 .2 4 .
GAS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
Pmax
MPa
(dP/dt) v 'max
MPa s_ 1
(dP/d t)max
MPa s *
I
s !U i
- i  !
m s  j
6 .4 0.49 0.49 - 0 . 1 0
1
7 .0 0.51 0.90 - 0 .06  j
0.63 0.98 2.27
!
0.17 i
j
7 .6 0.61 0.65 2 .55 0.13 j
0.55 1 . 0 0 1.97 0 . 1 0
0.63 0.95 2.32 0.18
0.61 1.73 1.45 0.25
8 .5 0.57 1 .30 0 . 2 1
0.64 2.45 - 0 .30
CH.4 9 .4 0.67 2.27 - 0 .30
9 .8 0.67 2 .65 —  ■ 0.32
0.73 3.05 0.36
1 0 . 2 *0.69 2 .80 2.77 0.35
0.69 3 .10 0.37
1 0 . 6 0.71 2 .80 3 .60 0.31
1 1 . 1 0.67 2 .4 0 • - 0 .32
11.9 • 0.65 2.07 0.28
12.3 0.59 1 .18 -  ■ 0 . 2 0
1 2 . 8 0.55 0.73 0.15
TABLE 5.24 .
The data of Tables 5 .23  and 5 .24 , ignoring the artefact of the doublet, are
presented graphically in Figure 37. The explosion param eters of quiescent
CH. - a ir  can be ascertained from these results -  see Table 5 .2 5 .4
GAS CONCENTRATION Pmax (dp /d tu Su
Vol % MPa M P a s ” 1
- 1
m s
CH4 1 0 . 2
0.72 3.1 0.34
TABLE 5 .2 5 .
Note that this 'most explosible’ concentration does not exhibit the distinct 
doublet which occurs at a concentration of 7 .6  Vol. %.
3
Quiescent 70/30 CH /H 9  -  a ir explosions were studied in the 6 .2m  v esse l  
using induction coil spark ignition only. These te sts  identified a m ore pro­
nounced 'doublet', again at specific fuel gas concentrations. A (dP/dt) max
measurement could not be meaningfully measured from such curves because  
' the perturbation occurred at v  0 .3  MPa; but S  ^ could be ascertained. 
Quiescent 70/30 CH^/H^ -  a ir  explosion results are sum m arised in Table 
5 .2 6 .
GAS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
Pmax
MPa
(dP/dt)' 'max
MPa s 1
<dP /dC x
- 1
MPa s
Su
- 1m s
9 .9 0.56 2 .9 - 0.19
10 .4 0 . 6 6 7 .6 0 .23
10.9 0.67 - 9 .6 0 .30
1 1 . 8 0.72 - 9 .1 0.35
70/30 12.3 0.67 4 .3 0.42
c h 4 / h 2 1 2 . 8 0.70 - 6 . 8 0 .44
13 .8 0.70 5 .0 -  ■ • 0.51
14 .8 0.76 5 .2 0.48
15 .8 0 .78 - 9 .1 0 .50
16 .8 0.72 - 6 .4 0.41 *
17 .8 0.69 3 .5 - 0 .34
TABL& 5 .2 6 .
These data are presented graphically in Figure 38. The explosion param eters 
of 70/30 CH^/Hg, ignoring the artefact of the doublet, can be estimated from  
these data -  see  Table 5 .2 7 .
GAS CONCENTBATION Pmax (dP/dt)max sU
Vol % MPa MPa s * “ 1  |m s
70/30 CH4 /H 2 15 0.78 5 .2 0.50
TABLE 5 .27 .
3
Quiescent C H -  air explosions were studied in the 6.2m  v e sse l using o o
induction coil spark ignition. It was found that the explosion p ressu re/tim e  
records exhibited a marked transition at (P ,^ ,t^ , ) for all concentrations 
4 .5  Vol %, and that the subsequent pressure record was violently  
oscillatory -  see sketch below:
P
< 4 .3  Vol % C0H
•^ 4.5  Vol % C_H
The pressure/tim e record of a 4 .3  Vol % C0H mixture exhibited a ’doublet'
0 .0 -
of the type observed with some CH^ and 70/30 CH^/Hg gas explosions. The 
results of C0H -  A ir explosions are presented in Table 5 .28  and Figure 39.GO
GAS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
Pmax
MPa
(dP/dt)'max
MPa s *
P
MPa
t
s
Su
- 1
m s
2 . 8 0.60 1 . 2 - - 0.18
3 .3 0.73 2 .5 - - 0.23
3 .8 0.78 4 .0 - - 0 .40
4 .3 0.82 5 .4 0.55 0.36 0.42
C3H8 4.5* 0.83 1 0 . 6 0.42 o;35 0.42
4 .6 0.81 11.9 0 .36 0.42 0.43
4 .7 0 . 8 6 14 .9 0.35 0.34 0.39
5 .2 0 . 8 6 19 .8 0.14 0.36 0.32
5 .7 0 .80 1 0 . 0 0.13 0.76 0.16
6 . 1 0.78 1 1 . 0 0.14 0.98 0.14
6 . 6 0.64 4 .2 0.15 3 .10 0 . 0 2
TABLE 5 .2 8 .
3The explosion param eters of C H gas in the 6 .2m  v esse l can be ascertainedO O <
from these data -  see Table 5 .2 9 .
GAS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
Pmax
MPa
<dP/dt>max 
MPa s" 1
Su
- 1
m s
4 .0 0.78 5 .0 0.42
C3H8 - 5 .2 '0 . 8 6 19 .8 *0.32
TABLE 5 .2 9 .
Note that the maximum (dP/dt) value and the maximum S value occurV 'max u
at different C_H_ concentrations.3 8
The course of fireball growth was determined using a multi-probe flame 
proximity detector shown in plate XII, and from high speed cine records 
of the quiescent gas explosions. Fireball growth was of the form shown 
below:
Axial wall
Fireball
Growth axial direction
Radial wall
radial direction
t
Note that there is  a finite tim e delay between ignition and propagation of 
the fireball away from the igniting electrodes. The fireball starts to grow 
out as a sphere, and then grows as an ellipsoid. The m easured actual 
flam e speeds, S^, are summarised in Table 5 .30  below:
GAS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
Pmax
MPa
<dP /dt>max 
MPa s" 1
Su
- 1m s
Sf' -  AXIAL 
- 1m s
S' -  RADIAL 
- 1
m s
CH4 7 .6 0.64 2 .90 0.18 2 . 6
1 .4
<*4 1 0 . 2 0.71 2 .70 0.35 5 .7
3 .7
C3H8 4 ,6 0.81 11.90 0.43 4 .9
3 .4
TABLE 5 .3 0 .
3The 6.2m  pressure v e sse l was fitted with strain gauges adjacent to the 
central pressure transducer to monitor the radial and hoop strains which 
occur in the vesse l walls during quiescent gas explosions. It was found 
that there was only minimal axial and hoop strain with a 10 .2  Vol % CH^
explosion, but that there was a major axial strain with a 7 .6  Vol % CH, 
explosion. This latter CH^ concentration exhibited the ’doublet’ artefact 
reported above. The pressure, fireball growth and strain gauge outputs 
superimposed on the same tim e axes are presented in Figure 40.
The theoretical burning velocity calculated from the pressu re/tim e record , 
S^, see  section 3 .1 .1 . ,  refers to a confined explosion centrally ignited 
in a closed sphere. The actual burning velocity in a non-spherical v e sse l  
i s ,  from equations 15 and 17:
s’ = S I  . 4  (42)u u 3 V ' 1
is  a vector average of the axial and radial burning ve locities. The 
theoretical flame speed, S ,^ i s  given by equation 9 :
S = E . S (9)f u ■ ' ' ~
For CH^ and CgHg; E - 7 .7 .  Table 5.31 com pares the theoretical average 
burning velocity with the corresponding average burning velocity S * 
calculated from the measured axial and radial flame speeds S^ .
GAS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
DIRECTION
MEASURED
s /  ' s '  - s 'f u u
-1 -1 -1m s  m s  m s
THEORETIC A
S "s u u
-1 -1
m s  m s
CH4 10.2 AXIAL
RADIAL
4.9 0.63
3.4 0.44 0,54 0.35 0.48
CEL4 7.6 AXIAL
RADIAL
2.6 0.34
1.4 0.18 0,26 0.18 0.25
C3H8 4.6 AXIAL
RADIAL
5.7 0.74
3.7 0.48 0,61 0.43 0.59
TABLE 5 .3 1 .
5 .1 .5 .2 . Dust Explosion Tests
3
Cellulose dust explosions were undertaken in the 6 .2m  v esse l using the 
experimental procedure described in section 4 .4 .5 .3 .  An ignition delay 
of 970ms was chosen to ascertain the m ost explosible cellu lose dust con­
centration in this test apparatus, since this ignition delay is  longer than 
the measured tim e interval of 860ms required to expel the total dust charge
into the container. Figure 41 shows that the optimum cellu lose dust con-
-3centration was ^ 0.73kg m . The influence of ignition delay, t^ t on the 
measured explosion param eters of this m ost explosible dust concentration 
was evaluated. All tests  used 100J capacitive spark ignition. The results  
are summarised in Table 5 .3 2 . and Figure 42.
DUST tv
m s
P o
kPa
P max
MPa
(dP/dt)' max
M P a s - 1
Su
- 1m s
282 4 No Ignition 0
425 6 0.87 16 .0 1 .9 6
-3
660 6 0.90 1 1 . 8 1 .14
,0.73kg m 860 7 0.89 9 .8 0.83
Cellulose 980 6 0 . 8 8 7 .8 0.77
(Batch WM) 1160 6 0.84 4 .9 0 .44
1380 8 0.82 3 .1 0.29
TABLE 5 .3 2 .
The available supply of the original batch of cellu lose dust (WM), see  
section 4 .1 .6 .2 . ,  was exhausted in these tr ia ls . A second batch of 
cellu lose dust with the same specification (WM2) was purchased for
subsequent tests  in the 6 .2m  v e sse l. Repeated tests  with this batch at the
’optimum’ ignition delay of 860ms demonstrated that the explosion data
3measured in the 6.2m  v e sse l was very reproducible; see  Table 5 .3 3 .;  and 
that the explosibility of Batch WM2 was 25% m ore violent than had been 
found for batch WM, compare Tables 5 .3 2 . and 5 .3 3 .
DUST ,t 
; v
m s
Pmax
MPa
<dP /dt>max
_  - 1  MPa s
Su
- 1m s
0.89 10.75 1.26
0.73kg m“ 3 0.90 11.40 1.15
Cellulose 860 0.92 11.60 1 .15
(Batch WM2) 0.91 10.80 1 . 2 1
0 . 8 8 9.45 0.92
1 . 0 2 11.30 1 .37.
0.98 11.70 1 .43
TABLE 5 .3 3 .
The cellu lose dust batch WM2 was used in a ll explosion suppression tr ia ls  
3in the 6 .2m  v esse l described in section 5 .4 .3 3 .
5 .2 . Explosion Suppressants
Cellulose dust explosions were undertaken in the Hartmann vertical tube 
apparatus in the presence of defined concentrations of suppressants using 
the experimental procedures described in section 4 .2 . The following 
agents were studied:
(i) carbon dioxide and nitrogen, see Figure 43;
(ii) Halon 1211 and Halon 1301+, see  Figure 44;
(iii) mono-ammonium phosphate and china clay, see  Figure 45.
Note that each point plotted in Figures 43 -  45 represents an average of at 
least five m easurem ents. The determined minimum inhibiting concentrat­
ion of these agents, for cellu lose dust d ispersions, are summarised in 
Table 5 .3 4 .
SUPPRESSANT AGENT INHIBITING CONCENTRATION
Carbon Dioxide 
Nitrogen 
Halon 1211 
Halon 1301
Mono-ammonium Phosphate 
China Clay
42 Vol %
51 Vol %
7 .4  Vol %
7 .6  Vol %
27 weight % (0.25kg m 3) 
69 weight % (0.65kg m 3)
TABLE 5 .3 4 .
+ Note that Halon 1211 and Halon 1301 are vapours at NTP.
5 .3 . Explosion Suppressors
The suppressant discharge characteristics of Graviner hem ispherical and 
high rate discharge (HRD) explosion suppressors were measured and are 
presented below.
5 .3 .1 .  Hemispherical Suppressors
3The discharge of a 1 dm capacity Halon 1011 hem ispherical suppressor 
against a background squared grid (30.0mm) is  shown in Plate XIV. Study 
of the high speed film records indicates that this type of suppressor opens 
within 1 m s, and discharges its  contents over a 180° solid angle with an 
initial discharge velocity in excess  of 1 0 0  m s \
3 3 3The discharge characteristics of 0 .5  dm , 1 . 0  dm and 5 .0  dm hemi­
spherical suppressors, charged with Halon 1011, were determined from  
high speed film s of the discharge event and are shown in Figure 46.
5 .3 .2 .  High Rate Discharge (HRD) Suppressors
' 5 .3 .2 .1 .  Standard Graviner HRD Suppressors
3 *The discharge of a 3 dm HRD suppressor, with elbow and 75mm long
spreader, against a background (300mm) squared grid is  shown in P late
XV. A close study of the film  records indicates that an initial burst of
Halon is  observed some 5m s after firing, and that the bulk discharge does
not start until *v 18ms after firing. The measured discharge velocity was
'*•' 43 m s The U .V . oscillograph output record, see  section 4 .3 .3 . ,
3for this 3 dm HRD suppressor is  shown in Figure 47. Canister de- 
pressurisation, which com m ences after ~ 7m s is  completed in 125m s. 
The maximum rate of depressurisation is  109 MPa s \  The oscillograph  
output had curves from two separate strain gauge networks mounted on 
the spreader:
* The standard nomenclature describes an HRD suppressor by its  
suppressant charge.
5 ms 30ms
40ms
50 ms
20ms
P L A T E  XIV:
60ms
Discharge Characteristic 
of 1dm Hemispherical
Suppressor
(i) SG  ^ -  full bridge strain gauge network;
(ii) SG -  single arm strain gauge network.
The more sensitive SG  ^ system  identified both an initial burst and, a bulk 
discharge of suppressant. This SG  ^ system , however, proved to be very  
unreliable because the strain gauges mounted on the inner surface of the 
spreader assem bly were frequently damaged by copper fragments from 
the detonator and the frangible d isc . The SG system , although much le s s  
sensitive, proved very reliable. However, the output from the SG  ^
system  was confounded by temperature effects, which produced a zero  
shift during the discharge event. Initial tests  were carried out with both 
strain gauge system s, but the inherent unreliability of the SG  ^ system  
delayed tests to such an extent that subsequent discharge experim ents were 
undertaken with only the SG  ^ system  operational. The following param eters 
were defined from these strain gauge outputs:
j n a s s  I 
discharge 
rate
tim e
t '  -  start of initial burst of suppressant
t -  start of bulk discharge o
t^ -  end of bulk discharge 
tg -  completion of discharge
E^ “ estim ated average m ass discharge rate between tQ and 
(bulk discharge). x
Eg -  estim ated average m ass discharge rate between t^ and t^.
70ms
100 ms40 ms
120ms
PLATE XV:
Discharge Characteristic 
of 3dm^ HRD Suppressor
The results of suppressor discharge te sts , using standard Graviner and 
Deugra single exit (76mm diameter) HRD suppressor system s, are 
summarised in Tables 5 .35 -  5 .37 .
HALON 1011 SYSTEMS -  P XT = 2 MPaNO­
SUPPRESSANT ELBOW SPREADER t 'n tn V V R 1 R 2
CAPACITY LENGTH
dm3 ;mm m s m s m s m s . “ 1kg s
, - 1kg s
3 No 75 - 9 25 1 0 0 142 45
3 Yes 75 3 .5 17 39 113 104 46
3 Y es 150 18 56 128 80 43
3.0 Y es 150 - 16 77 2 2 0 125 80
35 Yes 150 - 18 2 2 0 1370 89 44
TABLE 5. 35.
'
WATER SYSTEMS -  P XT =
2
2 MPa
SUPPRESSANT ELBOW SPREADER /
CAPACITY LENGTH to to % *2 R 1 E2 .
dm3 mm ins ms m s m s
. • - 1kg s . - 1kg s
3 Yes 75 5 1 2 31 83 63 35
1 0 Yes 150 - 1 2 80 2 2 0 59 42
35 Yes 150 • - 11 198 951 6 6 30
TABLE 5.36 .
POWDER SYSTEM -  P XT = 6  MPaN
2
SUPPRESSANT ELBOW SPREADER
CAPACITY LENGTH t '  
0
to 42 * 1 * 2
dm3 mm m s m s m s m s .  - 1kg s .  - 1kg s
4 Yes 150 9 23 1 1 0 1 1 0 32
TABLE 5 .3 7 .
The measured discharge profiles of single exit (76mm diameter) HRD 
suppressors are shown in Figure 48.
5 .3 .2 .2 .  Influence of F ill Ratio 
A ser ie s  of Halon 1011 discharge tests were undertaken using different fill
3
ratios in the standard 3 dm HRD suppressor (actual canister volume 
3^  5 dm ) with elbow and 75mm long spreader. The results obtained are 
presented in Table 5 .3 8 .
SUPPRESSANT CAPACITY FILL t '
0
t
0 ‘i *2 * 1
dm3 RATIO m s m s m s m s .  - 1kg s
1 . 6 0.32 13 28 90 80
2 .5 0.50 4 15 37 98 103
3 .0 0.60 3 .5 17 39 113 104
3 .5 0.70 5 15 49 138 84
TABLE 5.38
The influence of the fill ratio on the bulk (t, -  t ) and the total (trt -  t )1 o 2 o
discharge tim es are shown in Figure 49. Constant discharge rate lines are 
superimposed over the experimental curves in Figure 49 (a) and (b). 
Canister depressurisation curves for this ser ie s  of experim ents are pre­
sented in Figure 50. The initial discharge velocities determined from  
the film  records of these tests  were very sim ilar ^  43 m s * . It was 
evident from m easurem ents of the strain gauge network outputs that the 
percentage of the total suppressant capacity discharged between tQ and t^, 
bulk discharge regim e, was essentially constant at ^40% for suppressant 
fill ratios from 0.32 to 0 .7 .
5 .3 .2 .3 .  Influence of Propelling Agent P ressu re  P AT
2  “
Comparable discharge tests  were undertaken at three different propelling
3agent p ressures using the standard 3 dm HRD suppressor with elbow and 
75mm long spreader. The results obtained are presented in Table 5 .3 9 .
PROPELLING AGENT t 'o t0 V . ~ R 1
PRESSURE MPa m s m s m s m s . - 1kg s
1 .35 4 19 42 1 2 0 99
2 . 0 3 .5 17 39 113 104
3 . ! 3 14 35 1 0 0 109
TABLE 5 .3 9 .
The influence of the propelling agent pressure, P , on the bulk (t  ^ -  tQ)
and the total (t -  t ) discharge tim es, and on the bulk discharge rate (R.,) o J-
are shown in Figure 51. Measurement from the high speed film s of the 
suppressant throw 50ms after firing the suppressors, gave results of 
1 .82m , 1.85m  and 2.20m  for propelling agent p ressures of 1 .3 5 , 2 .0  and 
3 .1  MPa respectively.
5 .3 .2 .4 .  Influence of Outlet Orifice Area
Comparable discharge tests  were undertaken with reduced orifice areas
3using the same standard 3 dm HRD suppressor with elbow and 75mm long 
spreader. The orifice area was reduced by inserting a copper annulus 
between the frangible disc and the suppressor canister head assem bly. In 
these te s ts  the presence of the annulus did not impede the effective rupture 
of the frangible d isc . The results are presented in Table 5 .4 0 .
OUTLET
ORIFICE
OUTLET
AREA
t '
0
t
- o V *2 % DISCHARGE (bulk) Ei
DIAMETER
mm
3m m s m s m s  ^m s kg s’"1
76 0.0181 3 .5 17 39 113 40 104
63.5 0.0126 5 14 62 1 2 0 55 65
5! 0.0082 3 1 1 0 140 80 48
TABLE 5.40
It was evident from measurem ents of the strain gauge network outputs that
the percentage of the total suppressant capacity that was discharged between
t and t . , bulk discharge regim e, increased with reducing orifice area: but 
o l
the suppressant discharge tim e increased. These percentages of suppress­
ant discharged were estim ated and are included in the Table 5 .4 0 .
The influence of outlet orifice size  on the discharge tim es and the bulk d is­
charge rates are shown in Figure 52. The corresponding canister d epress- 
urisation curves are presented in Figure 50. The initial suppressant d is­
charge velocities measured from high speed film  records of the discharges  
were in the range 42 -  45 m s i
5 .4 . Explosion Suppression
3 i
The results of explosion suppression tr ia ls  undertaken in the lm  and 6 .2  m' 
test v e sse ls  are presented below. Computer estim ates of the suppressed  
explosion p ressu res, based on the theoretical model of explosion suppress­
ion described in section 3 .4 , are also included in this section to allow  
direct comparison between experimental m easurem ent and the theoretical 
prediction of suppression effectiveness, see section 6 .4 .
5 .4 .1 .  Suppressed Explosion Param eters 
A typical suppressed explosion pressure/tim e record is  sketched below:
start 
of dust dispersion ignition detection
I*—f  .— M
t
The following suppressed explosion param eters were measured from the 
oscillogram s:
P q -  initial pressure at ignition (gauge)
P A~  effective detection pressure (PA = P  '  -  P )
A  A  A  O
P -  suppressed explosion pressure (gauge)
p  -  suppressed explosion pressure including any influence 
B
of suppressant vapour pressure and suppressor
propelling agent 
* * 
t , t  -  tim e from detection to P_ or P 
R it - R H
- (d P /d t) -  rate of pressure r ise  at detection.
A
For quiescent gas explosions P q = O. Since the dust dispersion p ro ced u re  produces
an overpressure, P , prior to ignition, the effective detection pressure is
/  *
P . = P .  - P  . The distinction is  made between P ,^ and P „  since the A A o R R
latter occurs significantly later than the suppressor(s) discharge tim e(s) 
and reflects the influence of propelling agent pressure and suppressant 
vapour pressure on the m easured overpressure in the v e sse l. The para­
m eter, (dP/dt) , provides an indication, of the severity of the explosion  
A
that has been suppressed.
Figure 53 presents oscillogram s of typical suppressed explosion events and 
identifies three types of suppression:
(i) TYPE S. : very fast and effective suppression, P < P *1 R R
maximum system  overpressure is  largely a 
consequence of propelling agent pressure and 
suppressant vapour pressure;
(ii) TYPE S_ : effective suppression, P ^  P , maximum
2  K R
system  overpressure reflects the influence of 
the explosion;
(iii) TYPE S_ : le ss  effective suppression, P cannot be
*
distinguished from P , maximum system  over-
E
pressure occurs late largely as a consequence 
of the explosion severity .
In some experim ents, the suppression system  failed to arrest the develop­
ing explosion. Figure 54 presents oscillogram s of typical failed suppress­
ion events and identifies two types of failed suppression:
(i)
(ii) TYPE F : ’just* failed to suppress the developing
5je
explosion, P <CP but P ^  P , the It max K max
value of P represents the pressure to which 
explosion w a s ’almost* suppressed.
35 .4 .2 .  Collaborative Experiments in lm  V essel
In these experiments a single exit (76mm diameter) HRD explosion suppress­
or mounted centrally on the top of the explosion v e sse l was used.
5 .4 .2 .1 .  Datum Experiments
The following datum experim ents provide information on the influence of 
the experimental procedure on the measured suppressed explosion pressures:
TYPE F- : complete failure to suppress the developing
*
explosion, P cannot be distinguished from P  
* *** ^
and P „  and P „  ^  P ;R R max
TEST A1 : Fuel dust dispersion = 2  MPa)
No ignition
Measured overpressure -  12kPa
TEST A2 : No dust dispersion
lOkJ pyrotechnic igniter activated  
Measured overpressure -  6 kPa
TEST A3 : Fuel dust dispersion = 2  MPa)
No ignition
Suppressor discharged (4kg powder, P „  = 6  MPa)
2
Measured overpressure -  28kPa
TEST A4 : No dust dispersion
lOkJ pyrotechnic igniter activated
Suppressor discharged (4kg powder, P = 6  MPa)
2
Measured overpressure 26kPa
5 .4 .2 .2 .  Gas Explosions 
The results of explosion suppression tr ia ls  undertaken using the four
suppressants: water, a mono-ammonium phosphate powder, Halon 1011 
and Halon 1211 against quiesc 
are presented in Table 5 .4 1 .
scent 15 Vol % 70/30 CH^/H^ -  air explosions
The suppression effectiveness of 4kg of mono-ammonium phosphate based  
powder, and of 4kg of Halon 1011 against turbulent 9 Vol % CH^ -  a ir  and 
15 Vol % 70/30 CH^/H^ -  a ir explosions was evaluated. The resu lts of 
these tr ia ls  are presented in Table 5 .4 2 .
TEST
NO
SUPRESANT PA
kPa
PN2
MPa
(dP/dt)PA
-1MPa s ms
PR
kPa
*
PR
kPa
CURVE
TYPE
COMPUTER 
ESTIMATE 
- kPa
1 10 2 0.65
*
45
*
340 S3 ' FAIL SUPN
2 4kg Water 10 4 0.67 90
*
- 30 S3 FAIL SUPN
3 10 6 0.63 80 - 530 S3 FAIL SUPN
4 10 2 0.36 10 14 13 S2 3
5 4kg Powder 10 •4 0.63 8 19 26 S1 • 28
6 10 6 0.71 5 18 28 S1 25
7 30 2 1.25 15 57 69 S1 82
8 4kg Powder 30 4 1.37 10 52 53 S1 70
9 30 6 1.43 7 43 39 V 64
10 50 2 2.08 14 85 84 S2 137
1 4kg Powder 50 4 1.68 9 70 52 S2 17
12 50 6 2.08 8 70 5 S2 10
13 10 2 0.59 2 21 2 S1 34
14 4kg Halon 101 10 4 0.44 14 18 23 S1 27
15 10 6 0.40 8 15 31 S1 24
16 30 2 1.07 25 64 62 S2 101
17 4kg Halon 101 30 4 1.30 15 54 52 S2 80
18 30 6 1.15 10 51 49 S2 71
19 ' 30 6 1.48 1 50 49 S2 71
20 50 2 1.40
*
30
*
106 925 F2 FAIL SUPPN
21 4kg Halon 101 50 2 1.85 250
*
- 95 F1 FAIL SUPPN
2 50 .4 1.85 75 - 126 S3 139
23 50 6 1.47 19 84 85 S1 124
24 4kg Halon 101 5 2 0.56 20 20 18 S1 23
25 2kg Halon 101 j 5 2 0.42 14
*
12 17 S2 23
26 1.5kg Halon 101 5 2 0.50 8 - 18 S3 23
27 3kg Powder ; 10 6 0.67 7 2 37 S1 25
28 2kg Powder ! 10 6 0.67 7 - 42 S2 25
29 "-4kg Halon 121 ; 10 2 1.50 35 56 120 V 140
*
* tp refers to PR rather than PR
TABLE 5.41.
TEST
NO
FUEL SUPRESANT tV Po PA *R PR
*
PR CURVETYPE
COMPUTER
ESTIMATE
s kPa kPa ms kPa kPa kPa
30 4kg Powder 0.3 1 1.0
*
30 - 40 S3 FAIL SUPN
31 9 Vol % PN2 ~ 6 MPa 0.6 12 9 9 46 48 S1 10
32 CH4 4kg Halon 101 0.3 1 9
*
50 - 160 F1 FAIL SUPN
3 PN2 = 6MPa 0.5 8 12 45 68 104 • S2 FAIL SUPN
34 0.6 13 7 18 56 60 S2 15 PR
35 0.3 10 8
*
20 - 510 S3 FAIL SUPN
36 4kg Powder 0.6 12 10 12 53 52 S2 180
37 PN2 = 6MPa 0.9 1 9 10 46 45 S2 64
38 15 Vol % 1.5 13 1 48 46 S2 39
39 70/30 0.3 1 14
*
180 ■- 1230 F1 FAIL SUPN
40 CV H2 0.6 13 1
*
180 - 10 F1 FAIL SUPPN
41 4kg Halon 101 0.9 13 7 *3 40 47 S1 71
42 PN2 = 6MPa 0.9 12 12 17 54 50 S2 96
43 1.5 14 2 15 80 76 S2 149 PR
4 1.5 14 13 12 52 52 S2 108
45 4kg Halon 101 0.3 10 3 280* 1080 F1 FAIL SUPN
46 PN2 = 2 MPa 0.3 10 10 150 - 1010 F1 FAIL SUPN
TABLE 5 .4 2 .
TEST
NO
SUPRESANT: PA 
kPa
%
MPa
(dP/dt)
A^ 
MPa s 1
Po
kPa
*R
ms
PR
kPa
*
PR
kPa
CURVE
TYPE
COMPUTER
ESTIMATE
kPa
47 6 6 0.28 14 8 2 28 S2 23
48 32 6 0.98 12 10 57 28 S1 58
. 49 4kg Water 54 6 1.23 12 1 80 32 S1 87
50 - 52 4 1.07 1 20*
- 94 S3 90
51 52 2 1.17 12 21 98 V 102
52 16 6 • 0.37 10 10 36 43 S2 38
53 42 6 0.48 10 12 60 50 S1 75
54 4kg Powder 54 6 0.85 10 13 82 62 S1 91
5 58 4 1.41 13 14 97 58 S1 103
56 54 2 0.63 10 17 80 40 S1 12
57 13 6 0.39 12
*
60 - 48 S3 35
58 34 6 0.75 12 15 60 62 S2 67
59’ 4kg Halon 101 5 6 0.87 10 12 7 74 S1 98
60 52 4 0.96 12 25
*
104 101 S1 102
61 54 2 1.13 12 125 175 S3 124
TABLE 5 .4 3 .
*
* t refers to P _ rather than P r R R
P refers to a ’Poor Reliability’ computer prediction of suppression E
effectiveness (see section 3 .4 .5 . ) .
TEST
NO
SUPRESANT PA
kPa
V
MPa
(dP/dt)pA 
MPa s *
Po
kPa
tR
ms
PR
kPa
*
PE
kPa
CURVE
TYPE
---
COMPUTER
ESTIMATE
'
kPa
62 1 6" 0.40 13 10 30 30 S1 47
63 1 6 0.74 14 450* 38 270 V 47
64 12 6 0.40 12 9 30 29 S1 49
65 4kg Water 32 6 1.36 13 12 70 45 S1 91
6 51 6 2.40 14 17 12 52 V 131
67 53 4 2.40 12 25 142 240 S2 156
68 53 2 2.40 12 50 162 260 S2 22 _
69 1 6 0.66 12 85 40 53 S2 54
70 12 6 0.63 13
*
80 - 63 *3 57
71 4kg Powder 32 6 2.00 14
*
5 - 102 S3 108
72 52 6 2.80 13
*
30 - 14 S3 163PR
73 52 4 3.00 12
*
25 - 129 S3 205PR
74 52 2 2.70 12
*
95 146 161 V FAIL SUPN
75 1 6 0.68 12
*
70 - 64 V 7OPR
76 1 6 0.68 14
*.
5 - £5 S3 7 OPR
7 32 6 2.00 14
*
65 - 18 S3 FAIL SUPN
78 52 6 2.60 12
* ♦ 
190 - 10 F1 FAIL SUPN
79 4kg Halon 101 4.5 2 0.28 14
*
80 - 56 S3 78PR
80 5 2 0.38 14 260* 4 127 S2 83PR
81 8 2 0.64 12 320* - 150 F1 FAIL SUPPN
82 „ 8 . 2 0.57 12 150* - 90 F1 FAIL SUPPN
83 12 2 0.76 14 240* - 1090 F1 FAIL SUPN
84 16 2 0.92 14 365* - 1060 F1 FAIL SUPN
85 2kg Halon 101 6 2 0.50 12
*
75 - 39 S3 FAIL SUPPN
86 1.5kg Halon 101 5 2 0.30 13
♦
45 - 3 S3 FAIL SUPPN
87 1kg Halon 101 6 2 0.36 1 280* - 100 F1 FAIL SUPPN
8 2kg Powder 1 6 0.77 12 cn o
*
- 72 S3 54
89 1kg Powder 1 6 0.55 12
*
50 - 70 S3
FAIL StJPPN ;
90 4.5 2 0.32 14 470* - 140 F1 FAIL SUPPN
91 4kg Halon 121 4.5 2 0.28 12
*
180 - 21 V FAIL SUPPN
92 5 2 0.28 12 170* - 100 • V FAIL SUPPN
93 9 2 0.57 13 450* - 1090 V FAIL SUPPN .
*
* t refers to P B K
PR refers to a ’Poor Reliability’ computer prediction of suppression effectiveness (see section 3.4.5.)
TABLE 5.44.
5 .4 .2 .3 .  Dust Explosions
The results of explosion suppression tria ls  undertaken using the four
suppressants : water, a mono-ammonium phosphate powder, Halon 1011,
-3and Halon 1211 against both bituminous coal dust (0.25kg m ) and cellu lose
-3  / 3
dust (0.75kg m ) explosions in the lm  v esse l are summarised in Tables
5.43 and 5 .44  respectively. These te sts  were undertaken with an ignition
delay t = 0 . 6 s .  
v
35 .4 .3 .  Suppression T rials in the 6.2m  IEP Test Apparatus
5 .4 .3 .1 .  Datum Experiments
The following datum experim ents provided information on the influence of 
experimental procedure on the measured suppressed explosion overpressure
TEST B l : Fuel dust dispersion (P^j^ = 2 MPa)
No ignition
Measured overpressure 6 kPa
• TEST B2 : No dust dispersion
100J spark ignition activated 
Measured overpressure 0.02kPa
5 .4 .3 .2 .  Gas Explosions
The results of explosion suppression tr ia ls  undertaken using the three 
suppressants: water, a mono-ammonium phosphate powder, and Halon 
1011 against quiescent 10 Vol % CH  ^-  a ir  and quiescent 15 Vol % 70/30  
CH ./H 0  -  a ir explosions are presented in Table 5 .4 5 .
5 .4 .3 .3 .  Dust Explosions 
Explosion suppression tr ia ls  were undertaken against turbulent cellu lose
3
dust (Batch WM2) in the 6 .2m  v esse l using the three suppressants : 
water, mono-ammonium phosphate powder, and Halon 1011. The results  
of these tr ia ls  are summarised in Table 5 .4 6 i
S~ \J
TEST
NO
FUEL SUPN
SYSTEM
MPa
SUPRESANTPA
kPa
(dP/dt)pA
MPa s *
4r
ms
PE
kPa
*
PR
kPa
CURVE
TYPE
COMPUTER
ESTIMATE
kPa
94 0 0 15 2 4
S 1
3
95 0 0 15 1 - S 1 3
96 4 0 . 1 1 25 1 0 6 S 2
97
3
3 x 3dm 2 Halon 101 1 0 0 . 2 0 28 17 1 1
S 2
32
98 9 Vol %HRDs 16 0.28 31
*
24 19
S 2
4
9 CH4 25 0.47 460*
38 860
F 2
69
1 0 0 31 0.48 415 45 860
F 2
85 PR
1 0 1 2 Water 13 0.26
*
138 28 730
F 2
FAIL SUPPN
1 0 2 1 x 1 0dm* 2 Halon 101 13' 0.26 78 39 24
S 2
FAIL SUPPN
HRD
103 «  ^3 3 x 4dm 6 Powder 1 1 0 . 2 1 25 2 0 2 0 S 1 2 1
104 HRDs 46 0.72 31 58 42
S 1
6 6.
105
3
2. x 5dm 0 Halon 101 17 0.32 204* 830 F 1 48Hemi­ *
106 spheres 0 Water 1 2 0 . 2 0 1 1 2 . " 620
F 1
FAIL SUPPN
107 CH / 3 x 3dm^ 2 Halon 101 8 0.24 2 0 26 s2 43
HRDs
TABLE 5.45.
TEST N(3 tV SUPPN SYSTEM P„
2
SUPRESANT PA(dP/dt)A ‘r
PoPR
*
PR CURVETYPE
COMPUTER
ESTIMATE
ms MPa kPa MPa s" 1 mskPakPakPa kPa
108 1 x 30 dm'* 8 0.44
♦
245 4 _ 60 F1 FAIL SUPPN
109 HRD 19 0.91 250 6 - 635 F1 FAIL SUPPN
110 3 x 10 dm^ 2 WATER 5 0.32 30 6 29 28
S 2
114
111 HRDs 16 0.74 38 5 74 - V 261 PR
112 860 26 0.92 48 5107 480
F 2
486 PR
13 34x3 dm HRDs 4 0.19 25 5 20 680 F
2
108 PR
114 4 0 ^ 0 Z.5 k 8 IZ s» 54
15 3x4 dm^ 10 0.54
*
76 5 49 49 S1
1
120 |
116 HRDs 6 POWDER 23 1.12 • 16 4 54 6 6 «, FAIL SUPPN |
17 40 / . HZ* k - • 60 V FAIL SUPPN |
18 ' 63 2.76 310 sr 240 380 F 2 FAIL SUPPN!1
19 860 4.5 0.20 650* 5 -  . 960 F1 FAIL SUPPN
120 140 4.0 0.20 560 6 — 1000 F. FAIL SUPPN
121 1315 4x3 dm* 2 HALON 3.5 0.10 1650*. 4 16 895 Fo 45 PR
122 1470 HRDs 1011 3.5 9.08 24 4 10 13 S1 ' 29
123 1315
3
2 x 3 dm HRDs 
plus
2x5 dm HEMIS
-■ 3.5 0.15 51 6 17 14 S2 41
TABLE 5. 46.
P L A T E  XVI: Explosion Suppression System fitted to a Sugar Elevator
6. DISCUSSION
6 .1 . Explosions
The term  'explosion hazard’ refers generally to both the risk  of an explosion  
event, and the potential consequences of that explosion on personnel and the 
environment. When consideration is  being given to the design of adequate 
explosion protection m easures the explosion hazard is  a ssessed  in term s of 
the severest explosion that can occur with the given explosible m aterial in 
the particular industrial environment.
At the beginning of this research programme, the unequivocal determination 
of the explosibility param eters of quiescent flammable gas-a ir  m ixtures was 
established, and it was recognised that turbulence resulted in m ore violent 
explosions. Turbulence was defined and quantified em pirically. For the 
measurement of the explosibility param eters of combustible dusts there  
existed a plurality of test apparatus and test methods which gave widely
'V.-
differing data for a given dust. Explosion hazard assessm ent based on a 
Hartmann apparatus determination of dust explosibility was considered  
suspect, which was of great concern since this test was the accepted stand­
ard in the UK and USA. The work on explosion hazard assessm ent described  
in this th esis  has been directed at appraising the validity of established test  
procedures. It has sought a lso  to identify the reasons for the m easured  
differences in explosion param eters obtained using different apparatus, and 
thus to establish a sounder foundation for m ore meaningful test procedures.
The rate of explosion propagation is  influenced by the dispersed fuel con­
centration, homogeneity, and turbulence, and also  by the v e sse l geom etry  
and the nature and the location of the ignition source. Particulate m aterials  
have additional factors influencing their explosibility; these include purity,
particle size distribution, surface topography and ^moisture content* The 
complexity of the situation demands that a representative sample of the 
m aterial must be tested to determine its  explosion characteristics.
*
6 .1 .1 .  Quiescent Gas Explosions
Published data, see  section 2 .2 . ,  have established that explosibility m easure­
ments of quiescent g a s /a ir  m ixtures can be scaled by the cube law:
1 ,
V3 = K (explosion rate constant)
3This has been proved by measurements in test volum es ranging from 1dm 
3to 20m . Literature data pertinent to the flammable gases studied in this 
research are summarised in Table 6 .1 . below:
: GAS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
Pmax
MPa
K
MPa m s
Su
- 1m s
CH4 9.5 0.75 5 .4 0.33
70/30 CH /H 15 0.70 8 . 6
C3 H8 4 0.70 7 .3 0 .46
TABLE 6 .1 .
R esults of quiescent gas explosion experiments undertaken in the five test  
apparatus are presented in section 5 .1 . ,  and the pertinent explosibility  
determinations are collated in Table 6 .2  below:
GAS TEST APPARATUS CONCENTRATION 
Vol %
P• max 
MPa
K
- 1
MPa m s
Su
- 1
m s
31 .23dm Hartmann Tube 9 .5 0.60 2.95 0.33
1.75dm 3  1:1 AR Tube 9.5 0.69 6.04 0.35
CH,4
343dm Sphere 10 .5 0.69 6.16 0.29
2
lm  Cylinder 9 .0 0.74 5 .80 0.31
36.2m  Cylinder 1 0 . 2 0.72 5.69 0.34
1.75dm 3  1:1 AR Tube 14 .5 0.74 8.95 0.44
70/30 343dm Sphere 14 .0 0.69 8.98 0.45 \
CV H?,
3lm  Cylinder 15 .0 0.72 9.50 0.52
-
3 * 
6.2m  Cylinder 15 .0 0.78 9 .54 0.50
343dm Sphere 4 .5 0.80 11 .9
.......... 1
0.46
C3H8
36.2m  Cylinder 
3 *
4 .0 0.78 9 .2 0.42
■ i
6 .2m  Cylinder 5 .2 0 . 8 6 36 .4 0.32
* Anomalously high K values were recorded at specific fuel gas 
concentrations.
TABLE 6 .2 .
The correspondence between S values determined in the five test volum es,
3
ranging from 1.23dm  to 6 .2m 3 , was very good and in general agreement 
with the published values. With the exception of Hartmann apparatus data, 
the measured explosibility rate constants of CH^ and 70/30 CH^/H^ 
flammable gases were essentially  invariant over the range of test volum es 
and also  conformed with published values. Anomalous explosion resu lts
3
were obtained in the 6.2m  v esse l, particularly with C H -  a ir m ixtures,
o o
and are discussed in some detail later in this section.
/
The Hartmann apparatus underestimated the explosion violence of quiescent 
CH^/air m ixtures. It can be deduced from the shape of the corresponding 
p ressu re/tim e records, see  Figure 18, that the expanding fireball is  
partially quenched, firstly  at the combustion tube w alls, and then at the 
base of explosion tube; the ignition electrodes are located 0.13m  from the 
bottom of the 0.3m  long explosion tube. Premature wall quenching does not 
occur in near 1 : 1  aspect ratio v e sse ls  and the explosibility rate constant, K, 
was reasonably w ell defined in such v e sse ls  over the large range of volum es 
used. Calculation of from the early part of explosion p ressu re/tim e  
records obtained using the Hartmann apparatus provided meaningful data in 
agreem ent with data obtained using other test v e sse ls  .and thus supported 
the hypothesis that fully developed quiescent gas explosions are quenched pre­
maturely by the v esse l w alls in the Hartmann tube.
The influence of the spark ignition energy on the course of quiescent gas
3explosion development was studied in the 43dm spherical apparatus, see
section 5 .1 .4 .1 .  Table 5 .14  identifies an apparent inverse correlation
between (dP/dt) measurem ents and the spark ignition energy. It was max
evident from a study of the explosion p ressu re/tim e records, see Figure 32„ 
that an increm ent in igniting spark energy has the effect of truncating the 
early part of the p ressu re/tim e event. However, for any defined pressure  
P <  i  Pmax* the measured rate of pressure r ise  (dP/dt) was independ­
ent of the igniting spark energy. It was observed further that (dP/dt)max
occurred at a lower explosion pressure when the explosion was ignited by a 
high energy spark and had a consequently lower value; th is effect i s  not 
fully understood. One explanation is  that the ignition electrodes were not 
exactly centrally located, and that ignition with a low energy spark provided 
m ore tim e for the developing fireball to ’centralise' as pressure equalised  
either side of the combustion wave in the early stages of explosion development.
Thus, wall quenching occurred at an increased fireball radius (higher 
pressure) compared to high energy spark ignition. This study has indicated 
that ignition energy can influence the measured explosion param eters of 
quiescent gas explosions, but that the course of explosion pressure develop­
ment is  essentia lly  invariant provided that the ignition energy is  sm all 
relative to the final maximum explosion energy.
3
Quiescent gas explosions in the 6.2m  v esse l provided some interesting and
unexpected resu lts, see section 5 .1 .5 .  The p ressu re/tim e records of CH^/
air explosions exhibited a ’doublet' which was more distinct at specific CH^
concentrations. The explosion pressure increased predictably to a/ 0 .4  MPa,
and then rose more sharply to the maximum p ressu re . This second pressure
r ise  was accompanied by spurious pressure oscilla tions. The effect was
evident with both induction coil spark (30mJ) and capacitive spark (100J)
ignition. The pressu re/tim e records of 70/30 CH^/H^ -  a ir explosions
exhibited a sim ilar but m ore pronounced 'doublet' at specific concentrations
below and above stoichiom etry. The perturbation on the pressu re/tim e
records occurred at 0 .2  -  0 .3  MPa and the subsequent pressure changes
3were usually oscillatory. C0 H0/a ir  explosions in the 6 .2m  v e sse l demon-
«3 O
strated a distinct and very pronounced transition at (Py ,ty,) for a ll fuel gas
concentrations 4 .5  Vol %. Violent oscillations on the p ressu re/tim e
records occurred at t> .ty , . The observations from quiescent gas explosion, 
3tr ia ls  in the 6 . 2 m v esse l are summarised below:
(i) CH^/air explosion data, see Figure 37, ignoring the artefact
of the observed 'doublet' late in the explosion, are in agree­
ment with published data;
(ii) 70/30 CH /H  -  air explosion data, see Figure 38, identify 4 &
two explosion types. The occurrence of a ’doublet' at 
specific fuel gas concentrations m asks meaningful (dP/dt)max
measurem ent. The calculated values from the early part
of the P / t  records are a ll self-consisten t. The maximum K
value occurs at a different fuel gas concentration to that
corresponding to the maximum S value. A (dP/dt) ^ u max
value of 5 .2  MPa s at the stoichiom etric concentration i s  
consistent with the reported value for this gas.
(iii) C H - a i r  explosion data, see Figure 39, identify two distinct 3 8
regim es. At fuel rich concentrations a distinct transition  
* always occurred. The calculated values from the pre­
transition regim e of the P /t  records are all se lf consistent. 
The maximum K value occurs at a different fuel gas con­
centration to that corresponding to the maximum value.
The maximum (dP/dt) measurement of 19 .8  MPa s ' 'max
at r* 5 Vol % C0 H0  is  very significantly higher than the
- 1
literature value of 'v 4 MPa s at the stoichiom etric con­
centration of 4 Vol % C H .3 8
3The ’doublet’ type pressu re/tim e explosion records identified in the 6 .2m  ,
tr ia ls  have been reported with C H ~ a i r  m ixtures ignited at elevated p r e ss -
3 3ures (108), and very recently by Bartknecht (245) in 20dm and 30dm
spherical apparatus, but only using high energy spark ignition. These
effects are not reported with CH or 70/30 CH ./H  flammable g a s-a ir
3 3m ixtures and were not observed in corresponding 43dm and lm  tr ia ls ,
which formed part of this research study. Table 5.28 shows that C H -a ir
o 8
explosions exhibited a pronounced transition at (P^, ,t ^  ) fo r  a ll
3concentrations greater than 4 .5  Vol % in the 6.2m  v e sse l. P y  decreased  
to a minimum value of 0.014 MPa with increasing propane concentration, 
and t y  increased with concentration increm ents. At a propane concentrat­
ion of 6 . 6  Vol % the pre-transition tim e, ty . , exceeded 3 s , and yet the 
post-transition rate of pressure r ise  was greater than that reported in the
literature for stoichiom etric C H -a ir  m ixtures.3 8  •
3
The artefacts reported in the 6.2m  gas explosion tr ia ls  are not fully under-
3stood. Figure 40 shows that the fireball growth in this 6.2m  v esse l starts  
as a sphere, and subsequently grows as a buoyant ellipsoid . It is  evident 
that the observed perturbation on the p ressu re/tim e record occurs when the 
fireball is  in very c lose proximity to the v e sse l w alls. Strain gauge m easure­
m ents have indicated very violent axial shock loadings when a ’doublet1 or 
’transition' resu lts.
It is  tempting to suggest that the ’doublet’ type p ressu re/tim e record is  a 
consequence of premature wall quenching in this larger aspect ratio v e sse l,  
akin to that identified with quiescent gas explosions in the Hartmann tube. 
However, the observed higher rate of pressure r ise  cannot be explained by 
this miechanism alone. Perhaps induced turbulence results in the breakup  
of the laminar diffusion controlled combustionvwaye when it reaches the 
v e sse l w all, thus resulting in subsequent m ore violent combustion. The 
observed oscillations may reflect a sonic resonance of the explosion chamber 
initiated by the explosion shock wave. The oscillations had a periodicity of 
160Hz and in the more violent transitions there was a superimposed 450Hz 
component which dominated this 160Hz fundamental oscillation. These  
frequencies were constant, irrespective of flammable gas or explosion  
violence.
The above postulates would be expected to occur at all fuel gas concentrat­
ions, or at least at specific regim es of flame speed or explosion violence. 
This was not observed, thus suggesting that the artefacts are a consequence 
of some chem ical influence during the course of the explosion development. 
One hypothesis is  that the effect may be the consequence of some autoignit­
ion, akin to the mechanism of ’knocking’ observed in combustion engines. 
’Knocking’ and autoignition are known to be related to cool flame phenomena, 
which, in turn, are controlled by chem ical p rocesses of hydrocarbon oxidat­
ion. It i s  significant that propane is  the lowest m olecular weight alkane to 
exhibit cool flam es. It is  m echanistically im possible for methane to show 
th is effect (4), although methane can autoignite at elevated temperature and 
p ressu res. For C H /a ir  m ixtures cool flam es occur typically at 0.12 -
o o
0.15 MPa at 300 C (246), and this accords w ell with the observed lim iting 
Py, value identified in Table 5 .28 .  There is  usually a delay before the on­
set of cool flam es. In sm aller v e sse ls , the explosion duration is  shorter and 
hence cool flam es would be le ss  likely. Higher alkanes would exhibit the 
sam e transition effect if  the cool flame hypothesis i s  correct. The observed  
transition with C H /a ir  m ixtures may be attributable to cool flam e pheno-o o
mena, but the ’doublet’ type artefacts observed with CH  ^ and 70/30 CH^/H^ 
g a ses  are not. Adiabatic heating, alone is  insufficient to cause autoignition 
of CH^/air m ixtures, but a combination of adiabatic heating and radiant 
heating can be used to invoke^ heterogeneous ignition of the unburned explos- 
ib le gases at the explosion chamber w alls. The oscillatory nature of the 
pressu re /tim e records are sim ilar to those reported in com pression  
ignition experim ents (4), and therefore are characteristic of autoignition 
phenomena.
rv
An alternative and more probable explanation of the reported artefacts is  
that the laminar deflagration is  perturbed by reflected shock waves from  
the dished ends of the explosion chamber. Markstein (247) has shown that 
when a shock wave m eets a combustion wave a rarefaction wave propagates 
backward into the unburned gas, and a jet of unburned gas develops which
penetrates deeply into the burned gas. The sudden increase in turbulence 
that results causes a large increase in the burning rate and the formation 
of trains of com pression waves. The acceleration of the overall burning 
rate is  enhanced by precom pression and preheating of the unburned gas 
ahead of the combustion wave. Thus transient, non-steady state detonat­
ions are envoked under conditions which do not normally result in fully 
developed spherical detonations. The occurrence of such effects w ill be 
dependent on the v esse l shape, and the chem istry of oxidation of the 
combustion fuel.
3These 6 .2m quiescent gas explosion resu lts w ere appraised by van 
Wigerden (248). In further investigations he identified such transitions 
with higher molecular weight hydrocarbon fuels and suggests that the 
transition is ,ind eed , a consequence of acoustic coupling of shock waves 
with the combustion wave. Van Wigerden postulates that such artefacts 
w ill be more prevalent with non-central ignition.
A detailed investigation into the above hypotheses was outside of the scope 
of this study. The data in Table 6 .2 .  dem onstrates that the calculated  
burning velocity, S^, determined in any test apparatus provides an un­
ambiguous m easure of the explosion severity for the early stages of a 
quiescent gas explosion. Figure 40 dem onstrates the good correspondence 
between theoretical and experimental pressure and fireball growth 
characteristics for the early part of quiescent gas explosions in a large  
v e sse l. Figures 37 -  39 define the most explosible concentrations of 
th ese fu els, based on data. It is  probable that explosions of th ese fuel' 
concentrations would be m ore difficult to  suppress than explosions of fuel
concentrations that result in anomalously high (dP/dt) values, becausemax
the form er provide the severest rate of pressure r ise  in the early stages 
of explosion pressure development.
6.1 .2 .  Turbulent Gas Explosions
No attempt has been made to define the m echanisms of turbulent flame 
propagation, but the aim has been to quantify the influence of turbulence 
inasmuch as it affects explosion severity . Turbulent gas explosion data 
determined in the various test apparatus using ignition delays which corres­
pond to those used for ’standard’ dust explosibility m easurem ents are 
collated in Table 6 .3 .
GAS TEST APPARATUS tV
m s
P o
kP a
Pmax
MPa
K
MPa m s ^
~Tu
31 .2  3dm Hartmann Tube 1 0 0 42 0 . 8 6 6 . 8 1 .7
9 .5  Vol % 1.75dm 3  1:1 AR Tube 1 0 0 31 0.87 19.6 2 .7
CH.4
343dm Sphere 
3
265 39 0.93 43.0 5 .0
lm  Cylinder 600 14 0 . 8 8 28.2 4 .3
14.5  Vol % 1.75dm3  1:1 AR Tube 1 0 0 28 0.85 27.6 2 . 8
70/30 CH4 /H 2
343dm Sphere 
3
265 39 0 . 8 6 50.0 4 .0
lm  Cylinder 600 15 0 . 8 8 41 .9 •3.6
TABLE 6.3 .
Turbulent gas explosions were ^ 3  -  5 tim es m ore violent than the co rres-
*
ponding quiescent gas explosions. With the im plicit assumption,, see  
section 6 . 1 . 3 . ,  that the influence of turbulence is  sim ilar for both gases  
and dusts certain observations can be in ferred  from the data of Table 6.3:
(i) the turbulence level attained in the Hartmann tube is  ~40%
3
of that attained in the lm  apparatus; thus dust explosibility  
results obtained in the two apparatus may be expected to 
differ by a factor of ^2 .5 ;
* see section 6 .1 .3 .
(ii) the turbulence level attained in the 1.75dm 1:1 aspect ratio
3tube is  ~70% of that attained in the lm  apparatus, thus 
dust explosibility results obtained in the two apparatus may 
be expected to differ by a factor of <^1.5;
3(iii) the turbulence level attained in the 43dm apparatus is  ^110%
3of that attained in the lm  apparatus, thus dust explosibility  
results obtained in the two apparatus may be expected to 
differ by a factor of /v 1 . 1 .
The pressu re/tim e records of turbulent gas explosions in the Hartmann tube 
did not exhibit the fine structure identified with quiescent gas explosions. 
R esults of turbulent 9 .5  Vol % CH /a ir  explosions in both the Hartmann 
apparatus and the 1 : 1  aspect ratio vertical tube apparatus are presented  
graphically in Figure 55. Explosion intensity increased with increasing  
turbulence (reducing t^). The disparity between K determinations in the two 
laboratory explosion test apparatus reflects the influence of the significant 
wall quenching that occurs in the standard Hartmann tube.
Tables 5 .2  and 5.15 demonstrate a general correspondence between the two
m easures of turbulence factor, oC andTu, as defined in section 3 . 1 . 2 .
Figure 56 shows that (dP/dt) and ©d are linearly related (©£ ■> 1. )max
with a slope which corresponds to the (dP/dt) value of the quiescent gasmax
explosion. This supports the contention that o' ~  TU and that turbulent 
gas explosibility data can be scaled from one test volume to another using  
the revised cube law derived in section 3 .1 .3 .
-1
Experimental plots of and Tu against the reciprocal ignition delay, t
are presented in Figure 57. An increment in the ’absolute1 turbulence level,
t  has a greater effect on the ’im plied’ turbulence level, d -  o r T u ,  with 
v
CH explosions, compared to 70/30 CH /H  explosions. This is  consistent 4 4
with the postulate (see section 3 .1 .2 )  that:
oA S = S + S u u g ( o L > l ) (18)
Hence S , the average air perturbation velocity resulting from the induced 
g
turbulence, is  defined as:
S = (oC -  1 ) Su
(42)
The relations between S and t for turbulent CH V air and 70/30 CH ,/H_ -g v 4 4 2
air explosions in three test apparatus are presented graphically in Figure
58. The results for both fuel gases fit on the sam e curves, Hence these
curves are, in effect, calibration curves for the particular test apparatus.
Published turbulent gas explosibility data obtained from a standard test in 
3a 54dm apparatus (108) provided further support for the validity of
equation (18). Calculation of S from these data gave a ’constant’ value for
g
four fuels with very markedly different K and Tu values, see Table 6 .4 .
GAS K _ 
MPa m s *
Tu Su
- 1m s
S
g
- 1m s
CH4 39 7 .0 0.33
1.98
G3H8 51 5 .6 0.45
2.07
Coal Gas 48 3 .4 0.90 2.13
H 2
80 1 . 6 3.40 2 .04
TABLE 6 .4 .
The results of this study have established a foundation for the em pirical 
interpretation of turbulence derived in section 3 .1 .
6.1 .3 .  Dust Explosions
Meaningful dust explosion hazard assessm ent is  difficult. The first stage, 
however, requires a meaningful measurement of the ’absolute’ explosibility  
of the dusts used in industrial p rocesses. The experimental work on dust 
explosions reported in section 5 .1 .  was undertaken to:
(i) seek to resolve the uncertainly associated with a Hartmann 
apparatus dust explosibility determination;
(ii) develop an alternative sm all scale explosion test apparatus 
for quantification of the explosibility of industrial dusts;
(iii) appraise the relative importance of turbulence on dust 
explosion severity and its  im plications to explosion hazard 
assessm ent;
(iv) determine an experimental procedure suitable for meaning-
■r 3
ful dust explosion tr ia ls  in the 6 .2m IEP test facility .
6 . 1 . 3 . 1 .  Hartmann Apparatus -  An Appraisal
Eckhoff (100) had shown previously that the measured explosion severity of 
lycopodium dust was sensitive to changes in the ignition delay tim e in the 
Hartmann apparatus. The influence of the Hartmann test procedure on the 
resultant explosibility measurement of a dust was evaluated using cellu lose  
dust as a typical fuel. The chosen ignition source was the standard Ruhmkoff 
coil spark generator, which was activated after a preset ignition delay t y . 
It was noted, see Table 5 . 7 . ,  that effective ignition was not always achieved  
with the first spark, and that a significant tim e delay between activation of 
the Ruhmkoff coil and actual ignition could resu lt. The observed relation
between the preset ignition delay, t j ,  and the actual ignition delay, t , is  
presented in Figure 59. It is  evident that for all values of t^ ■< 100m s, 
the actual ignition delay t was ^ 100m s. Figure 21 demonstrates the 
very strong influence of the ignition delay on the measured explosion 
param eters; ( d P / d t ) d e c r e a s e s  with increasing t . Since high speed 
cine'' photography of the Hartmann apparatus dust dispersion procedure had 
shown that an explosible cellu lose dust cloud surrounds the ignition source 
after only 60m s, it was surprising to find that ignition was not achieved  
with induction coil sparks for 60 < t^ <  100m s. Effective ignition delay was 
achieved for all t >  65ms with both 100J capacitive spark and fuse head 
ignition procedures. It was inferred therefore that ignition delay of 
cellu lose dust is  possible under more turbulent conditions when a higher 
energy ignition procedure is  used.
The standard Hartmann hot coil ignition methodology usually results in
higher (dP/dt) values than are measured using the standard induction max
coil spark ignition methodology for industrial dusts. It is  possib le that 
this occurs because the dust cloud is  ignited in a m ore homogeneous and 
turbulent condition with the hot coil ignition procedure, and thus with a 
shorter ignition delay. Comparative cellu lose dust explosibility m easure­
ments in the Hartmann tube obtained using the hot co il, induction coil 
sparks, and 100J capacitor spark ignition procedures support this reasoning, 
see  Table 5 .7 .  At specific ignition delays, the explosion param eters are  
very sim ilar, irrespective of the choice of ignition source. Thus a dust
explosibility measurement in the Hartmann tube is  sensitive to the ignition 
* . 
energy and ignition methodology only inasmuch as that affects the resultant
ignition delay.
\
* There is  a second order influence of ignition energy on the resultant
(dP/dt) m easurem ent, see section 6 . 1 . 3 . 2 .' 'max
In view of the above observations, experimental dust explosibility records
of Hartmann te s ts , undertaken for industry over several years by Graviner
Ltd. , were re-exam ined. The ignition delay was estim ated from the
p ressu re/tim e record of the most explosible concentration of each dust
tested using the standard hot coil ignition procedure. Figure 60 is  a
scatter diagram of the m easured (dP/dt) values of over one hundredmax
dusts, plotted against their corresponding ignition delay tim es, Extended
ignition delays are in evidence for a significant number of the dusts, and it
is  probable that the reported explosibility of a least some of these dusts
represent a gross underestimate of the potential explosion intensity of these
sam ples. The correspondence between this analysis and Bartknechtrs  com -
3parison of Hartmann and lm  dust explosibility data (25) is  evident, see  
Figures 60 and 61.
Comparative dust explosion tests  in the Hartmann tube using either the 
Sustained’ hot coil or the ’d iscrete' 100J capacitive spark ignition proced­
ures provide further evidence of the influence of test procedure on an ex­
plosibility measurem ent, see Table 5 .8 .  These resu lts, presented graphic­
ally, in Figure 24, demonstrate a correspondence between the ratio of the
(dP/dt) m easurem ents, £  , and the observed ignition delay with the max
’sustained’ hot coil ignition procedure, As a generalisation le s s  explosible  
dusts are m ore likely to exhibit longer ignition delays in the standard 
Hartmann test and, hence, be ignited in conditions of lower turbulence.
This appraisal of the Hartmann test procedure has shown that the use of 
’sustained’ rather than 'd iscrete’ ignition sources does not provide an un­
equivocal assessm ent of the explosibility of industrial dusts. The dispersed  
dust cloud homogeneity and turbulence are not constant for each dust be­
cause the ignition delay is  not constant. In consequence, dusts which are
insensitive to ignition w ill exhibit longer ignition delays and therefore ex­
plode when the dust cloud is  le s s  turbulent. The use of an alternative test 
methodology with a 100J spark discrete ignition procedure rem oves largely  
the ambiguity, although such a procedure w ill not ignite all potentially ex­
plosible dust sam ples.
3
6 . 1 . 3 . 2 .  Development of the 43dm Apparatus
3
A 43dm explosion test apparatus was developed as a possible alternative 
to the Hartmann apparatus. Initially, the intention was to construct a 
larger volume Hartmann type apparatus using pneumatic dust dispersion and 
a sustained ignition source. It was found that dust dispersion via a pepper 
pot spreader, coupled with Ruhmkoff coil spark ignition, resulted in ex cess­
ive ignition delays and explosions of low intensity, see  Table 5 .16 .  The 
dust cloud produced with the pepper pot dust dispersion procedure could not 
be ignited with 100J capacitive spark for all t^cr 200m s, see Table 5.17 , 
although high speed cine photography had shown that a ll of the dust sample 
was dispersed into the explosion chamber in le s s  than 200m s. Ignition of
the dust cloud was unreliable for 200 -<t <  400m s. The m easured (dP/dt)v  max
of cellu lose dust decreased with increasing ignition delay, see Figure 34,
reflecting the decrease of turbulence with tim e which is  the characteristic of
pneumatic dust dispersion procedures. Experiments using a range of
capacitive spark ignition energies indicated that the probability of ignition
increased with the higher spark ignition energies, see Table 5 .1 8 . ,
Marginally higher (dP/dt) values were obtained with the higher sparkmax
ignition energies. Corresponding pressure/tim e records are presented in
Figure 62a and Figure 62b shows the theoretical relationship between ex-
* 3
plosion pressure and fireball radius for the 43dm apparatus. It i s  evident
that propagation of the explosion away from the ignition kernel is  delayed
with the lower ignition energies, probably reflecting the differing spatial
magnitudes of the kernel. Note that a significant overpressure ('v50kPa)
does not result until the fireball has attained a radius of ^15Omm. This
delay accounts for the lower (dP/dt) values since the dust cloudmax
turbulence is  decreasing as the fireball propagates away from the ignition
kernel. Increasing the dust dispersion pressure resulted in increased
(dP/dt) values because of the increased induced turbulence, see Table max
5.19 .  ;
There were three reasons which may have contributed to unreliable ignition 
with the pepper pot dispersion methodology:
(i) explosible dust concentrations were not consistently achieved  
in the vicinity of the sm all spark kernel;
(ii) the velocity of the dust/a ir suspension across the ignition 
electrodes could exceed the flame speed, hence the 
residence tim e of the dust particulates in the ignition kernel 
was too short to attain sustained combustion;
(iii) the ignition kernel was quenched by the du st/a ir  flow, thus
preventing ignition. .
In view of these experimental difficulties an alternative dust dispersion  
methodology using a spray ring was established and evaluated.
High speed cine^photography showed that the dust sample was effectively
3dispersed into the 43dm explosion chamber through the spray ring in 210m s. 
Effective ignition was achieved with this dust dispersion procedure for a ll 
tv> 9 0 m s  using a 100J capacitive spark, see Table 5 .20 .  Figure 35 shows
the predictable decrease in both S and (dP/dt) with increasing ignitionu max
delay. Note that the m ost intense explosion occurred at t = 170m s, although 
m easurem ents at t < 2 l 0 m s do not relate to a readily definable dust con­
centration because dust injection into the explosion chamber is  still in pro­
g r ess . For t^<^210ms, the m ost explosible dust concentration is  not
attained at ignition. However, increased (dP/dt) m easurem ents are ob-max
served for 170m s-ctv < 210m s because the higher turbulence outweighs the 
effect of the departure from the most explosible dust concentration.
3Comparable cellu lose dust explosibility data recorded in the 43dm apparatus 
using both pepper pot and spray ring dust dispersion procedures are 
summarised in Table 6 .5 .
DUST DISPERSION 
PROCEDURE
IGNITION SOURCE t '
V
m s
t
V
m s
P
o
kPa
Pmax
MPa
K
MPa m s *
'Pepper Pot' Induction Sparks 0 285 28 0.93 3.7
Spreader 100J Capacitive 
Spark 250 250 28 0;95 9 .6
Spray Ring Induction Sparks 0 460 28 0.96 5 .9
100J Capacitive 2 1 0 2 1 0 28- 0*98 /1 4 . 8
Sparks 265 265 28 0.98 1 2 . 8
TABLE 6 .5 .
Induction coil spark ignition results in a le ss  intense explosion in this test  
apparatus because the effective ignition delay is  long and the fireball is  slow  
to propagate away from the ignition kernel. Note that, at t = 210ms and 
using spray ring dispersion, the recorded explosibility of cellu lose dust in
the 43dm apparatus is  comensurate with the maximum K results obtained 
3in the lm  apparatus, compare Tables 5 .3 .  and 6 .S.  The average K
3measurement in the lm  apparatus was 12.8  MPa, see section 5 . 1 . 1 . 2 . ,
3thus t ■ = 265ms results in comparable 43dm data.
Both pepper pot and spray ring dust dispersion procedures produced an over­
pressure of ^28 kPa at ignition, which is  comparable with that produced in
3the Hartmann apparatus. The lm  apparatus dust dispersion procedure
produced an overpressure of ^14 kPa. These overpressures, and the
turbulence induced by the choice of dust dispersion pressure influence the
explosibility measurement of dusts. Table 5 .21 .  indicates the influence of
3these param eters on explosibility measurem ents in the 43dm apparatus, and 
highlights the importance of using controlled experimental conditions for dust 
explosibility m easurem ents.
It has been shown that, by the correct choice of experimental conditions, a
- sm all scale explosion test apparatus is  capable of providing explosibility data
3comparable with that obtained in the lm  apparatus.
6 . 1 . 3 . 3 .  Comparison of T est Apparatus
C ellulose dust explosibility results determined in the five test apparatus 
evaluated in this study are summarised in Table 6 .0 .
\
TEST APPARATU
............. .......
S IGNITION SOURCJE t '
V
ms
t
V
m s
P o
kPa
Pmax
MPa
K
- 1
MPa m s
c*LSu
- 1
m s
Hot Coil 0 80 28 0.77 3 .6 0 . 2 0
1.23dm^ Induction Sparks 0 1 0 0 30 0.79 3.1 0 . 2 0
Hartmann Tube 100J Capacitive 
Spark 1 0 0 1 0 0 30 0.78 • 3 .4 0 . 2 1
100J Capacitive 
Spark 70 70 28 0.77 4.1 0.24
1.75dm^ Induction Sparks 0 1 0 0 25 0.77 3 .4 0.25
1:1 Aspect Ratio 
Tube
100J Capcitive 
Spark 1 0 0 1 0 0 25 0.83 4 .7 0.23
100J Capacitive 
Spark 70 70 2 0 0.83 6.3 0.33
3
43dm Sphere Induction Sparks -0 460 28 0.96 5 .9 0.43
-
10CJ Capacitive 
Spark 265 265 28 0.98 1 2 . 8 1.05
(Spray Ring 
Dispersion) 100J Capacitive 
Spark 2 1 0 2 1 0 28 0.98 14.8 1.26
3lm  Cylinder lOkJ Pyrotechnic 600 600 14 0.92 15.5(12.8)+ 0.78
36.2m Cylinder 10QJ Capacitive 
Spark 860 860 6 • 0.89 17.8 0.83
^  TABLE 6 . 6 .
+ average measurement of K 
From these data certain salient facts can be extracted:
"X,
3 3(i) the 1.23dm  and 1.75dm  laboratory sca le apparatus gave
dust explosibility results which are some 3 - 4  tim es le s s
3severe than results obtained in the standard lm  apparatus;
(ii) for a given ignition delay, a higher spark ignition energy 
resu lts in a marginally m ore violent explosion;
(iii) d iscrete ignition procedures enable the dust cloud to be ignited 
in a m ore turbulent condition (lower t^), and thus result in 
m ore intense dust explosions;
(iv) even with d iscrete 1 0 0 J spark ignition at the optimum ignition
3delay in the 1.75dm 1:1 aspect ratio apparatus, the result­
ant explosibility determination was very significantly lower
3than that attained in the standard lm  apparatus;
(v)
(vii)
There are two contributory factors to the disparity in dust explosibility
3determinations in the Hartmann tube and lm  apparatus:
(i) wall quenching, inhomogeneous dust dispersion and th ein -  
herently low turbulence levels in the Hartmann tube result 
in an underestimate of K by a factor ^  2 .5 ,  see  section
with the correct choice of experimental procedure cellu lose
3dust K values determined from 43dm tests  were comensurate
- 3
with those obtained in the lm  apparatus, but there was a 
significant disparity in the corresponding determinations;
3the 6 . 2 m dust explosion test procedure produced slightly m ore
intense cellu lose dust explosions than those obtained in the 
3standard lm  apparatus.
(ii) the use of a sustained ignition source can lead to explosibility
data that is  difficult to interpret because t is  not controlled,
v
see  section 6 . 1 . 2 . 2 .
Wall quenching is  reduced with the 1:1 aspect ratio tube, but the lower
turbulence level and the inhomogeneous dust dispersion rem ains, thus this
apparatus a lso results in a severe underestimate of cellu lose dust explosibil-
3ity , compared to a lm  determination.
3 4The 43dm apparatus test methodology was adjusted em pirically so that
a K determination in this apparatus was comensurate with a corresponding
3m easurem ent in the lm  apparatus, see section 6 . 1 . 3 . 2 ,  The early stages
of explosion development in this apparatus w ere m ore intense than was re-  
3corded in lm  tr ia ls , which is  reflected by the disparity in the c^s determ in-
3 Uations. The tangent to the inflexion in the P /t  record of a lm  dust explosion
result i s  drawn at a higher pressure than the corresponding tangent for the P /t  
3record of a 43dm dust explosion result. This occurs because the sm aller  
explosion chamber produces more wall quenching of a turbulent dust explosion 
thari occurs in the larger volume v e sse l.
Comparable industrial dust explosibility m easurem ents were undertaken in
3
both the standard Hartmann apparatus (hot coil ignition) and the 43dm
+apparatus (spray ring d ispersions, t ■ = 265m s). The results are sum m arised  
in Table 6 .7 .  below.
+ 100J spark or lkJ  pyrotechnic ignition.
DUST SAMPLE K (MPa m s "S K RATIO
HARTMANN TUBE 43dm3  APPARATUS
Magnesium Stearate 8 . 8 23.7 2.69
Phenolic Be sin 7.1 19 .7 2.77
Cellulose 3 .6 12.5 3.47
Pharmaceutical Product 1 .9 10.6 5.58
Gum Arabic 1 .7 10.9 6.41
Avicel 1 .4 11.1 7.92
Spray Dried Coffee 0.58 17.3 17.65
Dried Milk Granules 0.40 9.2 23 .0
TABLE 6.7 .
These data emphasise the limitations of the standard Hartmann dust 
explosibility measurement procedure. There is  no simple scaling factor. 
However, the Hartmann test is  more likely to underestimate the explosibility  
of the le ss  explosible dusts.
3The experimental procedure designed for dust dispersion in the 6 .2m v esse l
resulted in an average cellu lose dust explosibility determination some 1 0 %
3more intense than the maximum value obtained in the lm  apparatus. A 
small increase in t could compensate for this discrepancy, see Figure 42. 
Table 5.33 demonstrates that dust explosibility determinations in this v e sse l 
were highly reproducible : + 4% for a P ^ ^  measurement, + 17% for a K 
determination, and+ 14 % for an ot S  ^determination.
\
6.1 .4 .  Influence of Turbulence on Dust Explosibility
The relationships between ignition delay, t , and turbulence (in as much as
it is  reflected by increased (dP/dt) values) has been established for bothmax '
gas and dust explosions in the different test apparatus. Since a quiescent
dust explosion is  not achievable practically, direct comparison between gas
and dust data is  not possib le. The S . calibration curves defined in Figure 58
8
are obviously not valid for turbulent dust explosions, since such values • 
would imply a negative value for
The influence of turbulence on dust explosibility can be inferred by consider-
3ing the ratio of test results at specific ignition delays. Comparable 43dm 
dust and gas data extracted from Tables 5.15 and 5.22 are presented as 
ratios in Table 6 . 8 .
EXPLOSIBLE FUEL (dP/lt)max vt = 265ms! (dP/dt)
MPa s- 1
'max v 2 1 0 m s
( d P / d t ) t  = 265ms max v
(dP/dt) t = 320ms ' max v
(dP/dt) t = 265ms ' max v
DUST
Cellulose
Magnesium Stearate 
Fenclofenac
Phenolic Resin
Gum Arabic
37
77
30
56
27
1.18
1.16
1.14
1.06
1.31
0.77
0.69
0.79
0.55
0.62
GAS
9 Vol % CH 1234
14 Vol % 70/30 CH VH0 1434 ,2  ^
1.17
1.18
0.77
0.76
TABLE 6.8.
It is  evident that the explosibility ratios of both gases and dusts are sim ilar,
although the range of (dP/dt) values vary from 27 to 143 MPa smax
This analysis suggests that:
(i) the influence of turbulence on dust explosibility is ,  to a first 
approximation, a simple scaling factor which is  independent 
of t h e ’absolute’ explosibility of the dust;
(ii) the influence of turbulence on dust explosibility may be 
estimated, to a first approximation, using a calibration 
determined from comparable gas explosion te sts .
3 3Turbulent gas explosion data pertinent to the 43dm and lm  apparatus 
demonstrate that at the ’standard’ ignition delay tim es of 265ms and 600ms 
used for dust explosibility measurements sim ilar levels of turbulence pre­
vail, see Figure 58. The turbulent gas explosion S ratios determined for
3 £
the 43dm apparatus are:
S (t = 320ms)
1.21 - -g - - -   ---------- = 0 .7 1
S (t = 265ms) g v
which are in general agreement with the (dP/dt) ratios reported in Tablemax
6 . 8 . for both gas and dust explosion te s ts . Although turbulent gas explosion 
tests  cannot provide absolute values which are meaningful for corres­
ponding dust explosion te s ts , because the mechanisms of combustion wave
propagation are quite different, the ratio of S values determined from
S
turbulent gas explosion tests provide the means of determining the influence 
of turbulence on dust explosibility. From equation (42) an estim ate of the
S ( t  = 210ms) 
g v
S ( t = 265ms) 
. g' v
theoretical 'quiescent* dust/air suspension burning velocity, S , can be made.u
For a homogeneous suspension of cellulose dust at the most explosible dust
concentration, the quiescent cellulose dust/air burning velocity S ^ 0.55m. s
-1  u 
Values of 0.55 m s reported for turbulent cellulose dust explosions
must reflect inhomogeneous dust dispersion and/or reduced dust/air con­
centrations. These effects are particularly prevalent at extended ignition 
delays.
/  ' •
In practice, determination of for an explosible dust is  of academic interest
only, and the turbulent burning velocity provides the basis for dust
explosion hazard assessm ent.
6 .1 .5 .  Explosion Hazard Assessm ent
Quantification of the potential explosion hazard associated with flammable gases  
and combustible dusts in industrial applications is  a pre-requisite to the design  
of active explosion protection m easures. The potential explosion intensity is  
dependent both on the nature of the explosible material and the conditions pre­
vailing in normal, or abnormal, working of the industrial process. In part­
icular, turbulence and air-flow  levels within a plant processing segment can 
have a major influence on the resultant explosion intensity of a combustible 
m aterial.
Dust explosibility measurement is  undertaken at a specific turbulence level 
defined by the test methodology. Such a determination4nay represent an 
underestimate, or an overestim ate, of the potential explosion intensity that can 
occur in a particular industrial processing segment. Hence a dust explosibility
determination provides a measure of the relative explosion intensity of the dust
.v .
sample dispersed as a cloud in air but does not quantify the actual hazard per 
se .
One philosophy of safety, is  to seek to quantify the severest explosion experi­
mentally possible with the particular dust sample and to accept this determin­
ation as an estim ate of the potential explosion hazard. In practice, this 
philosophy precludes the application of conventional active explosion protection 
m easures for many of the commonly encountered explosible m aterials, be­
cause the potential explosion hazard would be assessed  as 'too severe'.
Plant operators would be required to install alternative safety m easures such 
as inertisation. This philosophy, therefore, can impose severe practical and 
economic constraints on industry.
An alternative approach is  to estimate the potential explosion hazard from a 
knowledge of both the plant operating conditions and the measured explosibility 
of the m aterial. Such an approach to safety demands a measure of considered 
judgement. For example, an experimental dust dispersion procedure which 
rapidly injects the m aterial into a test vesse l through multiple nozzles can be 
considered representative of the conditions prevailing in m icronisers and 
grinders,but an overestim ate of the turbulence level prevailing in the head . 
space of gravity fed s ilo s . The empirical turbulence param eter, oi , provides 
an a priori means of classifying explosion hazard. From the results of this 
research the following categories of explosion hazard are suggested:
GAS EXPLOSIONS DUST EXPLOSIONS
High turbulence : 2:5 . 0  < £ ~ 2 . 0
Medium turbulence oL <*3.5 ©t=* 1 .5
Low turbulence : otc* 2 .5  ° ^ ~ 1 . 2
Quiescent conditions : cL& 1 .0  ------
Dust explosibility determinations in the standard 1m apparatus are considered 
(108) to be representative of the severest conditions of turbulence encountered 
generally. Such data can be scaled to other volumes and conditions of 
turbulence using the revised cube law derived in section 3 . 1 . 3 . ,  see equation 
(25). Explosion protection m easures would be designed for each industrial 
application, based on the meaningful estim ates of the worst case explosion 
hazards. The designed explosion protection system s would include significant 
safety m argins.
/
6 .1 .6 .  Correlation between Theory and Experiment
The isotherm al model of explosion pressure development described in section
3 . 1 . 1 .  has been used as a basis for all S and c*is data reported above.
u  u  2 
Figure 63 presents experimental plots of dP/dt against (1 -  Pq/ P ) 3 P for
^ 9 . 5  Vol % quiescent CH^-air explosions in the five test apparatus evaluated.
Good straight line fits result and the calculated burning velocity of 9 .5  Vol %
CH^-air is  invariant essentially over the test apparatus volume range.
Theoretical computer generated pressure/tim e curves of gas and dust explos­
ions, based on equation (19), are compared with corresponding experimental 
records in Figure 64. Good agreement is  evident during the early stages of 
explosion pressure development (P 0 .2 MPa). Hence the simple isotherm al 
model can form the foundation for a theoretical evaluation of explosion 
suppression system  performance.
Explosion hazard assessm ent provides the necessary data to permit computer 
simulation of the pres sure/tim e history of a worst case explosion of the com­
bustible m aterial in the pertinent industrial environment.
6.2.  Explosion Suppressants
The literature identifies both physical and chemical mechanisms of flame 
inhibition and suppression. The relative inhibition effectiveness of various 
agents against cellulose dust explosions in the Hartmann tube can be as­
certained from the results presented in section 5 . 2 . ,  see Figures 43 -  45. 
Table 6 .9 .  compares the measured inhibiting concentrations of those agents 
with their contribution to the heat abstraction capacity of the m ass of 
suppressant discharged into the system  q^. This parameter reflects the heat 
abstraction potential of the suppressant agent, see section 3 .2 .
SUPPRESSANT
AGENT
INHIBITING CONCENTRATION 
WEIGHT % VOL %
MASS
g
SPECIFIC HEAT 
Jg K
—  __  
j  k " 1
a o to
) 51 42 1.32 0.84 1 . 1 1
N 2
49 51 1.03 1.04 1 .07
Halon 1211 (vapour) 41 7 .5 0 . 8 8 0.45 0.40
Halon 1301 (vapour) 40 7 .5 0.80 0.46 0.37
Mono-ammonium
phosphate 27 - 0.28 1.85 0.52
China Clay 70 - 0.74 0.73 0.54
TABLE 6.9 .
From Table 6 .9 .  certain conclusions can be drawn on the inhibiting effective­
ness of these agents against cellulose dust explosions:
(i) the inhibiting concentrations (weight and vol %) of the ’inert’ 
gases, C00  and N0 , were greater than the corresponding 
inhibiting concentrations of Halon vapours;
(ii) the Halon agent contribution to the heat capacity of the system  
is  only ™ 40% of that found with the ’inert' gases;
(iii) the mono-ammonium phosphate powder suppressant and the 
’inert’ powder, china clay exhibited very sim ilar contributions 
to the heat capacity of the system;
(iv) the heat abstraction potential of the ’inert’ gases was greater  
than that of the powder suppressant agents.
These results demonstrate a chemical influence of the Halon vapours super­
imposed over their heat abstraction influence. It is  deduced that Halon 
vapours are more effective than ’inert' gases as inerting agents. In practice, 
it is  difficult to separate the thermodynamic heat abstraction capability of an 
agent from the kinetics of heat transfer. It would be expected that Halon 
liquid sprays used as explosion suppressants w ill demonstrate a larger  
thermal influence than is  suggested by the data in Table 6 .9 .  because of the 
kinetics of droplet evaporation and the corresponding latent heat of vapor­
isation of the liquid suppressant. The thermal contribution to explosion 
suppression will be more prevalent with the le ss  volatile Halons. Explosion 
suppression results presented in Tables 5.42.  and 5.44.  have demonstrated - 
that the more volatile Halon 1211 is  a le ss  effective explosion suppressant 
than Halon 1011.
The argument, see section 2 . 3 . 2 . ,  that a mono-ammonium phosphate based 
powder suppressant has a significant chemical influence is  not substantiated 
by these results. Its effectiveness is  sim ilar to that of an inert powder, that 
is  it acts primarily as a diluent and thermal quenching agent. The explosion 
suppression result obtained inadvertently, see section 5 . 4 . 3 . 3 . ,  whereby
1 2 kg of mono-ammonium phosphate powder suppressant was released into 
3
the 6.2m vesse l ^ 250ms after an unsuppressed cellulose dust explosion 
provided an insight into the action of this agent. The resultant p ressu re/ 
time record in this experiment is  shown in Figure 65. The explosion 
pressure was reduced rapidly from ^  0.84 MPa to 0.42 MPa in ^25ms 
upon injection of the suppressant. This effect must be that of heat abstract­
ion. since combustion would have ceased at ^ P  . The theoretical heatmax
abstraction consequence of the injection of the suppressant can be calculated 
from the thermodynamic data presented in Appendix 2 . An explosion p ress­
ure of 0.84 MPa corresponds to a system temperature of ru1400K, and to a 
system energy of ** 14.2MJ. The heat capacity of 12kg of the mono-ammon- 
ium phosphate suppressant is  22kJ K Hence injection of the suppress­
ant should result in a final temperature of ** 640K and a corresponding 
pressure of 0.39 MPa. This theoretical value is  in good agreement with the 
observed pressure of 0.42 MPa. Note that the pressure drop occurred in 
^  25ms which demonstrates the fast and efficient heat abstraction capability- 
of this powder suppressant.
The'relative effectiveness of the suppressants Halon 1011, Halon 1211, water 
and mono-ammonium phosphate powder against both gas and dust explosions 
have been evaluated experimentally, see section 5 .4 .  The implications of 
these results are discussed in section 6 .4 .
6 .3 .  Explosion Suppressors
The suppressant discharge characteristics of both hemispherical and high 
rate discharge (HRD) suppressors were measured to provide basic data 
necessary to test the theoretical model of explosion suppression described  
in section 3 .4 .
6 .3 .1 .  Hemispherical Suppressors ,
The discharge characteristics of hemispherical type suppressors described 
in section 2 .4 .1 .  are summarised in Figure 46. These suppressors deliver  
liquid suppressant very rapidly. They have a negligible activation tim e, and 
a 180° suppressant discharge profile; but a limited throw.
6 .3 .2 .  High Rate Discharge (HRD) Suppressors
The results of section 5 .3 .  have identified three regim es of suppressant dis­
charge from HRD suppressors of the type shown in Plate lib.
initial burst of suppressant 
bulk discharge of suppressant 
discharge of remaining suppressant
The t * t regime occurs only for the liquid fill HRD suppressors of
this specific construction. The liquid suppressant between the frangible disc  
and the detonator is  propelled ahead of the bulk of suppressant by the hydraulic 
shockwave created by the explosive. The same shockwave momentarily 
delays the bulk suppressant discharge because it opposes the propelling agent 
driving force. At time t^, the propelling agent ’punches through’ the remain­
ing suppressant charge.
6 . 3 . 2 . 1 .  Standard HRD Suppressors
All experimental work reported in this thesis was undertaken using Graviner 
explosion suppressors. The measured discharge characteristics of the 
standard Graviner HRD suppressors are presented in section 5 . 3 . 2 . 1 .  These 
suppressors demonstrate a significant activation tim e. The use of a 90°
t
3 ^elbow increased the bulk discharge tim e, t  ^ -  tQ, of the 3dm suppressor 
by approximately 10ms. The use of a longer spreader also increased the
suppressant discharge tim e. Comparisons between the data recorded for
3 3 3the standard suppressor range of 3dm , 10dm and 35dm , see Tables 5.35.
and 5 .3 6 . ,  are confounded by the different fill ratios used as standard in the
Graviner suppressors:
3dm3  HRD -  fill ratio 60%
10dm3  HRD -  fill ratio 53%
35dm3 HRD -  fill ratio 81%
6 . 3 . 2 . 2 .  HRD Suppressor Parameters
The optimum fill ratio is  inevitably a compromise between the quantity of 
suppressant discharged in the bulk tQ_>t^ regime and the suppressant m ass 
discharge rate. .
3Figure 49 indicates that the optimum fill ratio for the 3dm HRD suppressor 
is  55 -  60%. It is  evident from the suppressor canister depressurisation 
curves that the maximum depressurisation rate increased with fill ratio, thus 
reflecting the reducing effectiveness of the propelling agent to expel the 
suppressant, see Figure 50.
Figure 51 shows that the suppressant discharge tim e decreased with increasing 
propelling agent pressure and high speed cine' records demonstrated that a 
greater suppressant discharge velocity occurred at the higher propelling agent 
pressure.
'V'
* The standard nomenclature defines an HRD suppressor by its suppressant 
capacity.
Figure 52 shows, not unexpectedly, that the suppressant discharge tim es  
decreased with an increase in the suppressor outlet orifice diam eter. The 
measured initial suppressant discharge velocities were found to be independ­
ent of the suppressor outlet area. The canister depressurisation rate in­
creased with an increase in the suppressor outlet orifice diam eter.
6 . 3 . 3 .  Comparison of Results with Theory
Comparisons between measurement and theory is  not valid beyond tim e t^
because of the significant nitrogen ’punch through1 that occurs. The
observations summarised in section 6 . 3 . 2 . 2 . are all consistent with the
very sim ple theory of an HRD suppressor discharge described in section
3 . 2 . 2 .  The discharge rate is  proportional to the outlet area A and to the ^
root of the propelling agent pressure , J P , as suggested by the theory.
2
3The measured 3dm HRD suppressor discharge characteristic compares
w ell with theoretically predicted performance for t <  t . , see Figures 5 and
-1  -1
6 . The measured initial discharge velocity was 43 m s and 80 m s for
P of 2 and 6  MPa respectively. This is  in good agreement with co rres- %
2. - 1 - 1  ponaing theoretical values of 46 m s and 79 m s derived from equation
27. Agreement between theory and experiment breaks down at 13> t^.
Figure 6 6  compares the theoretical discharge characteristics of various HRD 
suppressors. The 19mm diam eter single and dual exit type suppressors have 
much longer bulk discharge tim es, but higher initial discharge ve locities  
than the 76mm diam eter single exit type suppressors; however it is  probable 
that a greater percentage of suppressant w ill be discharged in the bulk 
tQ—> t^, regim e with the 19mm diam eter type suppressors. The addition of 
peripherals, such as connecting pipework, elbows and spreaders w ill reduce 
the discharge rate and thus increase the suppressant discharge tim e.
6 .3 .4 .  System Analogues
Simple mathematical analogues of a suppressor discharge can be defined
from the experimental measurem ents of t , t, , t n and R„ and R„, oro 1  2  1  2
from theoretical interpolation of these data.
R
r < ■
V .
\ •\
/
1 * 2/
' t t
Pertinent suppressor discharge data are summarised in Tables 5.32 -  5 .34 .  
These analogues, coupled with the suppressant throw characteristics 
defined in Figures 46 and 48 were used in the explosion suppression model 
described in section 3 .4 .
6 .4 .  Explosion Suppression
Experimental tr ia ls  provide essential information on the efficacy of explosion
suppression m easures. The results of explosion suppression te sts  on gas and
3 3dust explosions in 1m and 6 .2m v esse ls  reported in section 5 .4 .  have 
determined the relative effectiveness of the three suppressants, mono-ammon­
ium phosphate powder, water, and Halon 1011. These resu lts provide a found­
ation to test the validity of the theoretical model described in section 3 .4 .
6 . 4 . 1 .  Suppression of Quiescent Gas Explosions
The explosion suppression tr ia ls  on quiescent gas explosions, see Table 5 .41 .  
and 5 .45 ,  have established certain experimental facts:
water is  not an effective suppressant of gas explosions;
at the lower detection pressures (P <  lOkPa) both
A
mono-hmmonium phosphate powder and Halon 1011 are  
equally effective suppressants;
m ore effective suppression is  attained with the use of a 
larger number of sm aller suppressors;
m ore effective suppression is  attained with the use of a 
higher propelling agent pressure;
at the higher detection p ressu res, Halon 1011 can fail to 
suppress the explosion; the resultant overpressure exceeds  
that of a corresponding unsuppressed explosion.
Typical p ressu re/tim e records obtained in explosion suppression tr ia ls  are  
sketched in Figures 53 and 54. Most commonly, curves of type S were  
obtained. Curves of type were only recorded in experim ents with a very  
low detection pressure; the pressure continues to r ise  after the explosion  
has been suppressed effectively because:
(i) the suppressant propelling agent continues to be discharged  
into the test chamber;
(ii) volatile liquid suppressants have a significant vapour p ressu re .
This second pressure r ise  i s  usually slow compared to the suppressed
explosion event. Conventionally, the suppressed explosion pressu re , P,,-™*
*
i s  reported as the greater value of the m easurem ents P_ or P_ defined inx\ xi
Figures 53 and 54.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
The influence of propelling agent pressure, P^ , on the suppression effective­
ness of mono-ammonium phosphate powder and%alon 1 0 1 1  in the lm ^ apparatus 
is  demonstrated in Figure 67. At-the higher detection p ressu res, suppression  
was more effective with the higher propelling agent pressures because the 
suppressant was injected more rapidly into the growing fireball. However, at 
the lower detection p ressu res, the higher propelling agent pressure produced
an increased suppressed explosion pressure, P ', because of the significantRED
contribution of this propelling agent pressure to the total system  p ressu re .
Figure 6 8  shows that m ore effective suppression was achieved with the higher
propelling agent pressure, P = 6  MPa, for all P >  18 kPa. Inevitably
2higher detection pressures resulted in le s s  effective suppression and for
-3P ^ ^ .  50 kPa and P^ = 2 MPa, 4kg m of Halon 1011 failed to suppress a
15 Vol % 70/30 CH /^  h  expl°sion in the lm^ v esse l (Tests 20 and 21). -
3 —3Halon 1011 also proved ineffective in 6 .2m trials; a concentration of 2.9kg m
failed to suppress 9 .5  Vol % CH^/air explosions for all P ^  25kPa (Tests 99
and 1 0 0 ).
H istorically, mono-ammonium phosphate powder and Halon 1011 suppressants 
were introduced into different market areas and installed with different 
operational requirements: *
P . m  lOkPa, PXT ~  6  MPa ------) P „ „  < 0 . 1  MPa
A 2 RED
P A^  3 .5kP a, P „  ^  2 MPa ------ > P _ m  jss 0.025 MPaA N RED
Figure 69 shows that these ’standard' system s were effective in suppressing
370/30 CH /H^ explosions in the lm  apparatus with a >  50% reduction in
-3
the nominal system  suppressant concentration of 4kg m . . It can be seen that
the P achieved with the standard Halon system  was lower than that achieved  RED
with the standard powder system , largely as a consequence of the lower detection  
pressure employed with the Halon system .
Powder system  
Halon system
3Explosion suppression tr ia ls  in the 6.2m v esse l demonstrated that three
3 3
3dm HRD suppressors were more effective than one 10dm HRD suppressor,
compare results-of T ests 97, 98 and 99 with T est 102 in Table 5 .45 .  This
dem onstrates the importance of the increased suppressant m ass discharge
rate achieved by using a larger number of sm aller HRD suppressors to
attain a particular suppressant design concentration. It is  worthy of note 
3that two 5dm hem ispherical suppressors (Test 105) did not suppress a 
comparable explosion. A s the hem ispherical suppressors have a superior 
suppressant discharge characteristic, this was an unexpected resu lt. A 
possible explanation is  identified in section 6 . 4 . 5 . 2 .  below.
6 . 4 . 2 .  Suppression of Turbulent Gas Explosions
It has been established in section 6 .1 .1 .  that a preset ignition delay, t  ,
defines a specific level of turbulence for turbulent gas explosions. Turbulent
3gas explosion suppression tr ia ls  were undertaken only in the lm  apparatus, 
see  Table 5.42 .
Figure 70 presents the relationship between the measured suppressed
explosion pressure, P -,-,^ , and the corresponding unsuppressed explosionRED
turbulent burning velocity • It is  evident that the mono-ammonium  
phosphate system  (P . = 0.01 MPa , P = 6  MPa) suppressed a ll turbulent
- i 2gas explosions with <=<S < 2 . 2  m s , and that the corresponding Halon 1011
u - 1
system  suppressed all turbulent gas explosions with <  1 .5  m s . The
distinction in effectiveness between the two suppressants is  increased further
since ’failed' Halon suppressions resulted in P—,,^  values greater than the
RED
corresponding unsuppressed Pmax values.
Interpolation from the experimental relationship between and K, see
Table 5 . 2 . ,  enables the lim its of effectiveness of these two specific ex­
plosion suppression system s (P^ = 0.01 MPa, = 6  MPa) to be defined 
for gaseous explosion hazards in volum es of nominally lm^:
Powder system  : -  K < 4 5  MPa m s ^
Halon 1011 system  : -  K *^30 MPa m s *
Thus, mono-ammonium phosphate powder suppressant is  m ore effective than 
Halon 1011, and the latter can result in ’critical failure’ as predicted by the 
thermal model described in section 3 .4 .
6 . 4 . 3 .  Suppression of Dust Explosions
3Explosion suppression tr ia ls  in the 1m apparatus were undertaken using a
lOkJ pyrotechnic igniter. Since the explosion energy corresponding to a
-3typical low detection pressure of ^ 3 . 5  kPa i s  only l l k j  m it is  evident 
that this pyrotechnic igniter represents a significant contribution to the total 
system  energy at detection. The datum experim ents reported in section
5 . 4 . 2 . 1 .  show that the overpressure created by the pyrotechnic igniter in
3 3the lm  apparatus was 'v  6 kPa. Explosion suppression tr ia ls  in the 6 .2m
apparatus used 100J spark ignition to ensure that the effectiveness of a
sensitive explosion suppression system  was not masked.
3R esults of explosion suppression tr ia ls  in the lm  apparatus are presented  
graphically in Figures 71 and 72, see Tables 5.43 and 5 .44 .  These resu lts  
show that:
\
(i) with a high propelling agent pressure, mono-ammonium  
phosphate powder, water, and Halon 1 Oil were equally 
effective against coal dust explosions;
(ii) water was the most effective suppressant against cellu lose  
dust explosions, although one poor result was obtained 
(Test 63);
(iii) at the lower propelling agent pressure of 2MPa,Halon 1011 
was ineffective against cellu lose dust explosions;
(iv) ’failed suppressions’ can result with Halon 1011.
Mono-ammonium phosphate powder, and Halon 1011 suppressants were 
originally introduced into different market areas and installed with different 
operational requirements:
Powder system  -  P A lOkPa, P__ ^ 6  MPa  v P ^ -,^  =<0.1 MPaJ A N * RED
Halon system  — P . < .3 .5k P a, P „  — 2 MPa _____> P ^ _ _  ^ 0 . 0 2 5  MPa
J A N 2  RED
Figure 73 shows that these ’standard’ system s were effective in suppressing
highly turbulent cellu lose dust explosions with a ; >  50% reduction in the
-3nominal suppressant design concentration of 4kg m . However, the resu lts
of Figure 72 shows that a very sm all increase in the detection p ressu re of
the standard Halon system  would result in ’cr itica l’ fa ilure. The difference
in effectiveness between the two system s is  le s s  pronounced than was found
with gas explosion tr ia ls , compare Figures 69 and 73. The poor perform ance
3of both Halon 1011 and Halon 1211 against lm  turbulent cellu lose dust 
explosions may have been partially accentuated by the lOkJ pyrotechnic igniter.
R esults of 6 .2m dust explosion suppression tr ia ls  are presented in Table 
5.46. Figure 74 dem onstrates the relative effectiveness of mono-ammonium  
phosphate, water and Halon 1011 suppression system s against cellu lose dust 
explosions. These results show that:
(i) both mono-ammonium phosphate and water can suppress 
effectively a highly turbulent cellu lose dust explosion in this 
large volume;
(ii) the Halon 1011 suppression system  was quite ineffective against 
an explosion of this intensity and scale;
(iii) the Halon 1011 suppression system  was demonstrated only to 
be effective against a low turbulence cellu lose dust explosion, 
see Test 119;
(iv) the choice of suppression system  hardware had a major 
influence on the level of explosion suppression achieved.
1 2 kg of a mono-ammonium phosphate based powder suppressant suppressed
3effectively a turbulent cellu lose dust explosion in the 6 . 2 m v e sse l, whereas
324kg (12dm ) of Halon 1011 proved quite ineffective. Water was le s s  effective
3
than the mono-ammonium phosphate powder suppressant. 1 2 kg (1 2 dm ) of
water failed to suppress the explosion. At a detection pressure P A ^  16kPa,
330kg (30dm ) of water suppressed the cellu lose dust explosion when d is­
charged from three single exit (76mm diameter) HRD suppressors; but did 
not suppress the explosion when discharged from one larger single exit 
(76mm diameter) HRD suppressor. Halon 1011 explosion suppression  
m easures were only effective against low turbulence cellu lose dust explosions
in the 6 .2m v e sse l. A Halon system comprising of two hem ispherical
suppressors and two HRD suppressors proved more effective than a system
comprising of HRD suppressors alone. This reflects the influence of the
higher suppressant discharge rate achieved with hem ispherical suppressors.
3T his is  contrary to the findings in 6.2m quiescent gas explosion suppress­
ion tr ia ls , see section*6 . 4 . 1 .  A possible explanation is  identified in 
section 6 . 4 . 5 . 2 .  below.
6 . 4 . 4 .  Tnternational Collaborative Research Programme
The efficacy of explosion suppression using a single HRD suppressor (76mm
3diam eter single exit) for both gas and dust explosions in a im  v esse l is  
demonstrated by the results presented in section 5 . 2 . 2 .  These te sts  formed 
part of an International collaborative research programme, see section 1 . 3. 
Comparable explosion suppression tr ia ls  undertaken by other workers are 
summarised in Appendix 1. Table 6.10.  presents an overall comparison of 
the results obtained in these trials:
EXPLOSIBLE EXPLOSION P A V=lm3 , V=lm3 , V=3.8m3 !i
FUEL SUPPRESSANT one dual one single
i
two single
kPa exit 19mm 
HRDa
exit 76mm 
HRDb
exit 76mm i
TTT1TN b iHRDs
Water 10
* * *
30 * * *
PROPANE* Halon 10 FAIL **** .
GAS 1011 30 FAIL *** ***
Powder 10 ****
30 *** ***
Water 10 ****
30 * *** ***
CELLULOSE Halon 10 * ***
DUST 1011 30 • FAIL ** ***
Powder 10
*** *** ***
30 ** *** ***
TABLE 6.10
* * * *
* * *
.* *
,*
FAIL
PRED -= 30kPa
30kPa < P .
lOOkPa
300kPa
P s RED
lOOkPa
.300kPa
RED
PRED 
:p <  p  
RED max
max
a PN,
b P N,
12 MPa 
6 MPa
In general the single exit (76mm diameter) HRD suppression system  was 
more effective than the dual exit (19mm diameter) HRD suppression system . 
More effective suppression was achieved in the larger volum e. This con­
clusion is  contrary to that inferred from the available explosion suppression
3 3results obtained in lm  and 6 .2m v e sse ls  reported in this th es is . Thus
there is  some conflict between the test results of the two ser ie s  of tr ia ls .
3 3Note that the propelling agent pressure used in the lm  / 6 . 2 m  comparable
3 3tr ia ls was 2 MPa, rather than the 6  MPa used for the lm  / 3 . 8 m  compar­
able tr ia ls . Furtherm ore, the explosion intensity of turbulent cellu lose
3dust was considerably greater in the 6 . 2 m v e sse l, because a m ore
turbulent dust cloud was produced by the chosen dust dispersion procedure.
3The converse was true in the 3 .8m .v e sse l.
Table 6.10 shows that the effectiveness of particularly Halon 1011 as an
explosion suppressant was dependent on the choice of explosion suppressor,
thus demonstrating the importance of a high suppressant m ass discharge
3
rate. Figure 75 presents comparable P—^ ^ data obtained in the lm
ELD
apparatus with the different explosion suppressors. The 76mm diam eter 
single exit suppressor was more effective than the 19mm diam eter dual exit 
suppressor at the higher detection pressures, but marginally le s s  effective  
at the lower detection p ressu res. The dual exit (19mm diam eter) suppressor  
has a higher initial discharge velocity than the single exit (76mm diameter) 
suppressor, but a lower m ass discharge rate, see  Figure 6 6 . Therefore at 
a low detection pressure, where the fireball is  spatially sm all and the system  
energy content is  low, the dual exit (19mm diameter) suppressor can prove 
m ore effective because it delivers a sm all amount of the suppressant charge 
to the explosion faster than does the single exit (76mm diam eter) suppressor. 
The superior suppressant m ass discharge characteristic of the latter ensures 
that, overall, it form s the basis of the m ost effective system s.
6 . 4 .5 .  Evaluation of Explosion Suppression Model
Section 3 .4 .  describes a mathematical model to estim ate the final pressure  
obtained in a suppressed explosion event. This estim ate of does not
take account of the suppressant vapour pressure or of the pressure r ise  re­
sulting from the suppressor(s) propelling agent. The param eters used for
computer estim ates of are listed in Appendix 4.
RED
3
6 . 4 . 5 . 1 .  lm  Explosion Suppression T rials
3The extensive ser ie s  of experiments undertaken in the lm  apparatus, see
section 5 . 4 . ,  provide a useful base to test the validity of the mathematical
m odel. Computer estim ates of i> for each of the 93 te sts  are listed alongRED
with the experimental conditions and results in Table 5.41 -  5 .44 .  Compari­
sons of theoretical and experimental values are presented in Figures
76 and 77. With a few exceptions, the theoretical value is  higher than
the experimental P value. In general, the theoretical model errs on the 
RED
side of safety; the disparity between prediction and experimental m easure­
ment is  greater for gas explosions than for dust explosions. In all te sts  
where a ’failed suppression’ occurred, the mathematical model predicted it . 
In a few instances the model has predicted ’fail suppression' where experi­
ment has demonstrated that a m easure of suppression is  possib le .
Figure 78 com pares the theoretical and experimental P -^ .^  values forRED
turbulent gas explosions of increasing severity . It is  evident that the m odel’s
prediction of P—-,-. errs on the side of safety and reflects the disparity in 
RED
effectiveness between mono-ammonium phosphate and Halon 1011 suppress-
*
ants. The theoretical curves show the regim es of reliable suppression, 
unreliable suppression and failed suppression. The a priori criteria  of a 
reliable suppression demonstrates a significant margin of safety. Hence the 
validity of the theoretical model is  established for the assessm ent of 
suppression system  performance in ^ l m ^  volum es.
* see section 3 .4 .5 .
36 . 4 . 5 . 2 .  6.2m Explosion Suppression Trials
A comparison of the measured and predicted values for quiescent gas
explosions in the 6 . 2 nr v e sse l suggests that the theoretical estim ate is  too 
optim istic, see Table 5 .45.  Indeed the mathematical model predicted a 
reliable suppression for experiments that subsequently demonstrated a failed  
suppression, see T ests 99 and 105. One hypothesis for this discrepancy, 
with large volume quiescent gas explosion suppression, is  that the suppress­
ant discharge significantly perturbs the predicted course of the explosion, as  
a consequence of induced turbulence.
This hypothesis was tested by comparing the measured (dP/dt) values ofmax
unsuppressed explosions with the measured va-lues correspond­
ing Tailed suppression’ events, see Table 6  .11.
1 V 
3m
EXPLOSION TURBULENCE
W
SUPPRESSION SYSTEM (dP/dt) v 'max
MPa s"1
' 1
Quiescent . 
70/30 CH4/H 2 1
NONE 
Water -  1 HRD -  2MPa 
Water -  1 HRD -  4MPa 
Water -  1 HRD -  6MPa 
Halon -  1 HRD -  2 MPa
9 .8
26.2
15 .0
42.7
12 .7
NONE 75.9
1 Turbulent 7 Halon -  1 HRD -  2MPa 53.6
70/30 CH./H0 4 2 Halon -  1 HRD -  6MPa 49.2
1 Turbulent NONE 41.9
70/30 CH ./H .4 a 4 Halon -  1 HRD -  6MPa 14.4
• NONE 2 .8
Quiescent Water -  3 HRDs -  2MPa 32.5
6.2 ch4 . 1 Water -  2 Hemis 15.7
Halon -  3 HRDs -  2MPa 6 .4
Halon -  2 Hemis 7.2
NONE 12.8  ' 1
Turbulent Halon -  1 HRD -  2MPa 8 .0  !
1 Cellulose Oust 4 Halon -  1 HRD -  6 MPa 10.5  !I
Halon -  1 HRD -  2MPa :
NONE 11.0
6 .2 Turbulent 4 Halon -  4 HRDs -  2MPa 7 .5
Cellulose Dust Water -  1 HRD -  2MPa 7 .2
6.2 Turbulent 2 NONE 5 .0
' Cellulose Dust Halon -  4 HRDs -  2MPa
" 2
TABLE 6 .1 1 . * Haloa 1211, other Halon tests  all Halon 1011
A ’failed suppression* of a quiescent gas explosion, when water or Halon 1011 
are used as the suppressant, is  a significantly more violent event than the 
corresponding unsuppressed explosion. The converse is  true for turbulent 
gas and dust explosions. Since both water and Halon 1011 demonstrate 
this effect, the increased explosion intensity that occurs with the quiescent 
gas explosion must be a consequence of induced turbulence, and not of any 
exothermic chemical reaction in the combustion zone. The data of Table
6 . 1 1 . suggest that the perturbation of the quiescent gas explosion that occurr­
ed when the explosion suppressors were discharged was equivalent to a 
turbulence factor ^  ~ 2 . 3 . , which must come into effect only after P ..
This induced turbulence parameter was included in the mathematical model 
as a perturbation on the burning velocity occurring at the time correspond­
ing to the injection of suppressant into the vessel:
t . + t + t , see Figure 7. Thus for
A  v v
t <  (tA + t;, + tA :- S = > S  . A  t  C7 u u
t'S*' (t* + t ,  + t J  S = > 2 . 3  S ' A 6 C u u
This induced turbulence has a greater influence on the estimate of P—.,.^ in
JR-CiD
larger test volumes because of the longer time intervals between the release  
of the suppressant and suppression of the explosion. Figure 79 demonstrates 
the influence of this induced turbulence parameter on the mathematical model 
nomogram. --
It'was found that the theoretical estimates of P _ _ _  listed in Table 5.41. wereRED
essentially invariant when an induced turbulence factor of 2 .3 .  was included 
in the calculation, with the exception of Test 16, where an unreliable suppress­
ion was predicted theoretically. Table 6.11.  shows the influence of an induced
turbulence factor of 2 .3 .  on the theoretical estim ates of P^__ for quiescent
3  RED
gas explosion tests in the 6 . 2 m apparatus.
................. .........
TEST NO SUPPRESSANT PRED
kPa
' .- .................:....... ........ -...... — i
COMPUTER ESTIMATE OF P „ _ ( k P a )  __ RED
(see Table 5.45) • • A s Table 5^45, With Iriduced Turbulence
94 Halon 1011 4 3 3
95 Halon 1011 1 . 2 3 3
96 Halon 1011 9.6 17 17
97 Halon 1011 17 32 32
9 8 Halon 1011 24 44 81 PR
99 Halon 1011 860 69 FAIL SUPPN J
i
1 0 0 Halon 1011 860 85 PR. FAIL SUPPN |
1 0 1 Water 730 FAIL SUPPN FAIL SUPPN j
1 0 2 Halon 1011 39 FAIL SUPPN FAIL SUPPN
103 Powder 2 0 2 1 2 1
104 Powder 58 . 6 6 .90 I
?
105 Halon 1011 830 48 87 PR
106 Water 620 FAIL SUPPN FAIL SUPPN
107 Halon 1011 26 43 43 j
j
TABLE 6.12.
A better correspondence between the measured and predicted P—.*^ valuesR ED
is  evident with the induced turbulence perturbation included in the model.
In practice, the usefulness of the model will be limited by the uncertainty 
in the choice of the induced turbulence factor. Test 105 refers to explosion 
suppression with hemispherical suppressors, and the data of Table 6.11.  
points to an induced turbulence factor greater than the value of 2 .3  estimated 
for HRD suppressors. Thus, the prediction of f° r Test 105 in Table
6 . 1 2 . is  somewhat optimistic.
Since applications of explosion suppression system s to ’quiescent gas' hazards 
are seldom encountered in industrial practice, a more systematic analysis of 
this problem has not been pursued, and an induced turbulence factor of 2 . 3 . 
accepted as an empirical estimate for theoretical evaluations of the effective­
ness of quiescent gas explosion suppression m easures.
36.2m cellulose dust explosion suppression tr ia ls , see Table 5.46, have
demonstrated a general correspondence between measured and predicted
P values. The limited number of turbulent dust explosion suppression RED
results obtained in this large volume apparatus were supportive of the 
theoretical explosion suppression model described in section 3 .4 .  Figure 
74b shows that the predicted regimes of ’Failed Suppression’, ’Unreliable 
Suppression’, and ’Reliable Suppression’ of cellulose dust explosions of 
differing turbulence levels, for a specific Halon 1011 explosion suppression 
measure , are in reasonable correspondence with experimental observations. 
Thus, the lim its of applicability of a suppression system , determined by the 
model, are in reasonable agreement with those established experimentally.
6 . 4 . 5 .3.  Other Workers Results
Explosion suppression trials reported by other workers are listed in 
Appendix 1. These data provided the opportunity to evaluate further the 
validity of the mathematical model described in section 3 .4 .  Computer 
estim ates of are listed adjacent to the corresponding results in
Appendix 1.
There is  a fair correspondence between the theoretical estimate, and the 
experimental measurement. In some instances ’Unreliable Suppression’ 
was predicted where experiment had demonstrated a failed suppression. A 
’Reliable Suppression’ prediction was matched always by an experimentally 
observed suppression.
Figure 80 compares the theoretical and experimental values for these
tests . A much larger scatter is  evident, compared to the corresppnding 
3comparison of lm  data, see Figure 77, and the theory has severely under­
estimated suppressed explosion pressures of seven tria ls. Variation in 
experimental conditions and less  well defined data are assumed to be 
partially responsible for these discrepancies. The predicted does
not include the influence of the suppressor propelling agent pressure, thus
the model tends to underestimate This underestimate is  predomin-RED
ant with the more effective (low P . )  explosion suppression m easures.
A
The study has demonstrated a correlation between experimental measure­
ment and theoretical prediction for some 75% of the reported explosion
3 3suppression trials in 3.8m and 20m v esse ls .
6 . 4 . 6 . Versatility and Applicability of the Model
The applicability of the explosion suppression model described in section
3 .4 .  has been demonstrated for. Halon, water and mono-ammonium phos­
phate powder explosion suppression system s against both gas and dust
' 3explosions in volumes ranging from 1 -  2 0 m .
An example of the computer program input and output is  shown in Figure 8 . 
The program was structured to permit either a routine appraisal of the 
effectiveness of any proposed explosion suppression system or a detailed 
evaluation of the lim its of effectiveness of a range of explosion suppression 
system s. Thus, it can be used both as a research tool and as a design aid 
for industrial explosion suppression applications.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This research has appraised the problems of meaningful explosibility 
measurement and industrial explosion hazard assessm ent and has quantified 
the discharge characteristics of explosion suppressors as a necessary  
foundation for a study of explosion suppression. The work has culminated 
in the establishment of a large volume explosion test facility, a compre­
hensive series of explosion suppression trials and the development of a 
mathematical model for the assessm ent of the efficacy of explosion 
suppression m easures. The specific findings of this study are collated 
below:
7 .1 .  Explosions
7 .1 .1 .  A simple isothermal model of explosion pressure  
development provides an adequate basis for the 
prediction of an explosion pressure/tim e history.
This model was used as the basis for computer 
simulation of an explosion pressure/tim e record 
in any defined volume.
7 .1 .2 .  The burning velocity, S^, determined from an
explosion pressure/tim e record, provides a more
meaningful measure of explosion severity than that
provided by (dP/dt) because the latter is  in -  max
fluenced by vesse l geometry and other wall effects.
7 .1 .3 .  Quiescent gas explosion tests in volumes ranging
3 3from 1 .23dm to lm  gave predictable and self
consistent explosion data. Comparable tests in the 
3
6 . 2 m vesse l identified a transition to a more violent 
combustion mechanism at specific explosion pressures  
during the course of the explosion. This effect was 
only observed at specific fuel/air ratios removed
from the stoichiometric and was m ost pronounced
The turbulence of the explosible mixture at ignition 
has a major influence on the consequential explosion 
intensity. The turbulence level attained with experi­
mental dust dispersion procedures can be estimated 
by comparable turbulent gas explosion experiments.
In practice, dust explosibility is  measured by igniting 
a pneumatically dispersed dust cloud in a closed  
v esse l. The time interval between dust dispersion  
and ignition has a major influence on the resultant 
explosion intensity because the turbulence level 
decreases with increasing ignition delay.
A dust explosibility measurement in the standard 
Hartmann apparatus gives a substantial underestimate 
of the potential explosion intensity of the dust. This 
underestimate occurs because a quasi-continuous 
ignition source is  used in the Hartmann test. Dusts 
which are insensitive to ignition exhibit long ignition 
delays, and thus explode when the dust cloud is  le ss  
turbulent. In the Hartmann apparatus a dust explos­
ibility measurement is  dust cloud ignition sensitivity 
dependent.
• The use of a 100J spark discrete ignition procedure 
in the Hartmann test resolves the major criticism  
of this apparatus. However, there remains a 
significant disparity between such Hartmann data 
and corresponding results in larger test apparatus 
because of both the small scale, the large aspect 
ratio, and the particular characteristics of the 
Hartmann dust dispersion procedure.
3A 43dm spherical explosion.test apparatus was 
developed as an alternative to the much criticised  
Hartmann apparatus. It has been shown that, with 
the correct choice of experimental parameters, 
this apparatus is  capable of providing explosibility 
data comparable with that attained in the standard 
lm'* apparatus.
3A large scale 6.2m explosion test facility was set 
up primarily for explosion suppression tr ia ls . It 
has been shown that, with the correct choicfe of ex­
perimental parameters, dust explosions with in­
tensities comparable to those attained in the standard
3
lm  apparatus can be achieved. Dust explosibility
3determinations in this 6 . 2 m apparatus were highly 
reproducible.
Explosion hazard assessm ent is  the quantification of 
the potential explosion intensity of an explosible fuel 
in specific industrial environments. An empirical 
turbulence factor, , is  proposed to aid hazard 
assessm ent, and the Cube Law for explosibility 
scaling is  redefined thus:
For turbulent gas explosion hazards oi can assum e 
a value > 1 0 , whereas 0 ^ 2 . 0  is  typical for 
turbulent dust explosions.
Explosion Suppressants
7 .2 .1 .  For the explosion suppression methods considered, 
the evidence suggests that the predominant mech­
anism is  physical rather than chemical.
7 . 2 .2 .  The scale on which suppression of a gas explosion 
occurs is  molecular, whereas for dust explosions 
the mean inter-particle separation is  a critical 
spatial determinant for effective suppression.
7 .2 .3 .  An effective explosion suppressant must abstract 
rapidly sufficient heat from the combustion kernel 
to prevent sustained combustion and also must inert 
the unburned explosible fuel/a ir  mixture.
7 .2 .4 .  It is  a particular property of Halon suppressants 
that they can'burn at elevated temperatures. Thus, 
if  effective suppression is  not achieved with Halon, 
the resultant ’Failed Suppression’ event may be more 
violent than the corresponding unsuppressed explosion 
event.
7*2.5.  If effective suppression is  not achieved with water
and powder suppressants, the resu ltan t’Failed 
Suppression’ event will be le ss  severe than the 
corresponding unsuppressed explosion event.
7 .2 .6 .  The effectiveness of a liquid suppressant i s  dependent
on both the thermodynamics of the liquid and the 
physical kinetics of heat transfer and droplet vapor­
isation. The effectiveness of a powder suppressant 
is  dependent on both the thermal properties of the 
powder and the particle size and shape distributions. 
The latter will influence the heat transfer rates.
Explosion Suppressors
7 .3 .1 .  The discharge characteristics of hemispherical suppress­
ors have been determined experimentally. They have a 
very fast discharge (typically^ 1 0 0  m s but a limited 
throw. '
7 .3 .2 .  The discharge characteristics of High Hate Discharge 
(HRD) suppressors have been determined experimentally 
for both liquid and powder suppressants. These 
suppressors are slower than the hemispherical suppress­
ors (typically v 40 m s *) but have a greater throw.
7 .3 .3 .  The adverse influence of peripherals (elbows, spreader 
type, etc) on HBD suppressor performance has been 
quantified.
7 .3 .4 .  A simple theory of suppressor discharge suggests that 
the discharge rate is  proportional to the outlet area 
and to the square root of the propelling agent pressure. 
This is  consistent with experimental findings.
7 .3 .5 .  Mathematical analogues of a suppressor's performance 
have been defined from both experiment and the simple 
theory. These analogues provided a basis for the 
mathematical model of explosion suppression.
\
Explosion Suppression
37 .4 .1 . An experimental facility, based on a 6 .2m pressure
v esse l, was set up and instrumented for this study. 
This facility was compatible with other explosion 
test facilities.
7 .4 .2 . Explosion suppression experimental tria ls with gas
3 3and dust explosions in both 1m and 6.2m  v esse ls , 
using Halon 1011, water, and powder suppressants 
are reported. This study has defined the efficacy 
and the limitations of specific explosion suppression 
m easures.
7 .4 .3 . Water is  not an effective suppressant of gas explos­
ions but proved very effective against explosions of 
the dusts evaluated.
7 .4 .4 . . The mono-ammonium phosphate based powder proved
the most effective suppressant against both gas and 
dust explosions.
7 .4 .5 . At the lower detection pressures, Halon 1011 proved 
very effective, but at the higher detection pressures  
this explosion suppressant could fail catastrophic­
ally to suppress the explosion.
7.4.6. More effective suppression was attained by the use of 
a larger number of sm aller suppressors.
In general, the single exit (76mm diameter) HRD 
suppressor was more effective than the dual exit 
(19mm diameter) HRD suppressor against explos­
ions in the lm** apparatus.
A mathematical model of suppression system
performance was developed. The validity of this
3 3model has been demonstrated by the lm  and 6.2m  
explosion suppression tria ls.
Explosion suppression measures against quiescent 
gas explosions proved less  effective than theoretic­
ally predicted. It is  considered that this occurs 
because the discharge of the suppressors significant­
ly perturbs the predicted course of the explosion as 
a consequence of induced turbulence.
Comparison of theoretical predictions of suppression
system performance with published results of other
workers for explosion suppression trials in volumes 
3 3ranging from lm  to 20m indicates a general cor­
relation. In most cases the theoretical prediction 
errs on the side of safety.
Theoretical predictions of explosion suppression 
efficacy can be obtained systematically using an 
interactive computer program. This program is  a 
“significant design aid tool for a manufacturing 
company of explosion suppression system s.
S. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
The work reported in this thesis has identified several aspects of explosion 
suppression technology which remain unexplained and has opened up a 
number of areas in which the limited resource has permitted only a cursory 
evaluation. These areas would benefit from a more detailed study. Com­
parable explosion and explosion suppression tria ls using other fuels, other 
suppressants, and other suppression system s would complement the results 
presented in this document and, thus, would establish an improved basis 
for the quantification of the efficacy of explosion suppression m easures.
Particular aspects which, in the opinion of the author, require significant 
further research are listed below:
(i) compare the explosibility measurements of a wide range
3 3 3of industrial dusts in the 43dm , lm  , and 6.2m  apparatus;
(ii) fislly appraise the usefulness of the Hartmann apparatus 
when using a discrete ignition methodology;
(iii) seek to quantify turbulence, in as much as it affects explosion 
intensity, by some more absolute method to expedite more 
meaningful explosion hazard assessm ent;
(iv) study large volume gas explosions to understand the nature 
and causes of the artefacts reported in Section 5 j
(v) establish the efficacy of explosion suppression m easures in
3
large volumes (50 -  250m );
(vi) undertake a systematic theoretical and experimental study 
of the vent/suppression hybrid concept. There has been 
little work in this area, but the vent/suppression option 
can represent the only viable solution for protection of 
industrial plant handling very explosible dusts or plant 
with limited surface to fit explosion vents;
(vii) further appraise the validity and usefulness of the mathe­
matical model of explosion suppression, both for other 
dusts, other suppressants, and other test volumes;
(viii) extend the concepts reported in this thesis to an appraisal 
of explosion suppression efficacy on the plurality of 
industrial plant components. In particular the following 
merit further study:
(i) bag filters;
(ii) large elevators;
(iii) fluidised bed driers;
(iv) spray driers;
(v) centrifuges.
The results of explosion suppression trials undertaken by other workers and available to the author are listed
below. Tests with the single exit (76mm diameter) HRD explosion suppressor(s) provide additional data to
test the theoretical model described in section 3.4. Computer estimates of P are included with theRED
experimental results of these particular trials in the tables below.
TRIAL SERIES A (237)
3Test Volume : lm
Suppression System : One dual exit (19mm diameter) HRD suppressor
-3' •Suppressant Concentration : Powder - 4kg m
-3Water - 4kg m
Halon 101 - 4kg m ^
UNSUPRESED EXPLOSION DATA
FUEL tV
s
Pmax
MPa
K
MPa ms*
Quiescent 0.74 7.5
4 Vol % 0.3 0 . 8 8 51.5
C3H8 0 . 6 0.87 34.7
0.9 0 . 8 6 *28.0
1.5 0.85 2 0 . 2
Coal Dust 0 . 6 0.78 7.2
Cellulose Dust - 0 . 6 0.92 16.5
TABLE A1
SUPRESION OF QUIESCENT C„HQ/AIR - (PXTO = 12 MPa) ----   o o N2________
POWDER WATER HALON 101
P P A RED
kPa kPa
P PA . RED
kPa kPa
P P A RED.
kPa kPa
1 0 ’ 2 0  
30 '  45 
50 75 
70 15
8 590 
29 520 
47 510
1 0 1080 
30 130 
«• ' —
TABLE A2
SUPPRESSION OF QUIESCENT CgHg/AIR -  (P 'vlOkPa)
pN2 P_ (kPa) RED v '
MPa POWDER WATER HALON 101
6 30 630 1050
9 50 530 1090
1 2 45 520 130
TABLE A3
SUPRESION OF TURBULENT C.H,/AIR - (P. = lOkPa, V .  = 12 MPa, Powder)_  o o A
t (s)V 0.3 0 . 6 0.9 1.5
P„TO (kPa) RED v ' 690 460 240 80
TABLE A4
SUPRESION OF COAL DUST - PN 2 = 12 MPa)
POWDER WATER HALON 101
PA P. P P PRED A RED A RED
kPa kPa kPa kPa kPa kPa
19 4 29 48 9 30
4 57 38 76 18 1140
71 275 54 192 37 150
TABLE A5
SUPRESION OF COAL DUST - (PA  ^40kPa)
PN2 ' ' -PBED <“ ■»>
MPa POWDER WATER HALON 101
6 54 1 2 0 -
9 62 1 2 0 -
1 2 57 76 150
TABLE A6
SUPPRESSION OF CELLULOSE DUST -  (PN2 = 12 MPa)
POWDER WATER HALON 101
PA PRED PA PRED PA
pRED
kPa kPa kPa kPa kPa kPa
4 27 1 80 4 85
24 43 13 520 13 1060
37 153 19 60 3 1030
54 510
TABLE A7
SUPRESION OF CELLULOSE DUST - (PA~ 20kPa)
pN2
MPa
PRED <“*>
POWDER WATER HALON 101
6 60 730 -
9 60 710 -
1 2 43 60 1030
TABLE A8
TRIAL-SERIES B (240)
• 3
Test Volume : 3.8m
Suppression System : Two single exit (76mm diameter) HRD suppressors
-3Suppressant Concentration : Powder - 4kg m
—3
- Water - 5.2kg m
.Halon 101 - 3.4kg m ^
UNSUPRESED EXPLOSION DATA
FUEL tV
s
Pmax
MPa
K
MPa ms*
Quiescent 0.74 29
5 Vol %
y
0.3 0.76 76
SH 8 0 . 6 0.77 47
0.9 0.72 32
Coal Dust 0 . 6 0.82 7.8
Cellulose Dust 0 . 6 0.82 11.8
TABLE B1
SUPPRESSION OF QUIESCENT CgHg -  PN2 = 4 MPa
POWDER WATER HALON 101
PA PRED PA PHKD <kPa> PA PRED<kPa>
kPa Experiment Theory kPa Experiment Theory kPa Experiment Theory
1 0 2 2 24 1 0 250 FAIL SUPN 5 24 13
30 54 62 PR 32 30 FAIL 
SUPN
28 40 5
5 960 FAIL
SUPPN
50 2^00 FAIL 
SUPN
47 65 127 PR
TABLE B2
SUPRESION OF QUIESCENT CgHg/AIR - (PA rv 7kPa)
POWDER WATER HALON 101
A.
MPa
PRED (kPa)
Experiment Theory
PRED
Experiment Theory
PRED ^  
Experiment Theory
2 2 1 25 450 FAIL
SUPPN
16 23
4 2 2 18 250 FAIL
SUPPN
24 17
6 - 26 16 176 3 PR 36 15
TABLE B3
SUPPRESlON OF TURBULENT C gH g/A IR  -.(Prv 7kPa, P^2 = 4 MPa
POWDER WATER HALON 101
t'V •■bed^ PBED<kPa> P^  ^(kPa) RED ' ’
s Experiment Theory Experiment Theory Experiment Theory
0.3 640 FAIL
SUPN
540 FAIL
SUPN
950 FAIL
SUPPN
0 . 6  • 360 75 PR 430 FAIL
SUPPN
1 0 0 0 FAIL
suppn;
0.9 124 29 310 FAIL
SUPPN
950 35 PR
TABLE B4
SUPPRESSION OF COAL DUST (PNg = 4 MPa)
POWDER WATER HALON 101
PA
kPa .
PRED(kPa) PA
kPa
pRED(kPa) PA
kPa
PRED(kPa)
Experiment Theory Experiment Theory Experiment Theory
7 31 1 1 7 2 1 1 2 7 !7 1 2
34 41 48 31 45 40 30 1 0 0 45
5 72 76 41 5 52 57 76 84
TABLE B5
SUPRESION OF COAL DUST (PA ~ 7 kPa)
POWDER WATER HALON 101
PN2 PRED <“*> AeD^
MPa Experiment Theory Experiment Theory Experiment Theory
2 - - 1 2 1 2 15 15
4 31 1 1 2 1 1 0 17 1 2
6 24 1 0 2 1 1 1
TABLE B6
SUPRESION OF CELULOSE DUST - (P = 4 MPa)
POWDER WATER HALON 101
PA
pRED(kPa) PA pRED(kPa) PA pRED(kPa)
kPa Experiment Theory kPa Experiment Theory kPa Experiment Theory
6 31 25 8 19 19 7 2 1 30
34 1 1 0 94 PR 30 57 58 34 80 FAIL
SUPPN
50 160 143 PR 57 83 108 59 109 FAIL
SUPPN
TABLE B7
SUPRESION OF CELULOSE DUST - (P. ~ 7 kPa)
- POWDER WATER HALON 101
PN2 P. RED(kPa) PRED(kPa) PRED(kPa)
MPa Experiment Theory Experiment Theory Experiment Theory
2 - - 1 2 23 16 54 PR
4 31 35 19 17 21 30
6 . 50 18 24 15 31 24
\
TABLE B8
ITRIAL SERIES C (23,24,104)
3Test Volume : 20m
Suppression Systems : (i) Dual exit (19mm diameter) HRD suppressors 
(i) Single exit (76mm diameter) HRD suppressors 
Suppressor Charge : 4kg mono-ammonium phosphate powder
UNSUPRESED EXPLOSION DATA
FUEL Pmax
MPa
K
MPa ms*
9.5 Vol % CH.4 0.72 5.3
Coal Dust 0.77 8.5
Dextrin Dust 0.87 2 0 . 0
Pigment Dust 1 . 0 0 29.0
TABLE Cl
EXPLOSION SUPRESION TRIALS - (PN 2 = 4 MPa)
FUEL NO. OF HRDs PA 19mm SYSTEM 76mm SYSTEM |
kPa PRED <“*>
Experiment
PRED
Experiment
(kPa) i
1
Theory ’
1 0 40 -
9.5 Vol % CH.4 6 30 50 70 83
50 1 2 0 1 2 0 178
- 1 0 27 - -
2 0 - 2 2 34
Coal Dust 6 30 - 50 48
50 1 1 0 160 82
1 0 0 350 - -
1 0 92 60 34
2 0 - 1 0 0 63 PR
Dextrin Dust 8 30 160 1 0 0 95 PR
50 184 \ - -
1 0 14 78 6 8 PR
30 230 -
Pigment Dust 1 0 40 - 240 FAIL
SUPPN
50 430 - -
TABLE C2
TRIAL SERIES D (247)
3TEST VOLUME : lm
SUPRESION SYSTEM : (i) One dual exit (19mm diameter) HRD suppressor
(i) One single exit (76m diameter) HRD suppressor. 
SUPRESOR CHARGE : 4kg mono-ammonium phosphate powder
UNSUPRESED EXPLOSION DATA
FUEL Pmax
MPa
K
MPa m s * '
9.5 Vol % CH.4 0.71 5.5
4 Vol % CgHg 0.71 7.5
Coal Dust 0.85 8.5
Antracol Dust 0 . 8 6 20.5
Hexamethylentestranin 1.03 25.4
Pigment Dust 1 . 0 1 28.6
TABLE D1
EXPLOSION SUPRESION TRIALS - (one dual exit (19mm diameter) HRD, PN 2 = 6 MPa)
PA-
kPa
PRED(kPa)
CH4 COAL ANTRACOL PIGMENT
1 0 - - - 90
2 0 - . 70 260
30“ 60 - 170 -
40 - • 80 340 -
50 95 105 - -
70 ' 140 15 -
1 0 0 230 230 - -
TABLE D2
\
EXPLOSION SUPPRESSION TRIALS -  (one single exit (76mm diam eter) HRD, P N2 = 4 MPa)
s '
CH4 Vs COAL HEXAMETHYLENTESTRANIN
PA pRED(kPa) PBED <“*> ■PRED <“*>.. PRED(kPa)
kPa Experiment Theory Experiment Theory Experiment Theory Experiment Theory
1 0 30 24 10 39 30 31 170 FAIL SUPPN
30 5 62 125 92 ■ 40 75 195 FAIL SUPPN
50 70 1 0 0 180 154 80 1 2 1 538 FAIL SUPPN
TABLE D3
EXPLOSION SUPRESION TRIALS - (one single exit (76mm diameter) HRD, PN 2 = 6 MPa)
CH.4 HEXAMETHYLENTESTRANIN
PA PBED <“*>
kPa Experiment Theory Experiment Theory
1 0 30 2 2 98 FAIL SUPPN
30 50 5 105 FAIL SUPPN
50 65 90 215 FAIL SUPN
TABLE D4
APPENDIX 2
Calculation of the thermodynamic parameters for suppressant and for the explosion system are described
Determination of P , Q and Q  l  . m m ____ e
Examples for 70/30 CH^/Hg and cellulose dust are given. Note that the calcalations assume no cooling, no 
dissociation and ideality.
15 Vol % 70/30 CH4/H2
Initial conditions:
P = 0.1 MPa, T = 298 K o ’ o
air
CH4 1 0 .5  Vol %
-34 .3  mols m
» 2 4 .5  Vol % 1 .8  mols m ^
r 0
2 1 7 .8  Vol %
_3
7 .3  mols m
I  N2 6 6 .3  Vol %
_3
2 7 .1  mols m
I A 0 .8  Vol % -30 .3  mols m
CH4 + 202 
H2 + °2
C02 + 2H2° 
H2°
An = 0 
An = +1
(i)
(i)
-3 -3For completion via reactions (i) and (i) 9.5 mols m of 0 are required, but only 7.3 mols m are available.
Assume that the folowing reaction occurs:
- CH4 + 2 °2 CO + 2H20 An = +£ (ii)
-3 -3Reaction (iii) requires 6.43 mols m of Og, hence 0.87 mols m are available for combustion via
reaction (ii).
Final conditions:
P , Tm m
CO
H-
4.3 mols m 
0 . 1  mols m
HgO 10.3 mols m 
N2 + A 27.4 mols m-3
42.1 mols m-3
Thermodynamic data:
CH —> CO
Hence AH^g = -519.7 kJ mol
AU = AH - AnRT = -520.9 kJ mol-1
AHf (CH4) = - 74. 8  kJ mol 
AHf (CO) = -110.5 kJ mol 
AHf (H2 0) = -241.9 kJ mol-1
H2~*H20 -1 AH2gg =-241.9 kJ mol
. . Heat release via reaction (iii) is 235 kJ m 
Also
AU = AH - AnRT =-243.1 kJ mol
* _3
, . Heat release via reaction (i) is 423 kJ m
-3
-1
Equating heat released with heat absorbed gives:
T 2982658 = £. n . Au.= n.(H -H ) - £.n,-B (T - 298)
The right hand side of this expression is plotted in Figure 81. Hence, by interpolation, the maximum
temperature, = 2525 K
• 2525 42 1. . Maximum pressure P = x x 0.1 = 0.874 MPa.m 298 40.09
Explosion Pressure P^ = 0i874 MPa
-30.75 kg m Cellulose Dust
Initial conditions
P = 0.1 MPa, T = 298 K o ’ o
cellulose
Air
C6H10°5 705g 4.4 mols m 3
H2 ° 45g
_3
2.5 mols m
-3
' ° 2 21 Vol % 8 . 6  mols m
N 2
78 Vol % *“331.9 mols m
- A 1 Vol %
—30.4 mols m
C6H10°5 + 302 6C0 + 5 H20 An= + 8 (i)
There is only enough 0g for the combustion of 2.87 mols of cellulose dust. Assume that the adsorbed 
H O is driven off, and that unburned cellulose pyrolyses by reaction (i)
C6H10°5 Cg + 5 HgO An = +5 (i)
'.Final conditions
P , T m m
Thermodynamic data
Hence AH, C6HiO°5298
CO
= -908 kJ mol-1
AU = AH- AnRT = -928 kJ mol-1
C 9.2 mols m 
CO * 17.2 mols m 
HgO 24.5 mols m 
Ng+A 32.3 mols m
-1
-1
AHf (CO) =-110.5 kJ mol
AH. (Ho0 v) =-241.9 kJ mol f 2 (g)'
A Hf (C6 H1q 05 ) = -965 kJ mol
(s)
-1
Also
Heat release via reaction (i) = 2653 kJ m 
C
-3
AH, C6II1005298 = -245 kJ mol
-1
AU = AH - AnRT = -257 kJ mol-1
Heat release via reaction (i) = 383 kJ m
-3Total Energy Released Qm = 3036 kJ m
Equating heat released with heat absorbed gives:
,T ,.298303.6 = £fn; AUj = £5n( . (H - H ) - £;nj . R (T - 298)
The right hand side of this expression is plotted in Figure 81. Hence, by interpolation, the maximum
temperature Tm = 1660K.
• . _ ' 160 73.8 _Maximum Pressure P = x ■ ■  x 0.1 = 1.005 MPam 298 40.9
.explosion .pressure Jr = i .uuoM±ja _______________ m_____________
Note that for 70/30 CH^/H2 and Cellulose dust is given by interpolation from Figure 81 where e
is the fuel autoignition temperature.
Determination of He
is the energy absorbed by the suppressant in increasing from its initial temperature, Tq to the fuel 
autoignition temperature Tq at constant volume, see section 3.4.
Cj . dT + L + C . dT
(g)
C . dT or 
g
C . dT if T > T g o B
Numerical data for liquid suppressants are listed in Table 3.1. Figure 92 presents vs T data for the
various Halons. Note that H for water can be calculated directly from published thermodynamic data.
G(g)
For powder suppressants: 
T
H = e c . drs
where C0 is the specific heat of the agent - see Table 6 .8 .
\
Calculation of Liquid Suppressant Vaporisation Characteristics
The droplet size distribution of suppressant discharges can be estimated from:
dN ,_= a D exp - bD
where dN is the number of droplets with diameters between D and D + dD, see reference 249. The constant, b, 
is given by:
j \  = liquid surface tension 
X = spray discharge solid angle (radions)
AP = pressure difference across nozzle
Calculated droplet size distributions for Halon 1011, Halon 121 and water discharged from a standard single 
exit (75mm diameter) HRD suppressor (P^. = 2 MPa) are shown in Figure 83. Both number average and . 
weight average distributions are included. ^Note that the bulk of the suppressant mass is transported to the 
combustion zone by the relatively small number of larger droplets. Also, the median droplet size of water 
spray is larger than that of Halon spray discharge. • « '
The rate of vaporisation of a liquid droplet injected-into an ambient of temperature T has been derived by Marty 
Kanury (249). The droplet diameter D at a given time, t, later is given by:
3-1where Q = suppressant flow (dm h )
In (B + 1) t (i)
where bQ = original diameter of droplet 
/Oj = density of liquid 
/O = density of gaseous medium 
B = mass transfer number
cxf = thermal diffusivity of gas, to which droplet is injected
The thermal diffusivity,cd , is given by
k
(iii)
where k^ = thermal conductivity of gas
C = specific heat of gas 
g
The mass transfer number, B, is approximately defined by:
B =
L + Cl(TB-To>
( T »  T b ) (iii)
where Cj = specific heat of liquid
L = latent heat of vaporisation
T = liquid boiling point B '
T = droplet initial temperatureo
(see Table 3.1.)
r  iu m  c^uciiJiuu ^jlij tu c  uxupj.cc c v a p u ia t iu u  u m c  1 o g jv c u  u y  i
y p  Di o
8y<g%  ln (B+1)
(v)
Equations (ii - v) refer to droplets which are stationary in a hot quiescent gaseous medium. In explosion 
suppression the evaporation rate will be enhanced by forced convection since the droplets are travelling 
at 40 - 60 m s *. It has been shown that the droplet diameter that will evaporate in a given time is
ii.
increased by (1 + 0.3 R 2 ) 2 where R is the Reynolds Number defined as:6 6
v D
R =---e F
where v = droplet velocity
j i = kinematic viscosity of gaseous medium
Note that k^, Cg, and p are functions of the ambient temperature, T. Data for dry nitrogen are 
tabulated below:
T
K
k
g
W m_ 1 K_ 1
cr
J g" 1 k" 1
" g
i ”3kg m 2 - 1. m s
P  
2 - 1  ms
30 2.5 x10- 2  
- 2
1.03 1 . 2 0 2.0 xlO- 5  
-5
1.5 x10- 5  
. . -550 3.8x10
- 2
1.07 0.65 5.5 x 10
-5
1.4 x 10 
„ -570 4.8x10 1 . 1 0 0.46 9.6 x 10 1 . 2  x 1 0
1 0 0 0 . 6.3 xl0" 2 1.16 0.32 1.7 xlO" 4 1.1 xlO- 5
130 7.4 xlO' 2  
. - 2
1 . 2 2 0.25 2.4 xlO- 4  
-4
1 . 0  x 1 0 “ 5  
. -4160 8.8x16
- 1
1.27 0 . 2 0 3.5 x 10 
. -4
9.4 x 10 
. . -4190 1.08 xlO 1.33 0.17 4.8x10 9.1x10
2 2 0 0 1.25 xl0 _ 1  
. - 1
• 1.38 0.15 6.0 xlO- 4  
-4
9.0 x 10~ 4
250 1.42 x10
-1
1.44 0.13 7.6x10
-4280 1.55x10 1.50 0 . 1 2 8 . 6  x 1 0 *
Calculation of )/
V represents the proportion of liquid phase suppressant evaporated in the unburned explosible mixture as 
the suppressant travels towards the fireball.
Equation (iv) is only valid for . Reference 249 defines a iterative procedure for the exact calculation
oof B for T 'V/ T . Such calculations for Halon 1011, Halon 121 and water at 20 C define B values of 0.17,B
0.57 and 0.005 respectively. Hence equation (i) defines droplet evaporation in the unburned zone. Final 
droplet diameters of suppressant discharged into a 2 0°C ambient at 40 m s Vare listed below:
Original Diameter i^m 50 1 0 0 2 0 0 30 400
Halon 101 42 95 197 293 398
Final diameter Halon 121 1 83 190 291 393
(pm) Water 48 9 2 0 0 30 400
V
By combining such data with the suppressant droplet size distributions the total volume of suppressant 
evaporated in the 10ms time interval can be estimated. Such estimates of  ^ are listed below for 
ambient temperatures of 20°C and 100°C.
T = 20°C T =10°C
Halon 101 3% 8%
Halon 121 14% 24%
Water 0 .2 % 0.9%
Calculation of
<f> represents the proportion of liquid phase suppressant evaporated as the suppressant discharge passes 
through the hot combustion zone.
The droplet evaporation characteristics of Halon 101 and water have been determined from equations (i) 
above, where B was defined by equation (iv), for the appropriate droplet size distributions. These 
calculated suppressant droplet size distributions are listed below:
DROPLET DIAMETER 
}im
% of TOTAL SUPRESANT CHARGE
Halon 101 Water
1 0 0 4.2 0
2 0 0 2 1 . 8 8 . 6
30 30.1 19*3
40 23.4 23.4
50 1 2 . 6 20.4
60 5.9 14.9
70 2 . 1 8.7 .
80 0 4.7
Calculation of the maximum droplet size that is completely evaporated defines the relative evaporation 
characteristics of Halon 101 and water suppressant discharges, see Figures 84 and 85. Interpolation 
and calculation provides curves of the percentage of suppressant that will evaporate (§) as a function of 
combustion zone temperature for defined suppressant resident times - see Figures 8 6 and 87. Hence 
the suppressant efficiency, f t , can be estimated from the appropriate curve: x
Theoretical explosion and suppressant data used to calculate using the computer model described inR-hD
section 3.4. are listed below:
FUEL : 9.5 Voi % CH„4
P = 0.940 MPa
m - 1  
.S -0.33ms
U -3Q = 3090 kJ m m
PARAMETER HA LON 101 HA LON 121 WATER POWDER
To K-3
760 84 84 84
Qe kJ m 
- 1
415 460 460 460
He Jg
- 1
45 428 3240 109
H / Xe (g) Jg
-3
2 2 2 293 103
t^hermal kg m 6 . 0 1 6.15 0.99 2.61
I  0 -v ? ) % ■ 90 90 60 1 0 0
if> (6 .2m3) % 1 0 0 • 1 0 0 85 1 0 0
(2 0m3) % 1 0 0 - - 1 0 0
M. .. (lm3) inerting' „ kg m 3  -3
5.58 6 . 1 0 16.70 -
M. .. (6.2m ) inerting 3 kg m-3
1 . 6 6 1.76 8.25
M. (20m ) inerting ' kg m 0.79
FUEL : 15 Vol % 70/30 CH./H--______ 4 2
P = 0.874 MPa
m -1 S = 0.51 m s u
Q = 2658kJ m
PARAMETER HA LON 101 HA LON 121 .WATER POWDER
"T K
kJ m ^
760 84 84 84e
O 415 460 460 460e
He
- 1
45 428 3240 109
H '/ X Jg 2 2 2 293 103 ..® (g) 
t^hermal kg m" 3 5.04 5.13 0 . 6 8 2.18
(f> (lm3) % : 90 90 62 1 0 0
<j (6 .2m3) % 1 0 0 1 0 0 87 1 0 0
M. .. (lm3) inerting' kg m~ 3  -3
4.68 5.11 13.98 -
M (6 .2m) inerting kg m 1.39 1.48 6.93
r  u i j j u  i •*• u v u i  /u _ i i |  o i
P = 0.956 MPa
m -1 S = 0.46 m s u
Q = 3202 kJ m
PARAMETER HA LON 101 HALON 121 WATER POWDER
Te K 760 77 77 77
Qe kJ m 3 495 502 502 502
He Jg" 1 45 410 3140 90
H , v o (g) Jg” 1
2 2 2 27 98 “
t^hermal
i “ 3kg m 6.08 5.74 0 . 8 6 3.00
/(lm3) % 90 90 60 1 0 0
/ (3.8m3) % 1 0 0 1 0 0 85 1 0 0
M. .. (lm3) inerting
M. .. (3.8m ) inerting
kg m 3  
kg m 3
5.65
2.26
7.21
2.79
18.7
12.7
FUEL : 0.25 kg m 3 Coal Dust
P = 0.901 MPa
m - 1
S = 0.38 m s
U -3Q = 2650kJ m m
PARAMETER HALON 101 HALON 121 WATER POWDER
T
e K-3
760 • 890 890 890
Qe kJ m 
- 1
50 650 650 650
He Jg 45 450 330 1080
M., . thermal kg m 3 4.83 4.44 0.60
1.85
V (lm3) 90 90 52 1 0 0
!
FUEL : U.YD Kg m Lieauiuse liuqi.
P = 1.005 MPa
m -1 -1= 0.89 m s (1.05 m s for WM2)
Q = 3036 kJ m” 3
PARAMETER HALON 101 HALON 121 WATER POWDER
Te K 50 50 50 50
Qe kJ m 3  
- 1
40 440 40 440
He
-3
31 26 2740 510
t^hermal kg m 8.35 11.48 0.95 5.09
5* (lm3) 75 * 75 30 1 0 0
4 (6 .2m3) 90 90 65 1 0 0
■ J
I
;  ' ■ I
Droplet Vaporisation Data !
V
3m
*r
ms
y(HA LON 101) ^  (HALON 121) y (WATER)
1 2 0 0.09 0.35 0.004
3.8 40 0.14 0.56 0.006
" 6 . 2 46 0.16 0.64 0.007
2 0 67 0.23 0.92 0 . 0 1 0
REFERENCES
1 IS0/TC21/SC5/WG3 -  PART Is ‘Test Methods fo r  the Determination of  
Explosion Indices of Combustible Dusts in  A ir ' , 1980.
2 ISO/TC21/s C5/WG3 -  PART II:  ‘Test Methods for the Determination of 
Explosion Indices of Combustible Gases in  A ir ’ , 1981*
3 IS0/TC21/SC5/WG3 — PART II:  ‘Test Methods for Evaluating the
E fficacy  of Explosion Suppression Systems' ,  1981.
4 Lewis B , and von Elbe G; ‘Combustion, Flames and Explosions of
G ases', Academic P ress , 1961.
5 Bradley J N; ‘Flame and Combustion Phenomena*, Chapman and H a ll, 1969*
6 S'emenov N N; Z. P h y s., 48 , 571 , 1928.
7 Campbell A S ; J . Appl. Mech., p72, March 1952.
8 Nagy J , Conn J W, and Verakis H C; US Bur. Mines, RI7 2 7 9 , 1969 .
9 Nagy J , S e ile r  E C , Conn J I ,  and Verakis H C; US Bur. Mines, RI7507*
1971.
10 Mamton J , von Elbe G, and Lewis B; Fourth In tem a t. Symp. Comb.,
The Combustion In s t itu te , P ittsb u rg , p , 1963.
11 Babkin V S , and Kononenko Yu G; F iz . Gor. O zr., 2 , 268, 1967*
12 Morton V M, and N ettleton  M A; Comb. & Flame, 30, 111 , 1977*
13 Kassoy D R; Comb. S c i .  & T echnol., tO, 27, 1975
14 Bradley D, and Mitcheson A; Comb. & Flame, 26, 201 , 1976.
15 Kratz A P, and Rosecrans C Z; *A Study of Explosions o f Gaseous
M ixtures', U niversity of I l l in o i s ,  1922.
16 Harris G F P; Comb. & Flame, JML, 17> 1967*
17 S choll E W; VDI-Berichte, 304, 151 » 1978. /
18 How M E; J . In st. Fuel, 39, 150, 1966.
19 Andrews G E, Bradley D and Lwakabomba S B; Comb. & Flame, 2 4 , 285, 1975*
20 Beer J M, and Chigier N A; 'Combustion Aerodynamics' , Applied Science
Publishers L td ., 1972.
21 Hultmann H I; 'F inal Report of Committee for Explosion T ests' , Bromo,
1957*
22 Maisey HR; Chera. & Process Eng. , October & December 19 6 5 .
23 Bartknecht W; 'Brenngas und Staubexplosionen', Forschungsbericht, F45» 
Koblenz, 1971.
24 Bartknecht W; Staub Reinhalt Luft, 31_, ( 3 ) ,  28, 1971*
s t25 Bartknecht W; 1 In tem a t. Loss Prevention Symp, ,1974.
26 S ch o ll EW; Z e itsc h r if t , 4 , 33, 1975.
27 Heinrich H J; Staub Re in h alt Luft, 31., ( 4 ) ,  10, 1971.
28 Heinrich H J; Staub Reinhalt L uft, J32, ( 7 ) ,  22, 1972.
29 Schneider G; Annales des Mines, . P a r is , 47.* 77, 1958.
30 Palmer K N; 'Bust Explosions and F ir e s ' , Chapman & H all, 1973.
31 Metzner H, and Beck J; Berbautechnik, 1_8, (1 ) , 45 , 1968.
32 ELyachko L A ; lyrodynamics; _6 , (1 9 ) ,  29, 1968.
33 Hartmann I;  Ind. Eng. Chem., 40, ( 4 ) ,  752, 1948.
34 Marshall W Fj J . In s t . Fuel, 37, 342, 1964 .
35 Helwig N; SMRE Transl. No. 5199, S h e ff ie ld , 1966.
36 Essenhigh R H, and Woodhead D W; Comb. & Flame, 2^ , 365, 1958.
37 Helwig N; Staub Reinhalt Luft, '26, 6 5 , 1966.
38 Leesley M E, and Siddal R G; J . In s t . Fuel, 4 5 , 169, 1972.
39 Leesley M E, and Hedley A B; J . In s t . Fuel, 4 5 , 224, 1972.
40 Cassel H M, e t  a l . ;  Third In tem a t. Symp. Comb., The Combustion 
I n s t itu te , P ittsb u rg , p185, 1949* - -
41 Long V D, and Murry W L; SMRE Research Report No. 145, 1958.
42 Essenhigh R H, and Csaba J; Ninth In tem a t. Symp. Comb., The Combustion
In s t itu te , P ittsb u rg , p111, 1963*
43 Bhaduri D; Indian J . Technol., 4 , 322, 1966.
44 Bhaduri D5 Comb. & Flame, 1 7 ,  15, 1971.
45 Howard J B, and Essenhigh R H; Eleventh In tem a t. Symp. Comb., The 
Combustion I n s t itu te , P ittsburg, p399 , 1967. .
46 Cassel H M, Liebraan I ,  and Mock W K; S ixth  In tem a t. Symp. Comb.,
The Combustion In s t itu te , P ittsb u rg , p602, 1956.
47 Singer J M; TJS Bur. M ines, RI7439 , 1970.
48 Nagy J , Cooper A R, and Stupor J M; US Bur. M ines, RI656I , 1964.
49 Palmer K N, and Tonkin P S; In s t . Chem. Eng. Symp. Ser. No.25 , p66, 1968
50 Palmer K N, and Tonkin P S; Comb. & Flame, 1_2, 159, 1971*
51 Cassel H M, and Liebman I; Comb. & Flame, 3.» 467, 1959.
52 Cassel H M; US Bur, Mines, RI6551 , 1964*
53 Thomas A; S h ell Aviation News , J3, 1 4 , 195'3.
54 L is itsy n  V I ,  e t  a l , ;  Comb, Explosions and Shock Waves, 2> (1)> 1» 1971*
55 BG-Chemie; R ich tlin ie  Nr 4 "Statische E le k tr iz ita t" , 1972*
id56 Pellmont G; 3 In tem a t. Loss Prevention Symp., p851 , 1980.
57 Essenhigh R H, and P e ll I; D isc . Farad. S o c ., 30, 208, i 9 6 0 .
58 Spalding D B; Fuel 30, 121 , 1951*
59 Williams A; Oxid. & Comb. R ev., j5, (1) , 1 , 1968.
60 Hedley A B, e t  a l . ; J . In st. Fuel, 44, 38,-197.1*
61 Krier H, and Chor Ling Foo; Oxid. & Comb. R ev ., 6, 111 , 1973*
62 Ubhayakar S K; Comb. & Flame, 26, 23, 1976.
63 Belyaev A F and Bakhnan N N; Comb. Explosions and Shock Waves, 2,  (4)* .
1 , 1966.
64 Leuschke G; Stauh Re in h a lt Luft, 26 , ( 2 ) ,  49, 1966.
65 Health and Safety Executive; ’Bust Explosions in  F a c to r ie s ', HMSO, 1975*
66 Wilkes S H; Trans. In s t . Chem. Eng.; 26, 77> 1948*
67 Schwab R F, and Othmer D F; Chem. and Process Eng., At 1 , 1964*
68 Leuschke G; B etr ieb ssich erh eit, 1_0, 3 6 5 > 1967*
69 Hughes J7 /j Fire Res. Abst. R ev., 1_2, 0 ) ,  20, 1970.
70 Rose H E; B r it . Chem. Eng., 371 , 1970.
71 Moodie T W; ISA Trans., 10, 224, 1971.
72 Palmer K N; The Chemical Engineer, p136, March 1973*
73 Gibson N; In tem at. Symp. on Dust Explosion Risks in  Mines and Industry, 
Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, 1972.
74 O 'R eilly B M; Chemistry and Industry, p24, January 1972.
75 Kuhnen G; Staub Reinhalt Luft, 31_, (3) > 40 , 1971.
76 Kuhnen G; Staub Reinhalt Luft, 3_2, (1 2 ) , ,1 9 7 2 .
77 Taublin S , and Taublin I; Khim. Prom., 6 , 427> 1976.
78 Napier D H; Powder Tech. Publ. No. 7> P51 > 1977*
79 Higashi T; Mining and Safety (japan), 22, (7 ) ,  337> 1976.
80 Clancey V J; 1St In tem at. Loss Prevention Symp., p253, 1974.
81 Martin R; Powder Metallurgy, 19.> ( 2 ) ,  70, 1976.
82 Palmer K N; Fire Research Note No. 992, October 1973*
83 Palmer K N; ’Explosions and F ires due to ’Industria l D usts’ , In s t , o f  
Fuel Conf. -  ’Plant a t Risk' , May 1975.
84 G r iff ith  W C; Ann. Rev. Fluid Mech., 10, 93, 1978.
85 Leuschke G; Staub Re in h a lt L uft, 32, ( 9 ) ,  326, 1979*
86 . Hartmann I ,  Nagy J , and Brown HR; US Bur. Mines RI3722, 1943*
87 Raftery M M; Staub Reinhalt L uft, 31_» ( 4 ) ,  85, 1971.
88 R afteiy M M; Fire Research Technical Paper No. 21, HMSO, Revised 1974.
89 F ield  P; 'The Hazards of Industrial Explosions from D u sts ', Oyez
Intellegen ce Report, 1980.
90 D orsett H J , Jacobson M, Nagy J , and Williams R P; US Bur. Mines 
RI5624, 1960.
91 Eggleston L A , and Pryor A J; Fire T echnol., 3., (2) , 7 7 , 1967
92 L utolf J; Staub Reinhalt l u f t , 31 » (3) , 1 , 1971 •
93 Brown K C and James G J; SMRE Research Report No. 201 , 1962.
94 Brown K.C; SMRE Research Report No. 22, 1951. '■
95 Brown K C; SMRE Research Report No. 194, 1960.
96 Ishihama YJ, and Enomoto H; Comb. & Flame, 21^ , 177, 1973.
97 Ishihama W, and Enomoto H; J . Japan Soc. for Safety Engng. , 14., ( 4 ) ,
195, 1975.
98 Beck H A J; Staub Re in h alt Luft, 3 6 , (1) , 49, 1976.
99 V D I; 'Druckentlastung von Staubexplosionen’ , VDI 3673, June 1979.
100 Eckhoff R K; Staub Reinhalt L uft, 2 7 , ( 3 ) ,  110, 1977.
101 Eckhoff R K; Fire Research, 4 ,  71 , 1978.
102 Burgoyne J H; Chem. Ind. (L on .), p81 , 1978.
103 Moore P E; Chem. Ind. (L on .), p430, 1979.
104 Lutolf J; Staub Reinhalt Luft , 33 9 ( 6 ) ,  2 5 9 , 1973•
105 Bartknecht W; VDI B ericht, 304, P 47, 1978.
106 Siwek R; 3 Internat. Loss Prevention Symp., p839, 1980.
107 Cocks RE; Chem. Eng., p94, November 1979.
108 Bartknecht YI; 'Explosionen Ablauf xmd Schutzmassnahraen' , Springer
V erlag, 1978.
109 Moore P E; In st. Chem. Eng. Symp. Ser. No.5 8 , p77, 1980.
110 Fristrom R M; Fire Res. Abs. R evs., £ ,  ( 5 ) ,  125, 1967.
111 McHale E T; Fire Res. Abs. R evs., 11 , ( 2 ) ,  90 , 1969.
112 Friedman R, and Levy J B; WADC Tech. Report 56- 5 6 8 , 1957.
113 Skinner G B; ASD Tech. Report 61-408, 1961.
114 Purdue Res. Foundation; Purdue U niversity Report 'Fire Extinguishing  
A g en ts', 1948.
115 Elkins G H J; FRS Note 327, 1957.
116 Bishop R C; Graviner Company Report S6 7 , 1962.
117 B o tter i B P, Cretcher R E, and Kane W R; Appraisal o f Halogenated Fire
Extinguishant Agents Symp. , Washington D C, A pril 11th .1972.
118 Bajpai S N; J . Fire Flammability, 255, 1974*
119 Yamashika S; Report of the Fire Reseasch In s t . Japan No. 36, 1973•
120 M iller M J; Factory Mutual Res. Corp., Report No. 16254.1 , 1967*
121 Johan C; 'T oxicological Problems o f Fire Fighting with particu lar
reference to Extinguishant Liquids of Halogen Carbon Type' , Report of 
Department of Industrial Medicine, Stockholm, 1975* ,
122 Thome P F; FRS Note 659, 1967.
123 Thome P F; FRS Note 1073, 1977.
124 Downing R C e t  a l . ;  NFPA Quart. R ep t., 45 , ( 2 ) ,  110, 1951.
125 Engibous D L, and Torkelson T R; WADC Tech. Report 59-463, 1960.
126 Combourieu J; Rev. Gen. Therm. F r ., 183, 223, 1977*
127 Ford C L; ACS Symp. Ser. 16, p1 , 1975.
128 Biordi J C e t  a l . ;  Fourteenth In tem a t. Symp. Comb., The Combustion
I n s t itu te , P ittsburgh, p367, 1973.
129 Biordi J C e t  a l . ;  F ifteenth  In tem a t. Symp. Comb., The Combustion 
I n s t itu te , P ittsburgh, p917, 1975*
130 Biordi J C e t  a l . ,  J . Phys. Chem., 81_, (1 2 ) , 1139, 1977*
131 Biordi J C e t  a l . , J . Phys. Chem., 82 , (2) , 125 » 1978.
132 Burdoii M C, Burgoyne J H, and Weinberg F J; F ifth  In tem a t. Symp. Comb., 
The Combustion In s t itu te , P ittsburgh, p646, 1955*
133 Bartov A N, Karagulov F A, and Makeev V I; Comb. Explosions and Shock 
Waves, 6 , ( 1 ) ,  15, 1970.
134 Rosser W A, Wise H, and M iller J; Seventh In tem a t. Symp. Comb., The 
Combustion I n s t itu te , P ittsburgh, p175, 1958.
135 Edmondson H, and Heap M P; Comb. & Flame, 1_2, 447, 1968.
13b Dixon-Lewis G, ana uimpson k o ; sixxeenxn jmxernax. symp. uomo.,
The Combustion I n s t itu te , P ittsburgh, p1111,197b.
137 Butlin R N, and. Simmons R F; Comb. Flame, 12., 447, 1968.
138 Biordi J C, Lazzora C P, and Papp J P; Comb. & Flame, '24, 401 , 1975*
139 Skinner G B; ACS Symp. Ser. 16, p295» 9^75•
140 Rubin R P, Knipe R H, and Gordon AD; ACS Symp. Ser. 16, p183, 1975•
141 C reitz E C; P ire Technol., ( 2 ) ,  131 , 1975*
142 Wilson W E; Tenth Internat. Symp. Comb., The Combustion I n s t itu te ,  
P ittsburgh, p47, 1965*
143 Wilson V/ E; 0 ‘Donovan J T, and Pristrom R M; Twelth In tem a t. Symp.
Comb., The Combustion I n s t itu te , P ittsburgh , p929, 1968.
144 F ield ing G H, Woods P J , and Johnson J E; J . Fire Flammability, 6,
37, 1975.
145 Pristrom RM, and von Tiggelen A; Seventeenth In tem a t. Symp. Comb.,
The Combustion I n s t itu te , P ittsburgh, p , 1978.
146 Spence D, and McHale E T; Comb. & Flame, 24, 211 , 1975*
147 von Tiggelen A e t a l . ,  11nhibition of Flame R eactions’ , Report No.
RTD TDR 63 4011 , AP Aero Propulsion Labs., Wright Patterson A ir Force 
Base, Ohio, 1963.
148 Larsen E E; J . Pire Flammability, 1_, 4 ,  1974*
149 - Larsen E R; J . Fire Flammability , £ ,  5 , 1975*
150 Perlee H E e t  a l . ;  US Bur. Mines RI6748, 19 6 6 •
151 Tucker D M, Drysdale D B, and Rasbash D J; Eighteenth In tern at. Symp.
Comb., The Combustion I n s t itu te , 1980.
152 Harpur WW, and H irst R; In s t . Fire Eng. Q uart., 30 , (80 ) , 417, 1970*
153 Emmrich F; Fire Prot. Rev., p324» 1971.
154 Woodhouse R A, and Sayers D R; F ire J . , 8 5 , 1973•
155 Richmond J K, Liebman I and M iller L F; US Bur. Mines RI8077 » 1975•
156 Dewitte M, Vrebosch J , and von Tiggelen A; Comb. & Flame, 8 , 257, 1964*
157 Rosser W A, Inami S H, and Wise H; Comb. & Flame , 7^ , 107, 1963*
158 Iya K S , Wollowitz S , and‘Kaskan W E; F ifteen th  In tem a t. Symp. Comb.,
The Combustion In s t itu te , p329, 1974.
159 Kaskan W E, and Konowalow D D; Proc. Conf. Fire R es ., US N at. S c i .
Foundation, Harvard U niversity , p90, 1975*
160 Freidman R and Levy J B; US Dept. Com. O ffice Tech. Serv. AD260, 726,
1961.
U  I r  X ts x ix iu c w x  xv j  e m u .  j j v j v  j  %j jj f \j \jhiu •  r  x c u u c  ^ i f  * ; v  ♦
62 Thomas C A, and Hochwalt C A; Ind. Eng. Chem., 2 0 1 675 > 1928.
65 McHale E T; Comb. & Flame, 24 , 277, 1975*
64 B irch a ll J D; Comb. & Flame, 2 4 , 85 , 1970*
6 5  Dolan J E and Dempster P B; J . Appl. Chem., 510, 1955.
66 Inami S H, and Y/ise H; Comb. & Flame, 2,  107, 1965.
6 7  L a ff it te e  P , Delbourgo R, Cumbourie J ,  and Dumont J C; Comb. & Flame, 
2 ,  357, 1965*
68 F ia la  R, and W in terfie ld  G; AGARD Conf. Proc. No. 8 4 , 1971*
6 9  Hayes K F , and Kaskan YI E; Comb. & Flame, 24 , 405, 1975*
70 Milne T A, Green C L, and Benson D K; Comb. & Flame, 2 2 ’ 255 , 1970.
71 Burgess D S e t  a l . ;  US Bur. Mines RI7 5 I 5 , 1971.
72 B r it is h  Patent No. 585 512, 1944*
75 B r it is h  Patent No. 643 188, 1948.
74 M inistry o f Supply Contract No. 6 /S to re s /2 4 3 5 l/C B 2 l(c ); 1952.
75 Graviner Company Report No. DI5 6 , 1953*
76 Maisey H R; Chem. Process E n g., March 1959*
77 Maisey H R; I n s t .  Chem. Eng. Symp. S er . No.5 8 , p171 , 1.980.
78 F actories A ct, S ectio n  51 , 1961 •
79 Health and S a fety  a t  Work Act? 1974*
80 I n s t . Chem. Eng.; 'User Guide to F ire  and E xplosion Hazards in  the  
Drying o f P a r ticu la te  M ateria ls1 , 1977•
81 R itte r  K; VDI B er ich te , 504, 157, 1978.
82 NFPA 68A; 1974.
85 Ray B; Phys. T ech n o l., 9 ,  255, 1978.
8 4  Merewood D W; B r it ish  Chem. Eng. , A p ril 1958*
8 5  Grabowski G J; NFPA Q uart., ^ 2 , ( 2 ) ,  109 , 1958.
86 'Sn u ff-ou t fo r  B la st Terror' , J . Am. Insurance, May 1963•
87 Keates R J; Chem. P rocessin g , 18 , 1965.
88 Schumacher; V D SI-Schriftenreihe H eft, 6 ,  7 2 , 1964*
89 Palmer K N; Chem. Ind. (L o n .) , p936, 1967.
90 Grabowski G J; F ire J . , 2> 21 , 1968.
191 B o tte r i B P , and. Mann eim j ;  Aerospace jvieaicm e, p r io o ,
192 ’Industria l Explosion Protection Systems' , Hazard, 1J_, 10, 1970.
193 R itter  K; Staub Reinhalt Luft, 31., ( 3 ) ,  21, 1971.
194 Schneider G; Zucker, 26, (10) , 5 2 4 , 1973.
195 FPA; Fire Safety  S h eets, FS 6015 , 1974•
196 Nasu K; J . Japan Soc. for Safety Eng., 14., ( 4 ) ,  2 7 5 , 1975.
197 Dale S G; Powder Technol., 59, 1977*
198 'Suppression of Dust Explosions in  Closed V e sse ls ’ , Khimscheskayee
Promysh, £ ,  105, 1978.
199 Bartknecht V/; HSE Transl. No. 8105, Mullhouse Colloquium, 1978.
200 Singh J; J . Occupational A ccidents, 2,  113, 1979.
201 Moore P E; Phys. Technol., 10, 201, 1979*
202 Moore P E; In s t . Mech. Eng. Symp. Ser. C261/79, pH , 1979•
203 Krauchenko V S , and Yakoulev V P; Obzor Issledovanni v O blasti
Podavleniya Vzyuov Methana; Moscow 1979*
204 Johnson L D e t  a l . ;  Report No. AD 768 742, Naval Y/eapons Laboratory,
S e p t . , 1973 •
205 S choll E V/; Gluckauf-Forschungshefte S209/19 5 1968.
206 , H insley R S; Fourteenth In tem at. Conf. Mine Safety  Research
Establishm ents, Paper B6, 1971*
207 Rae D; SMRE B u ll i t in ,  J ,  p2.1 , 1975*
208 Rae D , and Thompson W; Comb. & Flame, 32» 131 » 1979*
209 Liebman I ,  and Richmond J K; US Bur. Mines IC8 76 8 , 1978.
210 Graviner Company Report No l /3 ;  May 1958.
211 ICI Technical Report No. D6459A; July 196 4 .
212 Peterson P, and Cutler H R; Chem. Eng. Progress, 4 ,  42 , 1969.
213 Explosion Suppression in  Centrifuges Symposium; In s t . Chem. Eng.,
May 1974. ,
214 Fenwal Company Report No. PSR-193? October 1965*
215 Bartknecht W; 'Report of Experiments for Testing Safety  again st 
Explosions in  Fluidised Bed D r ie r s ' , Ciba Geigy, 1974.
216 Bartknecht Y/j 'Explosion Protection Measures on Flu id ised  Bed Granulator*, 
and F luidised Bed D r ie r s ', Ciba Geigy, 1975*
217 Peterson P; A. I .  Ch. E. Petrochemical E xposistion , Houston, Texas, 1967
iiiB Bartfcnecnt w; xne naaenourg iteview, august ly /0 *
219 G i l l i s  J , and Dale S R; 3 Internat. Loss Prevention Svmp., p1305
1980. ‘
220 Hillerbrand D M; Report of Committee for  Explosion T esting, Stockholm, 
1957.
221 Fenwal Company Report No. PSR-441; 1972 .
222 Martin A J; Aerosol Age, 2, 31 , 1979.
' ' r'
223 Report of US Coast Guard No CG-D-79-76, Januaiy 1976.
224 Factory Mutual Research Corporation Report No, 15088 , 1964 .
225 Graviner Company Report No, SS1001, 1966.
226 Bundesunstalt fur Material Prufung Report No. 16360/65* 4-3090, 1,968.
227 Physikalisch  Technische Bundesunstalt Report No. 14 285/65 H I  D/S , 1965 •
228 S ch o ll E W; Berggewerkschaftliche Versuchsstrecke Tgb.-Nr. 730/55/75, 197
229 Bartknecht W; Chemie-Ing Techn., 47, ( 6 ) ,  236, 1975*
230 Moore P E; ’Designing Explosion Suppression Measures for Industry’ , 
Protection  Pratique Contre Les E xplosions’ , Antwerp, 19th May 1980.
231 R itter  K, and Berthold W; Chem-Ing Techn., 51 , (3) , 174, 1979•
232 S ch oll E W e t  a l . ,  Chem-Ing Techn., ( l ) , 8 , 1979
233 . Sch oll E Wj VDI B erichte, 304, 151 , 1978.
234 WiemannW; ’Explosionunterdrukung’ , Protection  Pratique Contre Les
E xplosions’ , Antwerp, 19th May 1980.
235 Bartknecht W.j The Ladenburg Review, October 1977
236 TNO Report No. G9005-III; May 1979.
237 Bartknecht W; IS0/TC21/SC5/WG3 -  N17, 1978.
238 Sch oll E W; ISO/TC21/SC5/WG3 -N 1 9 , 1978.
239 Moore P E; IS0/TC21/SC5/WG3 -  N20, 1978.
240 C oll J P; IS0/TC21/SC5/V*'G3 -  N30, 1978.
241 Pineau J; IS0/TC21/SC5/WG3 -  N35, 1979.
242 Spring D Jj Private Communication, 1979*
243 Newman F H, and Searle V H L; ’The General Properties of M atter’ ,
Edward Arnold (Publishers) L td ., 1965*
244 Moore P E; ISO/SC21/SC5/SG3 -  N2?, 1978.
245 Bartknecht Yf; Private Communication, 1980.
246 Townend 3) T A; Third In tem a t. Symp. Comb., The Combustion I n s t itu te ,
Pittsburgh, p134, 1937.
247 Markstein G H; 'Non-Steady Flame Propagation', Pergamon P ress , 1964*
248 van Wingerden C J Mj TNO Draft Report G9535» 1981.
249 Murty Kanury A; 'Introduction to Combustion Phenomena' , Gordon and
Breach Science P u b lish ers, 1975*
9Halons containing' P *
HaIons containing Cl • j v
Halons containing Br .•
Halons containing I , •
20
400200 3 0 0
Molecular Weight
100
FIGURE 1: Inh ib ition  E ffectiveness of various Agentsa.
iamniability Peak Concentration
Halons containing F a 
Halons containing Cl • v 
Halons containing Br . ® 
Halons containing I  • 
HBr ■ •
S iC l, • *
s:-v 4 • 3
20
vo
10
*0 O'
100 500200
FIGURE 2: Inhib ition  E ffectiveness o f various Agents
(Weight basis -  CH^Br =* 100)
9
1 5 0 .
Halons containing F • A 
Halons containing C l• v 
Halons containing Br • ® 
Halons containing I  * •
S5C1
SF*
100
50.
too 200 300
Molecular Weigh t
400
FIGURE 3: In h ib ition  E ffectiven ess o f various Agent3
Temperature
2000
1600
1200 .
99 fo Decomposition
•50$  Decomposition '■
-10;. Decomposition
—1 ia ^Decomposition 
0 ,1 % Decomposition
800
1'0f6' 10”4 10"2 10°
Time ( s )
FIGURE A: Time required for  HalGn 1301 Decomposition
Experimental
Theoretical
t  (ms)
3
3dm HKD Suppressor discharge ch aracter istic
4 0 0  -
200 Theoretical
-Experimental
ms
FIGURE 6: 3dm HRD Suppressor discharge ch aracter istic
Pressure and 
Suppressant 
Charae t e r is t ic s
Suppressant delivered
i k g j - j
slope » R rV
Suppressant required^.
0 .8
*■—P-P (MPa x10~ )
12060 A 100
t  (ms)
14020
F ireb a ll growth 
C haracteristic f ir e b a ll  radius (+r)
•suppressant discharge ch a ra cter istic
f ir e b a ll  rad ius ( -r )
12020 100
t  (ms)
100 -
Suppressor Theoretical 
Analogue 50 -
20 80
FIGURE 7 : Explosion Suppression Model Nomogram
* *
* IEP PROGRAM *
* *
INPUT DETAILS OF EXPLOSIVE RISK 
VESSEL VOLUME <CU. M)?S.2 '
INITIAL AND THEORETICAL MAX. PRESSURE (BAR ABSOLUTE)71.06f10.65 
HOW MANY VALUES OF BURNING VELOCITY?!
VELOCITIES M/S70.51 
IS VESSEL LOW ASPECT RATI07N 
INPUT SURFACE AREA (SG M)?22.3
IS EXTANT! HALON 1011 (1) fWATER (2)f OR POWDER (3)71
HOW MANY EXTINGUISHANT CONSTANTS?1
EXTINGUISHANT CONSTANTS (KG/CU M)?8.35
DO YOU WANT TO INPUT ADDITIONAL DATA (YES/NO)?YES
ENTER 0 IF YOU DO NOT WANT TO SPECIFY ANSWER 
THROW (M)71.65
TDWELL3 (S)?0
PERCENTAGE EFFICIENCY OF EXTANT.730
QUIESCENT GAS TURBULENCE FACT0R70
HOW MANY EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS- UP TO 1071
INPUT DETAILS OF EACH SYSTEM
TYPE LETTER AT END OF LINE to INDICATE-
SAME SYSTEM TO BE CONTINUED ( C ) fOR NEXT SYSTEM<N) ^
SYSTEM NO. 1 DETECTION PRESSURE70.095
p r e s s . :  e l b o w s : c o r nm m ^ . ______  ^ _ _ _ __ _
o : o : c
*HEMI*
?i : 3 : 2 0 : o : c
?i : 3 : 2 0 : l : n-
* #
DO YOU WANT*GRAPHS7YES
LONG(IO)fDR SHORT(25)710
NO.
72
CAP,
5
3.7494558E-02 4.7850000E-03 0.OOOOOOOE+OO 3.5597799E-02
3.7494558E-02 4.7850000E-03 1.2253136E-02 3.0G734G2E-02
3.7494558E-02 4.7850000E-03 1.G670333E-02 3.0G73462E-02
72 -
G8 ?
SYSJE^No^ 1
BURNING VELOCITY 0.70 M/S 
EXTINGUISHANT CONSTANT 8.35 Ka/CuM 
TIME STEP O.OOOG S
64 j  
60 •• 
56 0000000
24
20
16
12
B
4
0
X
X*
###########$$#############
.X
X
xx 1 
x* *&
xX<
X * 
X *
:vv.,xxxxxxxxx, AA
ft XX
XXXX
,xx
# *
■oooooooooMM i --------------i --------------1--------------1
0 1 2 3 4 5
IN HUNDREDS 
TIME (Seconds x Time step)
*=EXT REQUIRED (EST)
X=EXT REQUIRED (WORST CASE)
#=PRDJECTED DELIVERY 
0=INTERSECT
OVERPRESSURES (Bar)
WORST ESTIMATE
0.41 - - 0.26
Pressure Transducer
Explosion Chamber
Non-return 
Valve Solenoid 
I Valve
Air Resevoir
EVENT MARK
EVENT MARK
CHART DRIVE
GALVO
AMR
GALVO
AMR
BRIDGE
AMR
IG N IT IO N
TRIGGER
SEQUENCE
CONTROL
U N IT S ta r t
UV RECORDER
FIGURE 9: Schematic of Experimental Layout
VOLTAGE ( E)
VALVE
IG N IT IO N
max
max
Typical Explosion Pressure/tim e Record
/ p
u.
Q.
m
uj mx Q
2 < 
2 S P
*- in
o
o
u. 2
FIGURE 11: Experimental Arrangement for Suppressor Discharge Tests
EV
EN
T 
IN
IT
IA
T
E
 
AT
 
SE
T 
F
IL
M
 
FO
O
TA
G
E
S/ ~ ~I - ■ *
f lE M  N ° DESCRIPTION
1 * SIGHT GLASS SUPPORT
6 -2 m 3 PRESSURE VESSEL
{ '  <3/-. 4 KGS SUPRESSION BOTTLE
, AUTOMATIC EXHAUST VALVE ASSY
* "  5 / A IR  PURGE CONTROL VALVE
6 " A IR  RESERVOIR
* 7 5 LITRE DUST .BOTTLE
f 8 . DUST DISPERSION U N IT
9 ‘ DUST SPRAY R IN G S
, . 1 0 ’1 100 J ELECTRODE A S S Y
- 11 /; GAS SPRAY ARM
5 1 2 . A IR  PURGE VALVE
-13 d r a in a g e  v a l v e
: 14 - 45  LITRE SPHERE
*■ .15 GAS CONTROL VALVE
IGNITION? induction spark
0
4'
8,
max (MPa s~1)
—r
10 11
y
\
FIGURE 13: Quiescent CH. - Air Explosions in Inr5 Vessel
max
0 .8
0.4
( |f .)  (MPa s’1) 
' max
o "
'^6'
IGNITION? induction spark
14 16 17
/
\ /
\ o
o
0
0
/
/
fr IGURE 1A. Quiescent 70/50 CH^/Hg - Air Explosions in Vessel
CM
16 _ 
(MPa e~1)
max
IGNITIONS lOkJ pyrotechnic
CM
— — - j .
0 .6  0 .
8o
I------r
1.0  1.2
Concentration (kg m
/
/
cr-».
/
FIGURE 15: Cellulose dust Explosions in 1ra^  Vessel
PT (MPa)roar v '
i f
0 .8
0.4
6 -
'a s }
max
/
/  o
IGNITION: 10kJ pyrotechnic
0 .2 0 .4 0 .6  . 0 .8  ^  
Concentration (kg tsT^ '
\  °  
O
FIG URE 16: C.oal dust Explosions in Im^ Vessel
------------— ......... ... - - » j ' . ____  -
0 .2  -
IGFITI01: induction spark
0
10
20
(MPa s”1}
max 3 0  -I
10 a u
o.
\ / S>'
Vol%' Oil,
\  0
\
\  0 
\ 0 GO
\  0° , 
\ /
FIGURE 17: Quiescent CH^  - Air Explosions in Hartmann Apparatus
A 1:1 aspect ratio vertical tube
apparatus
Hartmann vertical tut© apparatus
20 ms
t»
FIGURE 18: Qui^ sc^ nt 9*5 Vol$ CH^ - - A ir Explosion p /t  Records
0 .8
0*4 -
20
40
'ar' (MPa b*1) 
max
8^o
Q-o
Q.O'
.J6-o
8
. 8 -
o o
IGlfJTIONs hot coil
T—
0.4 0.8 1 ,6
Concentration (kg g ).'
/
o °  /
O °« /
8 '0  8 0 0 % o /
V  0° 0 0
o ^ - o -  ^
FIGURE 19: Cellulose dust Explosions in Hartmann Apparatus
P (MPa)Vi 1$ V
0.8 -
.4
S '
/
/
-Q -— o------O— —CL
-O “^ *0,
IGHITIOKs induction spark
/
/
/>
20
40
g f )  ( m s ' 1)
max
\
“~T~
0 .5
“T
1.< 1.5
\
Concentration (kg m )
\
\
\o
\ —or
notes each point is the average of 3 results
FIGURE 20: Cellulose dust Explosions in Hartmann Apparatus
-max
0.8
0.4 J
16
52
3. s *)
IGNITIONS in d u ction  spark
~~nr
40
~1  ------ - ---1—  ----- — i  —  -----~~T
.80 120 160  ^ 200
ty (ms) ^
r
/
/
s
S '
Q
notes each point is an average of 5 results
»ii- >if ii ynnriif
FIGURE 2 1 : Cellulose dust Explosions in Hartmann Apparatus
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eter Moore
tie first reported work on dust explosibility testing occurred 
n the early part of this century and stemmed from the earlier 
cognition that dusts had contributed significantly to several 
ining disasters.1 Laboratory-scale test apparatuses were 
*evised to characterise dust explosibility and have been 
eviewed extensively.2-3 The classification of dust explosibility 
as related to ignitibility in these tests and provided three 
ategories.
lass 1: Dusts which ignite and propagate flame readily, the 
ource of heat required for ignition being small, 
lass II: Dusts which ignite readily with flame but require a 
arger source of ignition, 
lass III: Dusts which do not ignite in the tests, 
ecently, in the United Kingdom, a reclassification into two 
roups was made.4
roup (a): Dusts which, when tested, ignite and propagate 
im e in the test apparatus.
Group (b): Dusts which, when tested, do not ignite and propa­
gate flame in the test apparatus.
The most widely used test apparatus for assessing dust 
explosibility was developed by Hartmann.5 In the United 
Kingdom, this apparatus has been the accepted means 
for explosible dust hazard assessment,6 and hence Hart­
mann explosibility data have formed the basis for the design 
of both venting and explosion suppression safety measures. 
The Hartmann test method provides information on the maxi­
mum pressure, Fmax, and the maximum rate of pressure rise, 
(dP/dt)max, of a dust suspension ignited in a 1.23dm3 steel 
cylinder. There exists in the literature a large amount of dust 
explosibility data from tests in the Hartmann apparatus.
Recently, the suitability of the Hartmann apparatus as a 
means of categorising dust explosibility has been questioned 
by Bartknecht.7-8 He has shown that, in the small volume of 
the test apparatus, a considerable underestimate of (dP/dT)max 
is obtained and that scaling of test results to larger 
volumes is not reliable. Bartknecht prefers the use of a lm 3 
apparatus, although this is hardly suitable for laboratory 
characterisation of dusts. In the absence of a better laboratory 
test apparatus, Burgoyne9 considered that the Hartmann 
apparatus should be retained as the means of dust explosi-
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bility measurement for the design of explosion protection 
measures.
Bartknecht10 has recently described a 20dm3 spherical test 
apparatus, in which results comparable to those from a lm 3 
test vessel were obtained for a range of industrial dusts. From 
a study of a range of test-vessel volumes, he concluded that 
20dm3 was the smallest volume suitable for the determination 
of dust explosibility. Currently, consideration is being given 
to various standard test apparatus for the characterisation of 
the explosibility of industrial dusts by a working group of the 
International Standards Organisation.
Comparisons to date between the 1.23dm3 Hartmann 
apparatus and the lm 3 Bartknecht apparatus have tended to 
neglect the fact that the former uses a continuous low energy 
(<  10J) ignition source, whereas the latter uses a discrete 
lOkJ ignition source. Eckhoff11 has demonstrated that 
ignition delay in the Hartmann apparatus can have a marked 
influence on the measured explosibility, and suggested that 
the lower degree of turbulence that results from a long 
ignition delay could be one significant reason for the lower 
explosibility values measured using this apparatus.
-T
Fig 1 Hartmann vertical cylinder apparatus
Fig 21 :1 Aspect ratio vertical cylinder apparatus
As well as the shape and scale of the explosion test vessel, 
factors such as ignition energy, ignition procedure, homo­
geneity of dust suspension and degree of turbulence are all 
known to influence the measured explosibility of a particular 
dust. This article assesses the influence of such factors from 
comparative experiments undertaken in four different test 
vessels. In particular the reasons for the disparity between 
Hartmann and lm 3 explosibility results are considered in 
detail.
T e st v e s s e ls
Standard vertical cylinder (Hartmann apparatus)
The test apparatus, shown in Fig 1, is a 1.23dm3 explosion 
tube with an aspect ratio of 4.6:1. A weighed sample of the 
fuel dust is placed into the bottom cup and the small air 
reservoir (50cm3) is charged with compressed air to a pressure 
of 0.82MPa. A solenoid valve releases this compressed air 
charge, via a mushroom deflector, onto the dust, which is then 
dispersed upwards into the region of an ignition source. 
Ignition is usually achieved using either a hot coil, or a train 
of induction coil sparks (100Hz). The established mode of 
operation is that the ignition source should be initiated before 
the solenoid valve is activated.
1 :1 Aspect ratio cylinder
Figure 2 shows a 1:1 aspect ratio cylinder vessel which has an 
internal volume of 1.75dm3 and was constructed as part of a 
programme to investigate the influence of aspect ratio on the 
measured explosion parameters in cylindrical test vessels. The 
explosion chamber is mounted on the standard Hartmann cup 
and mushroom dust dispersion system, and ignition is achieved 
by spark across central electrodes.
1 m3 Cylinder (Bartknecht apparatus)
The explosion chamber (see Fig 3) has a nominal volume of 
lm 3 and 1:1 aspect ratio. A known weight of fuel dust is 
placed in a 5.4dm3 canister which is pressurised to 2MPa with 
compressed air. The canister is fitted with an electrically 
activated explosive valve which releases the dust/air mixture 
through a spray ring into the explosion chamber. Dust 
explosions are ignited using a lOkJ pyrotechnic ignition 
source which is detonated 0.6s after the explosive valve has 
been activated. This ignition delay is chosen as it takes 0.6s 
to disperse all of the fuel dust into the explosion chamber.
4 3 dm3 Sphere
This apparatus, shown in Fig 4, was developed to provide 
small-scale test procedure that would produce explosibilit 
results comparable to those obtained in the lm 3 test vessel bu 
more conveniently and less expensively than using the latter 
The dust sample is placed in a 0.9dm3 canister which i 
pressurised to 1.64MPa with compressed air. Dust i 
dispersed into the explosion chamber using either a ‘peppe
Fig 44 3 d m 3 Spherical apparatus
Fig 31 m 3 Apparatus (Bergbau Versuchsstrecke, Dortmund)
ou spreauer or a nemispnericai spray ring. /vnaiysis 01 nign- 
eed film has shown that the dust is dispersed into the 
hamber after 200-220ms with both dispersion procedures, 
he spray ring produces a more homogeneous dust cloud, 
nition is achieved by spark across the gap between two 
entral electrodes after a predetermined ignition delay.
nition delay and aspect ratio e ffec ts  
small cylindrical apparatus
nition delay is defined as the time interval between acti- 
ation of the dust dispersion valve and effective ignition of the 
ust cloud. Eckhoff14 had shown that the measured explosion 
verity of lycopodium dust was sensitive to changes in the 
lition delay time. This aspect was further investigated in the 
tall test apparatus using cellulose dust as the fuel. The 
osen ignition source was the standard train of sparks from 
induction coil, which was activated after a preset 
elay, tv ' . It was found that effective ignition was not always 
hieved with the first spark, and that a significant time delay 
tween induction coil activation and actual ignition, t d, 
uld result. The observed relation between the preset 
nition delay, t v ,  and the actual ignition delay,/v(i.e. /v'+fa) 
shown in Fig 5. It is evident that for all values of t v ' <  100ms, 
e actual ignition delay, tv ,  was about 110ms. Figure 6 shows 
at the measured maximum rate of pressure rise (dP/df)max 
cellulose dust explosions in the Hartmann apparatus es 
nsiderably reduced as the ignition delay time tv is increased. 
Analysis of high-speed film of the Hartmann dust dis- 
rsion procedure showed that the dust cloud takes ~  60ms 
reach the electrodes. It is surprising therefore that the 
llulose dust is not ignited by an induction coil spark for 60 
t v <  110ms. Tests, using a higher energy (100J) capacitor 
scharge spark as the ignition source, showed that effective 
nition was achieved for all t v  >65ms and that the most 
vere explosion occurred at t v  — 70ms. It is inferred that 
nition with the capacitor discharge spark is possible under
g 5 Relation between preset and actual ignition delay in vertical 
linder apparatus
ctual ignition 
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A typical pressure/time record of a quiescent gas explosion 
in the Hartmann vertical tube apparatus is shown in Fig 7a. 
From the shape of the curve, it is inferred that the growing 
fireball is quenched, firstly, at the combustion cylinder walls, 
and then at the bottom of the apparatus: the ignition elec­
trodes are located 0.13m from the bottom of the 0.3m long 
cylinder. Hence a fully developed explosion does not result. 
The pressure/time curve of a similar explosion in the 1:1 
aspect ratio cylindrical apparatus is shown in Fig 7b. Pre­
mature wall quenching does not occur in this vessel. Ideally, 
explosibility testing should be undertaken in a spherical 
apparatus with central ignition.
Dust explosibility
Dust explosibility is quantified in terms of the maximum 
explosion pressure (Pmax) and the maximum rate of pressure 
rise (dP/df)max of the most explosible dust concentration.
Fig 6 Influence of ignition delayon measured dust explosibility in 
vertical cylinder apparatus
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m e explosion pressure is essenuany vessei-voiume ( kj 
independent, and it has been shown that (dP/dt)max can be 
scaled theoretically using the cube law relationship:
/dP \  ,( —  ) V3 =  K  (constant)
\ d f / m a x
K is defined as the explosion rate constant -  for the SI system 
of units it corresponds to the maximum rate of pressure rise 
that would result in a vessel with a volume of lm 3. The 
explosibility parameters Pmax, (dP/dOmax and K  are all 
influenced by changes in the initial pressure at ignition, P0.
1 -2dm3 Versus 1 m3 test vessel
The measured explosibility parameters of cellulose dust 
ignited by induction coil sparks, 100J capacitor discharge 
spark and hot coil in the small cylindrical test vessels, and 
ignited by lOkJ pyrotechnic charge in the lm 3 cylinder are 
compared in Table 1. All tests were undertaken using the 
mostexplosible dust concentration (0.75-0.85kgm'3) and pre­
set ignition time delays. The following observations can be 
made.
Q  With induction coil spark ignition, both small test vessels 
show measured explosibilities some three to four times less 
severe than those obtained in the 1 m3 vessels.
$  For a given ignition delay, t v ,  100J capacitor discharge 
ignition produces a more violent explosion than induction 
coil spark ignition.
^  As previously noted, capacitor discharge ignition enables 
the dust to be ignited in a more turbulent condition and hence 
a more severe explosion is produced.
®  Even with 100J capacitor discharge ignition at the optimum 
ignition delay, t v  =  70ms, the 1:1 aspect ratio cylinder pro­
duces a measured explosibility which is still only half that 
recorded in the 1 m3 apparatus.
43dm3 Versus 1m3 vessels
The relationships between the explosion rate constant, K, in 
the 43dm3 vessel, and the ignition delay time, tv , were 
determined for both the ‘pepper pot’ and ‘spray ring’ dust 
dispersion procedures with 100J capacitor discharge ignition 
and are presented in Fig 8. The results at the optimum ignition 
delay time are shown in Table 2, together with the results o f  
comparative tests using induction coil spark ignition. It is 
evident that the ‘pepper pot’ spreader dust dispersion pro­
cedure results in a less severe explosion than the spray ring 
dispersion procedure. It was observed that the probability of 
ignition diminished with reducing t v '  for the pepper pot 
dispersion method and effective ignition  ^was not achieved 
for t v  < 250ms, but ignition was always achieved for all 
t v  > 100ms with the spray ring dispersion procedure.
k (MPa m s ')
 Spray ring dispersion
  'Pepper pot' dispersion
600 800200 400
Ignition delay, fv (m
Fig 8 Influence of ignition delay on measured dust explosibility in 
43dm 3 spherical apparatus
Figure 8 shows that, at the optimum ignition delay ( 
~  210ms) for the 43dm3 spherical apparatus, the recorde 
explosibility, using spray ring dispersion and capacitor di 
charge ignition, of cellulose dust is ~  20 per cent greater tha 
that measured in the lm 3 vessel. It can be inferred that, f  
cellulose dust with spray ring dispersion in the 43dm3 spher 
an ignition delay of ~  265ms will give results comparable t 
those obtained in the lm 3 apparatus.
The dust dispersion methodology described for the 43di 
apparatus generates an initial overpressure in the vessel, 
ignition of ~  28kPa, which is comparable with that produce 
in the Hartmann apparatus. The lm 3 apparatus dust di 
persion procedure produces an initial overpressure 
14kPa. These overpressures and the turbulence created by th 
dust dispersion procedure will have an influence on th 
measured explosibility. Test results in the 43dm3 apparatu 
using spray ring dispersion with a lower dust dispersio 
pressure, and also with partial evacuation of the explosio 
chamber so that the dust explosion was initiated at atmos 
pheric pressure, are presented in Table 3. These tests wer 
undertaken at the optimum ignition delay of 210ms with 100 
capacitive discharge ignition. They demonstrate the effect o 
these experimental parameters on the measured explosio 
severity.
Discussion
Tests with two alternative ignition means have demonstrate 
that the nature of the ignition source can have a majo 
influence on the severity of the explosion in a given test vessel 
Differences between explosibility determinations wit
Table 1 Cellulose dust explosions
Test apparatus Ignition source '(ms) tv (ms) P0 (MPa) Pmax (MPa) .K(M
lm 3 lOkJ Pyrotechnic 600 600 0.014 0.92 12.3
Standard vertical tube H ot coil 0 80 0.030 0.77 3.6
Induction spark 0 100 0.030 0.79 3.1
100J Capacitor spark 100 100 0.030 0.78 3.4
100J Capacitor spark 70 70 0.028 0.77 4.1
1:1 Aspect ratio vertical tube Induction spark 0 100 0.025 0.77 3.4
100J Capacitor spark 100 100 0.025 0.83 4.7
100J Capacitor spark 70 70 0.020 0.83 6.3
Table 2 Cellulose dust explosions in 0.043m3 apparatus 
Dust dispersion procedure Ignition source ty ' (ms) ty (ms) Pq (MPa) • Pmax (MPa) AT(MPa m s -1)
‘Pepper pot’ spreader Induction spark 0 285 0.028 0.93 3.7
100J Capacitor spark 250 250 0.028 0.95 9.6
Spray ring Induction spark 0 460 0.028 0.96 5.9
100J Capacitor spark 210 210 0.028 0.98 14.8
ble 3 Cellulose dust explosions in 0.043m3 apparatus at different dispersion pressures 
st dispersion procedure Dispersion pressure (MPa) P q (MPa) -fm ax (MPa) ^ ( M P a m s '1)
ndard -  Spray ring 0.82
ndard -  Spray ring 1.64
rtial evacuation -  Spray ring 1.64
ernative ignition sources are further exaggerated in
perimental tests if the ignition delay times are not fixed. It 
s been shown that, for a given methodology and ignition 
ergy, the degree of turbulence has an influence on ignitibility 
the fuel dust. High dust/air flow rate across the ignition 
ark quench it, thus preventing ignition of the combustible 
xture.
There are two factors which contribute to the lower dust 
plosibilities measured in the Hartmann vertical tube 
paratus. First, the problems inherent in small-scale test 
paratus lead to an underestimate by a factor of about three 
mpared to 1 m3 apparatus measurements. Second, the use of 
ntinuous ignition sources can lead to a misleading evalu- 
on of explosibility. In particular, a dust which is relatively 
ensitive to ignition can take some time to be effectively 
ited in the Hartmann tube. This time delay will mean that 
turbulent conditions prevailing immediately after the dust 
s been dispersed into the tube will have moderated con- 
erably. Hence a less violent explosion, possibly by a factor 
ater than 10 will be recorded because of the lower turbul- 
ce prevailing at ignition. In consequence, overall, the 
rtmann apparatus can give a gross underestimate of dust 
losibility, by a factor greater than 30. This observation 
at the (dP/d/)max values measured in the Hartmann 
paratus are dependent on the ignition sensitivity of the 
ist determines the value of published data on dust explos- 
lity based on Hartmann measurements. Dusts, which from 
ch measurements are seemingly only mildly explosible, 
uld prove to be severely explosible.
It has been found that an explosible concentration of 
llulose dust/air is in the vicinity of the electrodes in the 
ndard vertical cylinder for some 30-40ms before ignition 
induction coil sparks occurs. The large aspect ratio of the 
ndard vertical cylinder is a factor that contributes to the 
er level of explosibility recorded. Tests in a 1:1 aspect 
tio cylinder using capacitor discharge ignition, and with 
timum ignition item delay produced values closer to those 
tained in the lm 3 -  but a considerable discrepancy still 
ists as the following results show.
K  (MPa m s'1)
ndard 1.23dm3 vertical cylinder
th induction coil ignition 3.1
1 aspect ratio 1.75dm3 cylinder with
0J capacitor discharge ignition 6.3
3 apparatus with lOkJ pyrotechnic
iter 12.3
It is probable that lower turbulence, dust cloud
omogeneity, ignition source differences, and uni- 
ectional movement of the dust in the 1:1 aspect ratio 
linder apparatus are contributory factors to the discrepancy 
tween the measured dust explosibilities in this and the 
3 apparatus.
The reported difference in cellulose dust explosibility, 
ng the two dispersion procedures in the 43 dm3 vessel 
directly attributable to the different turbulence levels and 
rees of homogeneity of the dust clouds. It has been
0.014 0.89 12.8
0.028 0.98 14.8
0 0.83 12.4
Table 4 Explosion rate constants, using different test methods
K  (MPa m s -1)
Dust sample Hartmann apparatus 43dm3 Apparatus
Magnesium stearate 8.8 23.7
Phenolic resin 7.1 19.7 "
Cellulose 3.6 12.5
Pharmaceutical product 1.9 10.6
Gum arabic 1.7 9.0
Dried milk granules 0.4 9.2
shown that by correct choice of the experimental conditions 
the 43 dm3 apparatus is capable of producing experimental 
data comparable with those obtained in the lm3 apparatus.
The K  values determined using either the lm 3 or 43dm3 
vessels have no significance in absolute terms. These test 
procedures represent essentially arbitrarily defined means of 
evaluating dust explosibility and the applicability of such test 
data to industrial processing areas must be related to the 
conditions prevailing there. They tend to characterise the 
most severe conditions for explosibility of particular fuel/air 
mixtures. In the actual plant the nature of the ignition source, 
the turbulence level and the dust cloud homogeneity are para­
meters which require skilled judgement and cannot be 
defined precisely. However, in the design of safety measures, 
it is.important to take account of both the dust explosibility 
and the nature of the process to be protected. For example, 
the turbulence level in a microniser will be considerably 
greater than that in a storage silo.
To prescribe safety measures it is necessary to evaluate the 
explosibility of the dust at risk. The use of the standard 
vertical cylinder with the accepted test methodology under­
estimates the explosibility of dusts, and will give a misleading 
estimate of the hazard if the dust is somewhat insensitive to 
ignition. The latter difficulty could be resolved if a higher 
discrete energy, rather than a continuous ignition procedure 
was used with this apparatus. Table 4 lists comparative 
explosibility rate constants of various dusts, as determined 
from standard Hartmann apparatus measurements and from 
43dm3 measurements (tv =  265ms.) These results serve to 
emphasise the limitations of the Hartmann apparatus, in 
particular the fact that there is no simple scaling factor. It 
would be inappropriate to design explosion countermeasures 
for, say, a dried milk process, directly upon Hartmann data. 
Larger test apparatuses such as the lm 3 and 43dm3 vessels 
represent more suitable vehicles for dust explosibility 
evaluations.
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D U S T  E X P L O S I O N S  A N D  T H E I R  S U P P R E S S I O N
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SYNOPSIS D ust ex p lo s io n  couterm easures are based on an assessm ent o f  the dust e x p lo s ib i l i t y .  I t  i s  
shown th a t the standard t e s t  method u sin g  the Hartmann apparatus can g iv e  u n r e lia b le  r e s u lt s  because  
the e x p lo s ib i l i t y  o f  a d ust i s  dependent on i t s  ig n i t io n  s e n s i t i v i t y .  Improved t e s t  methods are ou t­
lin e d . The methodology o f  d e te c t io n  and su p pression  o f  ex p lo s io n s  w ith  com m ercially a v a ila b le  
system s i s  d escr ib ed , and the r e s u l t s  o f  su ppression  t r i a l s  and comments on the advantages and d is ­
advantages o f a lt e r n a t iv e  suppressants are p resen ted . The data required  fo r  a computer aided  a s s e s s ­
ment o f  each in d u s tr ia l problem , and the d esign  o f  s p e c i f ic  su p pression  m easures, are in d ic a te d .
1. INTRODUCTION
The m ajority  o f  m a ter ia ls  handled as p a r t ic u la t ­
es  in  the a g r ic u ltu r a l ,  pharm aceutica l, ch em ical, 
cosm etic , p la s t i c ,  and food in d u s tr ie s  can, under 
c e r ta in  c o n d it io n s , exp lod e. T h erefore, the pro­
c e ss in g  o f  th ese  m a ter ia ls  i s  p o te n t ia l ly  hazard­
ous and p la n t operators are requ ired  to  take 
n ecessary  measures to p r o te c t  both p la n t and 
personnel a g a in s t the e f f e c t s  o f  such e x p lo s io n s .
There are two methods o f  counterin g  the d e str u c t­
iv e  e f f e c t s  o f e x p lo s io n s . In the f i r s t ,  the 
ex p lo s io n  i s  d e tec ted  very  soon a f t e r  i t s  in cep ­
t io n  and s u f f i c i e n t  .suppressant d e liv ered  in to  
the growing f i r e b a l l  to quench or suppress i t  
b efo re  s ig n if i c a n t  p ressu re  i s  developed in  the  
p la n t . In the second, the ex p lo s io n  i s  vented  
in to  the surrounding environm ent by rupturing a 
weak ven t panel in  the p la n t ,  thus r e l ie v in g  the  
p ressu re  and p reventing  p la n t damage. F igure 1 
shows a ven ted  p rop an e/a ir  e x p lo s io n . The 
immediate e f f e c t  i s  a 10m j e t  o f  flam e and a 
n o ise  heard over a very la rg e  area . With vented  
dust ex p lo s io n s  an a d d it io n a l hazard could be 
the d isp ers io n  o f  to x ic  combustion p rod ucts. 
V enting couterm easures th ere fo re  n e c e s s ita t e  a 
la rg e  ’ sa fe  a rea ’ surrounding each ven t p an el.
The a p p lic a tio n  o f  both ex p lo s io n  supp ression  
and ex p lo s io n  ven tin g  techn iqu es req u ires a 
m eaningful e stim a te  o f  the v io le n c e  o f  the 
se v e r e s t  ex p lo s io n  th at i s  p o s s ib le  in  the 
in d u s tr ia l p la n t p ro cess in g  a p a r t ic u la r  m a ter ia l. 
This enab les the n ecessary  ex p lo s io n  counter­
measures to be designed  and hence forms a most 
im portant p art o f  ex p lo s io n  supp ression  tech­
n o logy .
2. EXPLOSIBILITY ASSESSMENT
The e x p lo s ib i l i t y  o f  a fu e l  i s  u su a lly  d escrib ed  
in  terms o f  the maximum p ressu re , P _ , and the 
maximum ra te  o f  pressure r i s e ,  (dP /d t) „ ,
as measured in  an experim ental t e s t  v e s s e l ,  fo r  
the most e x p lo s ib le  con cen tration  o f  the p art­
ic u la r  fu e l .  The maximum pressure i s  e s s e n t ia l ­
ly  v e s s e l  volume independent, whereas the maximum 
ra te  o f  p ressure r is e  i s  a fu n ctio n  o f v e s s e l
volum e. Maisey (R ef. 1) id e n t i f i e d  a cube law
r e la t io n  between (dP /dt) and volum e, V:max
{SL\
VH (D
where K i s  the e x p lo s ib i l i t y  ra te  co n sta n t. From 
a measurement o f  the tim e, t ,  required  to  reach a 
c e r ta in  p ressu re  in  a s p e c i f ic  volume, V, the  
t im e, t  , required  to  a t ta in  the same p ressu re  in  
a volume, V^, i s  g iven  by:
x (2)
In r e a l i t y  i t  i s  n o t p o s s ib le  to  ach ieve  a 
q u ie scen t d u s t /a ir  su sp en sio n , and the tu rb u len ce  
o f  a d u s t /a ir  su sp en sion  in c r e a se s  the ex p lo s io n  
s e v e r i ty .  S ince turbu lence le v e l s  vary from 
v e s s e l  to  v e s s e l ,  equ ation  (1) needs to  be amend­
ed t o :
P],
hV -  o' . K (3 )
where K i s  the e x p lo s ib i l i t y  ra te  con stan t  
specific^  to  the fu e l in  a q u ie scen t s t a te  and oL 
i s  the turbulence fa c to r .
F igure 2 shows the measured (dP /d t) v a lu e s  o f  . . . , max.gas ex p lo s io n s  in  a lmJ v e s s e l  fo r  v a r io u s  de­
grees o f  tu rb u len ce . A h ig h ly  tu rb u len t fu e l  
can explode w ith  ten  tim es the s e v e r ity  o f  the
corresponding q u ie scen t f u e l .  S in ce  i t  i s  not
p o s s ib le  to measure the e x p lo s ib i l i t y  o f  a 
q u ie scen t d u st , a p r e c is e  determ ination  o f  the  
turbulence fa c to r  o f an experim ental d ust ex­
p lo s io n  i s  n ot p o s s ib le .  In p r a c t ic e ,  a turbu­
len ce  fa c to r  o f  4 .5  i s  consid ered  to rep resen t  
the h ig h e s t  l e v e l  o f  turbu lence encountered in  
in d u s tr ia l  p ro cess in g  and turbu lence fa c to r s  o f  
2 -3  are common fo r  most in d u s tr ia l  environm ents.
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2.1  The Hartmann apparatus
The curren t UK procedure fo r  the d esign  o f s a fe ty  
measures to g iv e  p r o te c t io n  a g a in s t the e f f e c t s  
of ex p lo s io n s  req u ires th a t the dust a t  r is k  
should be eva lu ated  in  the standard Hartmann 
v e r t ic a l  tube apparatus (R ef. 2 ) .  In the Hart­
mann apparatus, the dust i s  d isp ersed  in to  a 
1.23dnw ex p lo s io n  tube onto a continuous ig n i t ­
ion  sou rce , which i s  t y p ic a l ly  a hot c o i l  or a 
tr a in  o f in d u ctio n  c o i l  sparks, and P and 
(dP /d t) are measured from the recorded exp lo ­
sio n  p ressu re /tim e  h is to r y . H igh-speed photo­
graphy has shown th a t a co n sid era b le  delay  
occurs between the a r r iv a l o f  an e x p lo s ib le  dust 
cloud a t  the ig n i t io n  source and the e f f e c t iv e  
in i t i a t io n  o f  the e x p lo s io n . Eckhoff (R ef. 3) 
has demonstrated th a t the measured e x p lo s ib i l i t y  
o f lycopodium sp ores d ecreases w ith  in crea s in g  
ig n it io n  d e lay  in  the Hartmann apparatus. F igure  
3 shows s im ila r  behaviour fo r  c e l lu lo s e  d u st.
The lon ger  the d e lay  betw een dust d isp e r s io n  and 
ig n i t io n ,  the lower i s  the r e su lta n t  turbulence  
a t ig n i t io n ,  and hence the low er i s  the recorded  
e x p lo s ib i l i t y  o f  th e  d u st.
T ests w ith  a lt e r n a t iv e  ig n i t io n  procedures in  
variou s t e s t  apparatus have id e n t i f i e d  a r e la t ­
ion  between ig n i t a b i l i t y  and turbulence l e v e l .
I t  i s  concluded th a t Hartmann t e s t  data are sub­
j e c t  to  c e r ta in  in c o n s is t e n c ie s ,  s in c e  the re­
corded dust e x p lo s ib i l i t y  i s  dependent on i t s  
ig n it io n  s e n s i t i v i t y .  This occurs because the  
standard t e s t  methodology does n ot co n tro l the  
ig n i t io n  d elay  tim e. I g n it io n  d elay  tim es were 
estim ated  from the p ressu re /tim e  records o f  over  
100 d u sts th a t have been eva lu ated  in  the Hartmann 
apparatus over the l a s t  3 y ea rs . The r e s u l t s ,  
p resen ted  as a p lo t  o f  ig n i t io n  delay  tim e, tv , 
a g a in st measured e x p lo s ib i l i t y ,  (d P /d t)mgy, are  
shown in  Figure 4. Most d u sts w ith_j 
(dP /dt) v a lu es  l e s s  than 5 MPa s have ex­
tended 111331 ig n i t io n  delay  tim es. Hence th ese  
measurements are not m eaningful assessm ents o f  
the p o te n t ia l  e x p lo s iv e  v io le n c e  o f  th ese  fu e l's . 
Bartknecht (R ef. 4) has a ls o  shown th a t th is  
t e s t  method can r e s u l t  in  a con sid erab le  under­
estim ate  o f the dust e x p lo s ib i l i t y ,  and th a t  
sc a l in g  to  large  volumes i s  n o t d ir e c t ly  
a p p lic a b le .
2 .2  Progress towards a r e l ia b le  standard
I t  must be accepted  th a t the Hartmann apparatus, 
using  the cu rrent t e s t  m ethodology, does not 
g iv e  r e l ia b le  dust e x p lo s ib i l i t y  d ata . Hence 
ven tin g  and ex p lo s io n  suppression  countermeasur­
es should not he designed  w ith  re feren ce  to  such  
data. R esu lts  p u b lish ed  by Bartknecht have 
demonstrated th a t dust e x p lo s ib i l i t y  measured in  
the Hartmann apparatus i s  g en era lly  some 2 .5  
tim es l e s s  sev ere  than the corresponding measure­
ment in  la r g e r  volume apparatus, in  th is  case  
Im3 ( see  F igure 5 ) .  The d if fe r e n c e , however, 
becomes more pronounced fo r  the dusts th a t are 
le s s  v io le n t ly  e x p lo s ib le .  The s im ila r it y  b e t­
ween F igures 4 and 5 i s  ev id e n t .
This whole q u estion  o f hazard assessm ent i s  be­
ing review ed by a working group (IS0/TC21/SC5/
WG3) o f  the In te r n a tio n a l Standards O rgan isa tion . 
The current^philosophy o f the working group i s  to  
accept a lm apparatus as a referen ce  apparatus. 
Other types o f  t e s t  apparatus must be shown to  
g iv e  dust e x p lo s ib i l i t y  d eterm inations which can
be r e la te d  to  the lm measurements, over the  
com plete range o f  e x p l o s i b i l i t i e s . Bartknecht 
(R ef. 5) has r e c e n t ly  d escr ib ed  a 20 dm^  
sp h e r ic a l apparatus, and the author cu rren tly  
u ses a 43 dm  ^ sp h e r ic a l apparatus fo r  dust 
e x p lo s ib i l i t y  measurements n ecessa ry  fo r  the  
d esign  o f  ex p lo s io n  su p p ression  m easures. Both 
o f th ese  v e s s e ls  g iv e  r e s u l t s  c o n s is te n t  w ith  
the lm3 v e s s e l ,  and are very  much e a s ie r  and 
cheaper to  o p era te .
3. EXPLOSION SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
3.1 D etectors and suppressors
E xp losion  su p p ression  as an a lt e r n a t iv e  to v en t­
in g  was developed by Graviner Ltd in  the 1950 's .
A range o f  hardware was evo lved  and th is  has 
been p r o g r e s s iv e ly  expanded and improved to  en­
ab le  su p p ression  system s to  be o ffe r e d  fo r  a 
wide range o f  in d u s tr ia l  a p p lic a t io n s .
F igure 6 shows the p ressu re /tim e  h is to r y  during  
the e a r ly  s ta g e s  o f  a ty p ic a l d evelop in g  exp lo ­
s io n ,  and dem onstrates th e  o p era tio n a l ch aracter­
i s t i c s  o f  an ex p lo s io n  su p p ression  system . Most 
in d u s tr ia l  p la n t i s  o n ly  capable o f  w ith stan d in g  
p ressu res o f  0 .0 2 -0 .0 3  MPa; hence the tim e 
a v a ila b le  to  suppress the e x p lo s io n , i . e .  keep  
the overpressure to  ^  O.OSMPa, i s  t y p ic a l ly  on ly  
a few ten s o f  m ill is e c o n d s .
E xp losion s are d e tec ted  u sin g  e i t h e r  a p ressu re  
th resh o ld  d e te c to r  or a r a t e - o f - r i s e  p ressu re  
d e te c to r . T y p ica lly  such d e te c to r s  a c t iv a te  a t  
s e t t in g s  o f  0.0035MPa and 0.08MPa s “  ^ r e sp e c t­
iv e ly .  The r a t e - o f - r i s e  p ressu re  d e te c to r  has 
an upper p ressu re  th resh o ld  s e t t in g  to  ensure  
th a t 's lo w ' ex p lo s io n s  are a ls o  id e n t i f i e d .
This d e te c to r  i s  used in  p referen ce  to  the 
th resh o ld  d e te c to r  to  reduce the p r o b a b il ity  o f  
f a l s e  a c t iv a t io n s  in  in d u s tr ia l  p la n ts  where 
the op era tin g  p ressu re i s  somewhat v a r ia b le .  I t  
a ls o  has a su p er ior  performance to  the th resh o ld  
d e te c to r  in  sm all volume in s t a l l a t i o n s .
E xp losion  suppressors which have su p pressant 
c a p a c it ie s  ranging from 0 .5  to  30 dnH are a v a i l ­
ab le  to  the en g in eer  d esign in g  an ex p lo s io n  
su p p ression  system . A hem isp h erica l type  
suppressor i s  shown in  F igure 7a. I t  c o n s is t s  
o f a scored  h em isp h erica l ca sin g  which co n ta in s  
l iq u id  su p p ressan t. H ydraulic shock , generated  
by an e l e c t r i c a l ly  f ir e d  d eton ator lo c a te d  in  
the su p p ressan t, 'p e t a ls '  the fr a n g ib le  dome 
and r e le a s e s  the suppressant in to  the p la n t .
This type o f  suppressor i s  e x c e p t io n a lly  f a s t ,  
d e liv e r in g  suppressant in to  the e x p lo s io n  
w ith in  5ms a t  an i n i t i a l  d isch arge v e lo c i t y  in  
ex cess  o f  200m s . ^j  but i t  has a lim ite d  d is ­
charge range. I t  i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  s u ite d  to  the  
sm aller  in s t a l la t io n s  where p ressu re  r i s e s  are  
very rap id . I t  i s  in s t a l l e d  in s id e  th e  p la n t .
A h igh  ra te  d isch arge suppressor i s  shown in  
Figure 7b. This type o f  su ppressor i s  used in  
the la r g e r  in s t a l la t io n s  where more tim e i s  
a v a ila b le  fo r  su p p ressio n , but a g rea ter  
suppressant throw i s  req u ired . These su p p ress­
ors co n ta in  e ith e r  liq u id  or powder su p p ressan t  
which i s  sto red  under a h igh  p ressu re  o f  n it r o ­
gen. They are mounted on the o u ts id e  o f  the  
p la n t . A fr a n g ib le  d isc  i s  e x p lo s iv e ly  ruptur­
ed and the suppressant i s  d isp ersed  in to  the  
p la n t w ith  a v e lo c i t y  o f some 50m s “ * and a
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mass d isch arge ra te  in  ex cess  o f 100kg s which  
i s  su sta in ed  u n t i l  a t  l e a s t  50% o f the con ten ts  
are d ischarged . The f i r s t  o f the suppressant 
reaches the p la n t w ith in  1 0 -15ms o f  the system  
a c t iv a t io n .
A c e n tr a l co n tro l u n it  prov id es continuous 
m onitoring o f  e x te r n a l c ir c u i t s  and i n i t i a t e s  
autom atic p la n t shut-down in  the even t o f  system  
a c t iv a t io n . E xp losion  sup pression  measures can 
in corp orate  h igh  speed i s o la t io n  v a lv e s  and 
advanced in e r t in g  measures to prevent flame 
propagation down in terco n n ec tin g  d u ctin g , thus 
ensuring th a t the ex p lo s io n  cannot propagate to  
oth er  p arts o f  the p la n t . F igure 8 shows a 
ty p ic a l Graviner ex p lo s io n  su p p ression  i n s t a l l ­
a t io n .
3 .2  T estin g  su p p ression  equipment
The e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  ex p lo s io n  su p pression  
measures are determ ined by comprehensive evalua­
t io n  o f the l im i t s  o f a sy stem 's performance in  
sp e c ia l la r g e  volume v e s s e ls  capable o f  w ith ­
stand ing  the unsuppressed ex p lo s io n  o verp ressu re . 
As p art o f  an in te r n a t io n a l stu d y , t r i a l s  were 
r e c e n tly  ca rr ied  o u t , in  c o lla b o r a tio n  w ith  Dr 
E.W. S c h o ll , u sin g  a lm3 t e s t  v e s s e l  a t  Bergbau 
V ersu ch sstreck e, Dortmund. The main aim o f  th ese  
t r i a l s  was to  ev a lu a te  the performance o f  a 
s in g le  75mm diam eter o u t le t  h ig h -r a te  d isch arge  
system  con ta in in g  e ith e r  chiorobromomethane 
(Halon 1011), w ater , or ammonium phosphate 
powder.
T ests  were undertaken u sin g  both gas and dust 
e x p lo s io n s , and a range o f  d e te c t io n  p ressu res  
extending up to 0.05MPa, which i s  more than ten  
tim es the d e te c t io n  p ressure used in  most in ­
d u s tr ia l a p p lic a t io n s . R esu ltan t suppressed ex-1 
p lo s io n  overp ressu res a g a in s t  15 v o l % 70/30  
CH,/H_ ex p lo s io n s  (K = 9.5MPa m s - *) and
0.75kg m~~ c e l lu lo s e  dust ex p lo s io n s  
(K = 12.5MPa m s  ) are presen ted  in  F igure 9 .
In th ese  t e s t s  the suppressant p r o p e ll in g  agent 
pressure was 6MPa. I t  i s  ev id en t th a t w ater i s  
not an e f f e c t iv e  suppressant o f  gas e x p lo s io n s ,  
and th at Halon 1011 i s  under th ese  t e s t  con­
d it io n s  n ot e f f e c t iv e  a t  the h igh er  d e te c t io n  
pressu re! F igure 10 shows the r e s u l t s  o f  t r i a l s  
w ith  two system s:
( i )  Halon 1011, D etec tio n  p ressure
= 0.005MPa, p r o p e ll in g  agent p ress­
ure = 2HP a.
( i i )  Ammonium Phosphate power, D etection  
p ressu re  = O.OlMPa, P r o p e llin g  agent 
pressure * 6MPa.
w ith  variou s suppressant con cen tra tion s a g a in st  
tu rb u len t c e l lu lo s e  dust e x p lo s io n s . These 
r e s u lt s  in d ic a te  the. minimum suppressant con­
cen tra tio n s  under th ese  t e s t  co n d it io n s .
3 .3  S p e c if ic  system  design
Consider the su p p ression  o f  tu rb u len t c e l lu lo s e  
dust ex p lo s io n s  in  sp h e r ic a l v e s s e ls  o f  lm, 1.5m 
and 2m diam eters r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  u sin g  a s in g le  
75mm diam eter o u t le t  h ig h -r a te  d ischarge  
suppressor o f  s u ita b le  ca p a c ity  such th a t  the 
f in a l  su ppressant con cen tra tion  in  each v e s s e l  
i s  4kg m“ 3.
F igure 11 shows the suppressant d isch arge  
c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  a ty p ic a l 75mm h igh  ra te  d is ­
charge system . The tim es required  to  com plete­
ly  d is tr ib u te  the suppressant in  each o f  the  
v e s s e ls  are 34, 50 and 76ms r e s p e c t iv e ly .
F igure 12 shows the p ressu re /tim e  h is t o r ie s  o f  
unsuppressed c e l lu lo s e  d ust ex p lo s io n s  in  each 
o f  the v e s s e l s .  For a predeterm ined d e te c t io n  
p ressu re  = 0.0035MPa, su p erim p osition  o f  the  
re le v a n t d isch arge tim e en ab les the suppressed  
e x p lo s io n  o v erp ressu re , Pre(j» to  be deduced. 
F igure 12 shows th a t th i s  s p e c i f i c  su ppress­
ion  system  i s  more e f f e c t iv e  in  the in t e r ­
m ediate volume v e s s e l .  In the ca se  o f  the lm 
diam eter v e s s e l  the su p p ression  system  in e r t ia  
l im i t s  i t s  perform ance. More e f f e c t iv e  
su p p ression  would be ach ieved  w ith  the f a s t e r  
a c tin g  hem isp h erica l su p p ressors. In  th e  case  
o f  the 2m diam eter v e s s e l  the e x tin g u ish a n t  
throw l im it s  the system  perform ance. More 
e f f e c t iv e  su p p ression  would be ach ieved  u sin g  
e ith e r  se v e r a l suppressors or a very  h ig h -r a te  
d isch arge su p p ressor.
This a n a ly s is  i s ,  o f  co u rse , a gross over­
s im p li f ic a t io n  o f  the way in  which the ca p a b il­
i t y  o f  ex p lo s io n  su p p ression  measures are 
a ss e sse d . Graviner ex p lo s io n  su p p ression  sy s ­
tems are designed  w ith  the a id  o f  computer 
sim u la tio n  tech n iques which take account o f  
suppressant d is p e r s io n , co n cen tra tio n , 
d r o p le t /p a r t ic le  s i z e ,  evaporation  r a te ,  and 
mode o f  a c t io n , as w e ll  as the r e le v a n t para­
m eters o f  the e x p lo s ib le  m a ter ia l and the  
in d u s tr ia l  environm ent.
Many fa c to r s  have to  be consid ered  in  choosing  
a su p p ressan t. Water appears a t t r a c t iv e  b e­
cause i t  i s  in e x p e n s iv e , but as i t  i s  on ly  about 
h a lf  as dense as halon s or powders and as the  
mass o f  suppressant i s  a most im portant fa c t o r ,  
tw ice as much has to  be u sed . This can mean 
tw ice  the number o f  d isch arge su p p resso rs. For 
o u ts id e  in s t a l l a t i o n s ,  in  p a r t ic u la r , w ater must 
con ta in  a s u ita b le  a n t i fr e e z e .
Halon suppressants have gen era l a p p l ic a b i l i t y ,  
but cannot be used where h igh  d e te c t io n  p r e ss ­
ures are n ecessary  because o f  very  v a r ia b le  
p la n t op eratin g  p r e ssu r e s . They are the on ly  
suppressants which can be used where i t  would 
be c o s t ly  or u n d esira b le  to contam inate p la n t  
or product, as they are ch em ica lly  pure and 
very v o l a t i l e .  Thus, the p la n t can be r e s t a r t ­
ed a sh ort time a f t e r  a su p p ression  e v en t.
This i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  im portant in  the pharm a-- 
c e u t ic a l  and food p ro cess in g  in d u s tr ie s .
Powder su ppressan ts are u s e fu l where h igh  
d e te c t io n  p ressu res have to be u sed , and where 
the dust i s  very v io le n t ly  e x p lo s ib le .  In 
g e n e r a l, th e ir  use r e s u l t s  in  o v erp ressu res  
g rea ter  than the 0.03MPa which Halons can 
a c h ie v e , and th ere fo re  the p la n t must be 
corresp ond in gly  stro n g er .
The te s t in g  o f  ex p lo s io n  suppression  measures in  
a p a r t ic u la r  volume o b v io u sly  gen erates va lu ab le  
in form ation  which i s  re le v a n t to in d u s tr ia l  
hazards in  s im ila r  volum es. T ran sla tion  o f  th is  
in form ation  to la rg er  and sm a ller  volum es, how­
e v er , i s  not a sim ple m atter. The problems o f 
such s c a l in g  are i l lu s t r a t e d  below.
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4 .  CONCLUSIONS
I t  has been shown th a t the standard Hartmann 
apparatus can g iv e  u n r e lia b le  dust e x p lo s ib i l ­
i t y  data because the experim ental procedure  
does not co n tro l the ig n it io n  delay  tim e. Im­
proved apparatus and methods are now a v a ila b le  
and should be used fo r  the d esign  o f  ex p lo s io n  
p r o te c t io n  m easures.
The fo llo w in g  b a s ic  inform ation  i s  required  to  
a s s i s t  in  the d esign  o f  ex p lo s io n  sup pression  
system s:
a) a m eaningful assessm ent o f  the ex­
p l o s i b i l i t y  o f  the fu e l;
b) th e performance c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  
ex p lo s io n  su ppression  hardware, and
c) the geom etry, turbulence le v e l  and 
o p era tin g  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  the  
p ro cess in g  area a t  r is k .
Computer s im u la tion  techn iqu es are used to  
design  the optimum ex p lo s io n  su p pression  
system  fo r  the p a r t ic u la r  in d u s tr ia l  hazard.
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Fig. 1 Vented propane/air explosion. (25m3 test apparatus 
situated in an airship hanger) Photograph by courtesy 
of Fire Research Station, Borehamwood
Fig. 3 Influence of ignition delay time on the measured 
explosibility of cellulose dust in the Hartmann 
apparatus
Fig. 5 Relation between dust explosibility measurements in 
the Hartmann apparatus and in a large apparatus (4)
Fig. 2 Turbulent gas explosion tests in a 1m3 vessel
Fig. 4 The measured ignition delay and maximum rate of
pressure rise for various dusts tested in the Hartmann 
apparatus
Fig. 6 Comparison of pressure/time histories of unsuppressed 
and suppressed explosions
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Fig. 7 a Hemispherical explosion suppressor b High rate discharge explosion suppressor
Fig. 8 Explosion suppression equipment installed on a 
cyclone dust collection system
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*»•< 7Cy30CH4/U2(lSVM%)
S u p p r e s s e d  E x p lo s io n  P re s s u re  MPa
Fuel C«<IuIom Oast (o.7S*9mJ )
O e te c t io n  P r e s s u r e  MPa
Fig. 9 Results o f explosion suppression trials with alternative suppressants against 
a 70 /30  CH4 /H 2  gas explosions b cellulose dust explosions
S u p p re ssed  E xp lo sio n  P r e s s u r e * M P a
4 A m m onium  p h o sp h a te  p o w d e r ;^ *  0*0IM P* 
PN * 6 M P ,
«  H a lo n IO II:P as  0 -005M P a
Pm2* 2 MPa
S u p p re ssa n t C o n c e n tra tio n  kgm *3
Fig. 10 Results of cellulose dust explosion suppression trials 
using various suppressant concentrations
S u p p r e s s a n t  T h row
T im e m s .
Fig. 11 Suppressant discharge characteristic o f  a 75mm  
diameter outlet high rate discharge explosion  
suppressor
P r w u n  MPa
Fig. 12 Estimation of suppressed explosion overpressures for 
turbulent cellulose dust explosions in 1m, 1-5m and 
2m diameter vessels using a particular suppression 
system
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SFj, SF4 . . . F) attach electrons to  form  negative  
ions, the m obility  o f  w hich is so  sm all that they do  
not participate in current transport. Electrons 
diffusing out o f  the thin residual channel are 
attached, and thus the rapid rise in resistance is 
enhanced.
T o  describe the quenching processes theoretically, 
attem pts were m ade in 1933 by Cassie and 1943 by  
Mayr using differential equations for the arc 
resistance based on  the energy balance o f  the plasm a  
colum n. C om binations o f  the tw o m odels by Browne  
Jr, and extensions by E Schm idt for instance, were 
able to  give valuable insights into the current and 
voltage behaviour o f  breakers near current-zero.
Newer and m ore refined arc m odels use system s o f  
partial differential equations o f  gas- and electro­
dynam ics. A lthough very encouraging results have  
been achieved, all m odels m ust introduce a num ber 
o f  unknow n constants which m ust be fitted to  the  
experim ental data. For the readers interested in a 
detailed treatm ent Sw anson (1978) has given an 
extensive com parison o f  these m odels.
Som e present and future problem s
The general aim  at all voltage levels is to  increase the 
breaking capacity by increasing the current as well as 
the voltage per break. T o realise the ehv and uhv 
transm ission system s, voltages o f  245 kV per break 
are envisaged. In such system s not only the 
interruption but also the closing causes difficulties 
because o f  high switching overvoltages. Another  
trend is to shorten the sw itching time to  tw o cycles.
Finally, high-voltage DC transm ission should be 
m entioned, for it has advantages if  energy is to  be 
transm itted over very large distances. Since up to  
now  high-voltage DC interrupters do not exist, such  
system s can only be run between tw o sites.
There are thus still a large num ber o f  problem s to  
be solved in the breaker field which are challenging  
both from  the scientific and the technical points o f  
view .
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Figure 1 Consequences o f  a secondary dust explosion five lives lost 
(Photograph courtesy H M SO . London)
I t is com m on  know ledge th a t flam m able  gases and  
v ap o u rs, w hen m ixed w ith air, can  form  explosive 
m ix tures; b u t it is less w idely recognised th a t m any  
everyday m ateria ls , such as flour, coffee a n d  m ilk 
p ow der, can  form  explosib le d u st c louds. In  D ecem ber 
1977,54 lives w ere lost in a series o f  g ra in  e levato r dust 
exp losions in the  USA, and  in the 15 years 1962-76,21 
fa ta lities and  601 in juries occurred  in 432 separa te  
inciden ts in the  U n ited  K ingdom  in w hich the  ignition  
o f d u s t w as the p rim ary  cause. In  ad d itio n , in d u stria l 
p la n t and  factory  bu ild ings suffered co n sid erab le  and  
costly  dam age. In  certa in  in stances the shock  wave 
from  a  localised exp losion  has d is tu rb ed  accu m u ­
la tio n s o f du st from  the  floor, sills, g irders, etc, an d  thus 
c rea ted  co n d itio n s for a secondary  du st explosion  
w hich then  p ro p a g a ted  th ro u g h  th e  factory . T he co n ­
sequences o f one such inciden t are show n in figure 1.
M an u fac tu rin g  an d  processing  in d u strie s are 
req u ired  to  tak e  all p rac tica l steps to  p rev en t o r restric t 
the  p ro p a g a tio n  o f exp losions in indu stria l p lan t. In  
m an y  processing  an d  sto rag e  areas it is im practica l to  
p rev en t the  fo rm ation  of du st o r v a p o u r clouds, and  
p ro tec tio n  m easures m ust be tak en  to  m inim ise the 
effect o f an  explosion . T he p rocessing  p lan t can  be 
p u rged  w ith n itrogen , th u s  p reven ting  the  fo rm ation  o f 
explosive m ixtures. A lternatively , the  b u ild -u p  of 
d estructive  pressures in  p lan t can  be preven ted  by 
u sing  e ither ven ting  o r exp losion  suppression  p ro ­
cedures. T hese la tte r  p ro ced u res are  effective because 
exp losions o f  v a p o u r and  d u st c louds a re  n o t in s tan ­
tan eo u s occurrences. T ypically  the  flam e com m ences 
a t a localised  ign ition  source  and  grow s spherically  a t 
velocities o f 1 -1 0 m s - 1 . It follow s th a t the la rg e r the 
vessel, the  longer is the  tim e taken  to  reach a  given 
pressure . F ig u re  2 show s th a t the tim e availab le  for 
effective exp losion  co u n te rm easu res is only a few tens 
o f m illiseconds for the  sm aller volum es.
Before exp losion  p ro tec tio n  m easures can be 
designed it is necessary to  ascerta in  the  level o f the
explosion  h azard . T h is a rticle  will identify  the v a rio u s 
factors th a t influence exp losion  severity, and  ou tlin e  
som e o f the  p rob lem s in h aza rd  assessm ent. A fter 
briefly d iscussing venting , a  d e ta iled  desc rip tio n  o f 
exp losion  suppression  m easures, u sing  bo th  liqu id  and  
po w d er su p pressan ts, will be given, and  the  design 
c rite ria  for exp losion  suppression  system s discussed . 
A n acco u n t o f  the  de tection  o f fires a n d  exp losions w as 
p rov ided  in an article  in an  earlie r issue of Physics in 
Technology (R ay 1978).
Hazard assessment
T o assess the  risk level o f a  p a rticu la r  m ate ria l it is 
necessary  to  estab lish  th e  m ost severe exp losion  th a t 
can  be p ro d u ced  w ith it. E xplosion  severity  is u sually  
quantified  in term s of th e  m axim um  explosion  p ress­
ure, P max, and  the  m ax im um  ra te  o f p ressu re  risfe, 
(d P /d f)max, a t the  m ost explosib le fuel co n ce n tra tio n . 
T he course  o f  the  exp losion  will be influenced by the 
n a tu re  an d  lo ca tio n  o f the ign ition  source, th e  level o f 
tu rbu lence , th e  h om ogeneity  o f the  explosive m ix tu re , 
vessel geom etry , an d  en v iro n m en ta l factors such as 
tem p era tu re  an d  hum id ity .
T he explosib ility  o f a fuel is d e te rm in ed  in a 
s ta n d a rd  test ap p a ra tu s . T h e  m easu red  exp lo s io n  
pressure , P max, is essentially  ind ep en d en t o f  vessel 
volum e V, w hereas the m axim um  ra te  o f p ressu re  rise, 
(d P /d f)max obeys a  cube  law re la tionsh ip :
• V ,/3 =  K  (explosion ra te  co n stan t).
max
Since it is no t possib le to  p ro d u ce  a  qu iescen t d u s t /a ir  
suspension , acco u n t m ust be tak en  of the  level o f 
tu rbu lence , a, in the experim en tal p roced u re :
w here K q is the  explosion  ra te  co n s tan t o f  th e  qu ies-
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Figure 2 P ressure-tim e histories o f  suppressed and 
unsuppressed turbulent cellulose dust explosions
cen t fuel. I t  has been show n experim entally  th a t 
tu rbu lence  can  increase (d P /d f)max by up  to  a  facto r o f 
ten. T he qu iescen t explosib ility  p a ram ete rs  o f m ost 
so lvent v ap o u rs  an d  flam m able  gases a re  rep o rted  in 
the  lite ra tu re . D a ta  on  m any  d u sts  a re  a lso  reported . 
H ow ever, in p ractice , each specific in d u stria l d u st 
sho u ld  be assessed because particle  size and  shape 
d is trib u tio n , m o is tu re  co n ten t, im purities, etc. can 
have a  m ark ed  influence on  the  d u st explosibility .
T he c u rren t p ro ced u re  in the U n ited  K ingdom  is to  
assess dusts  u sing  the  s ta n d a rd  1-23 d m '’ H a rtm a n n  
type vertical tu b e  a p p a ra tu s  show n in figure 3. 
G e rm an  and  Swiss w orkers have show n th a t the 
H a rtm a n n  a p p a ra tu s  underestim ates  d u st exp losi­
b ility  by a facto r o f a t  least 2-5, p a rtia lly  as a 
consequence o f qu en ch in g  the  explosion a t the  tube  
walls. T hey have recom m ended  th a t explosib ility  
de te rm in a tio n s shou ld  be u n d e rtak en  in large-vo lum e 
( » l m 3) ap p a ra tu s . T h e  a u th o r  has show n th a t
Figure 3 The H artm ann test apparatus
H a rtm a n n  d a ta  a lso can be in e rro r  because the 
m easu red  explosib ility  is d ep en d en t on  the  ign ition  
sensitiv ity  o f the dust. T h u s a  d u st w hich is difficult to  
ignite will have a low H a rtm a n n  exp losib ility  ra ting ; 
b u t in a  la rg e r vo lum e w ith a h igher energy ign ition  
source it cou ld  exp lode  violently . An exam ple  o f  such a 
m ate ria l is pow ered  m ilk w hich h as an  exp losib ility  
ra te  c o n stan t o f  4 b a r m s -1  ( =  400 k P a m s - 1 ) 
m easured  in the H artm an n  app ara tu s , and  92 b a r m s -1  
m easu red  in a larger ap p ara tu s . T he design o f ex­
plosion  p ro tec tio n  m easures based  on the H a rtm a n n  
d e te rm in a tio n  c ou ld  resu lt in in ad eq u ate  p ro tec tio n . It 
has been show n recently  th a t 2 0 d m 3 is the sm allest 
vo lum e o f a p p a ra tu s  w hich gives resu lts consisten t 
w ith th o se  o b ta in ed  in large 1 m 3) ap p a ra tu s .
Venting
E xplosion  venting  is a  sim ple m eans o f exp losion  
pro tec tio n . W eak vent panels are  in co rp o ra ted  in to  the 
stru c tu re  o f indu stria l p lan t, an d  the p ressu re  gene­
ra ted  by the  develop ing  explosion ru p tu re s  these 
panels, th ereb y  lim iting  the b u ild -up  o f d estructive  
pressu res in the  p lan t. W ith  th is m eans o f  p ro tec tio n  
the  full force o f  the exp losion  is released  in to  the 
en v iro n m en t. V enting  co u n te rm easu res therefore  
req u ire  a  large  safe a rea  su rro u n d in g  each ven t panel, 
since b u rn in g  m ate ria l can  be th ru s t som e ten  o r  m ore  
m etres an d  the  co n sid erab le  sonic  b last will be h eard  
over a  very large  area.
T he recom m ended  vent a rea  is defined w ith refer­
ence to  the  fuel explosib ility  w hich is cu rren tly  based  
on H a rtm a n n  a p p a ra tu s  m easu rem en ts in the  U K .
Explosion suppression
E xplosion  suppression  requ ires th a t the exp losion  is 
detected  very soon afte r its incep tion , and  th a t 
sufficient su p p re ssan t is delivered in to  the  g row ing  
fireball to  quen ch  o r suppress it before d estructive  
p ressu re  is developed  in the p lan t. M ost in d u stria l 
p lan ts  in the  p rocessing  indu stry  c a n n o t w ith stan d  
overp ressu res m uch  g rea ter th a n  0-3 b a r  (3 0 k P a). 
Typically  exp losion  suppression  co u n te rm easu re s can  
restric t p ressu re  b u ild -u p  to  below  0-2 ba r. T he  ex p lo ­
sion is c o n ta in ed  w ith in  the  p lan t, and  h ence  the  
en v iro n m en ta l h aza rd s  p rev alen t w ith ven tin g  are  
avoided.
The action o f  suppressants
An explosion  can be described  as a  freely p ro p a g a tin g  
co m b u stio n  w ave in a  flam m able  fu e l-a ir m ix tu re . T he 
ra te  o f  p ro p a g a tio n  m ay  be physically  o r  chem ically  
co n tro lled . As a  g enera lisa tion , co m b u s tio n  reac tio n  
kinetics a re  considered  to  c o n tro l flam e p ro p a g a tio n  in 
gas explosions, w hereas hea t tran sfer betw een particles 
is considered  to  c o n tro l the  p ro p a g a tio n  ra te  o f d u s t 
explosions. H ence to  suppress a  gas exp losion  it is 
necessary  to  in h ib it the co m b u stio n  reac tions, w hereas 
to  suppress m ost d u st exp losions o ne req u irem en t is to  
quench  the co m b u stio n  wave. H ow ever, such a  sim ple 
d is tin c tio n  c a n n o t alw ays be m ade  in practice.
T he consequence  o f d ischarg ing  a sp ray  o f liqu id  o r 
po w d er su p p re ssan t in to  a g row ing  fireball is com plex.
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Figure 4 Explosion  suppression hardware: a: Detector, b: H em ispherical suppressor, 
c: H igh-ra te  discharge suppressor
N u m ero u s effects can  be identified, any  o f which m ay 
be principally  responsib le  for th e  suppression  o f  a 
p a rticu la r  explosion. Som e o f  these effects are:
(a) F ree  rad ica l sc a v e n g in g -a c tiv e  species in the 
su p p ressan t in h ib it the co m b u stio n  chain  p ro p ag a tin g  
reac tions.
(b) A dvanced  in ertin g  -  the  co n cen tra tio n  o f su p p ress­
a n t in jected  in to  the  u n b u rn e d  explosive m ix tu re  can 
ren d er th e  m ix tu re  nonflam m able.
(c) T h erm al q u e n c h in g -c o o lin g  o f co m b u stio n  zone 
a n d  co m b u s tio n  p ro d u c ts .
(d) Physical q u e n c h in g -u n b u rn e d  particles o r d ro p ­
lets are caused  to  ag g lo m era te  such th a t non-explosive 
c o n d itio n s prevail.
E v ap o ra tio n  ra te  per u n it o f surface area , chem ical 
specificity, th e rm al cap ac ity  an d  residence tim e in 
th e  co m b u stio n  zone all have an  influence on the 
effectiveness o f  liqu id  d ro p le ts  an d  pow der particles as 
su p pressan ts. T he d ischarge  profiles o f  suppresso rs, 
p a r tic le -d ro p le t size d istrib u tio n s, and  su p p ressan t 
c o n cen tra tio n  levels all influence suppression  
effectiveness.
Explosion detection
I t  is ev iden t from  figure 2 th a t to  restric t the  pressure 
b u ild -u p  in a  p lan t to, say 0-3 bar, it is necessary  to 
detect the  onse t o f an explosion  before the  p ressu re  has 
exceeded 0-1 bar. In  indu stria l p ractice, exp losions are  
de tected  by m eans o f e ither rad ia tio n  o r  pressure 
de tecto rs. F o r  d u st explosions, p ressure  de tection  is 
the u su a l choice because the  rad ia tio n  from  the  fireball 
m ay  be o b scured  by the d u st cloud . F igu re  4a  show s a 
p ressu re  th resh o ld  d e te c to r which has general ap p lic ­
ability , except in p lan t processing  areas w here n o rm al 
p ressu re  flu c tu a tio n s m ay tem p o rarily  exceed the 
th resh o ld  level for w hich ac tiv a tio n  is necessary. 
F o r  such ap p lica tio n s , an d  for sm aller volum e 
insta lla tio n s, a  ra te-of-rise  p ressu re  d e tec to r is m ore
suitable. T h is type  o f d e tec to r has an  u p p e r th resh o ld  
p ressu re  se tting  to  ensu re  th a t ‘slow ’ exp losions are 
also detected .
T he choice o f de tec to r, an d  o f d e tec to r settings, 
d epends on  the n a tu re  o f the  h aza rd , the  estim ated  
exp losion  severity  an d  the  p lan t o p e ra tin g  co n d itio n s. 
T ypical se ttings o f th resh o ld  and  ra te-of-rise  d e tec to rs  
a re  0 -035b a r an d  0 -8 b a r s ” 1 respectively.
Explosion suppressors
T here  is a  w ide range o f exp losion  su p press ion  h a rd ­
w are  availab le  to  the  ap p lica tio n  eng ineer design ing  an  
exp losion  su p press ion  system . T he selection  o f the 
a p p ro p ria te  h a rd w are  for a  p a rticu la r  ap p lica tio n  
requ ires n o t on ly  an assessm ent o f the h aza rd , b u t a lso 
a  know ledge o f th e  p e rfo rm ance  cap ab ilities o f the 
ha rd w are .
F ig u re  4b show s a  sectioned hem ispherica l ty p e  of 
supp resso r w hich  can  deliver liqu id  su p p re ssan t w ith in  
5 m s o f d e tection , a n d  w ith  an  in itial d ischarge  velocity  
in excess o f  2 0 0 m  s - 1 . T he hyd rau lic  shock , w hich  is 
genera ted  by an  electrically  fired explosive charge  in 
the  cen tre  o f  th e  sup p ressan t, ‘p e ta ls’ th e  scored  
frangible dom e an d  th ru s ts  the  su p p re ssan t in to  the  
p lan t. T hese suppresso rs  are availab le  in cap acitie s o f
0-5, 1 0  and  5-,O drn3. Since they  are  fixed inside the  
p lan t they  are unsu ited  to  h ig h -tem p era tu re  in d u stria l 
processes. T he hem ispherica l su p p resso r is ex cep tio n ­
ally fast, bu t has a lim ited d ischarge  range, typ ically  
< 2-5  m. It is p a rticu la rly  su ited  to d u c tin g  an d  sm all- 
volunre c o n ta in e r app lications.
H ig h-rate  d ischarge  (hrd) suppresso rs  w hich can  
deliver liquid o r po w d er su p p ressan t are av ailab le  w ith 
capacities in the range  4 70 kg. A 75 m m  o u tle t system , 
a 20 m m  o u tle t system  and  a d o u b le  o u tle t 2 0 m m  
system  a re  m ark e ted . T he su p p re ssan t is co n ta in ed  in 
a can iste r u n d e r a high pressu re  (2 0 -1 2 0  bar) o f 
n itrogen . F igu re  4c show s one o f the  range  o f  75 m m  
o u tle t h ig h -ra te  d ischarge  suppresso rs  designed  for a
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liquid suppressant. A frangible disc across the outlet 
orifice is ruptured by the hydraulic shock generated by 
an electrically fired detonator, and the suppressant is 
ejected from the canister by the compressed nitrogen. 
A ‘pepper pot’ spreader disperses the liquid as a fine; 
mist into the plant. This type of suppressor typically; 
has a delay of some 10-15 ms between activation and1 
.suppressant appearing at the spreader. The suppress­
ant discharge velocity is about 50m s-1 and the mass 
discharge rate is about 100kg s-1 for the first 25ms; 
then it decreases. The choice of propelling agent 
pressure influences the performance of a h r d  sup­
pressor. The higher the pressure, the higher ' the 
discharge velocity, but the higher is the overpressure 
injected into the plant as a consequence of discharging 
the suppressor. Powder systems use higher propelling 
agent pressures than liquid systems in order to achieve 
effective dispersion of the powder.
hrd  suppressors are used in larger installations 
where m ore tim e is available for suppression, because  
o f  the lower rate o f  pressure developm ent, but a greater j 
suppressant throw is required.
The explosion suppression system
Although general guidelines are available, explosion, 
suppression installations have to be carefully designed 
for each application. Complete plant protection may 
include high-speed isolation valves and inerting 
countermeasures to restrict flame passage down inter­
connecting ducting. A central control unit provides 
I continuous monitoring of external circuits, and will 
initiate plant shut-down in the event of an explosion.
Figure 5 shows typical explosion suppression 
countermeasures for a grinder/cyclone processing 
system. The grinder and ducting are protected by 
hemispherical suppressors. An explosion in the grinder 
will be detected by detector DI and suppressed -by the 
hemispherical suppressors in the grinder. The halon 
injected into the ducting will prevent flame propag­
ation to the cyclone. Similarly an explosion in the 
cyclone will be detected by detector D2 and suppressed
Figure 5 Industrial explosion protection measures fo r a  
grinder/cyclone system. Key: D -  explosion detectors, 
H -hem ispherical suppressors, h r d  -h igh-rate  
discharge suppressors
55 mm HRD
.20 mm HRD
High-speed 
isolation valve
Cyclone
.75 mm HRDGrinder
Rotary gate valves
by the h rd  suppressors. Flame propagation to the 
grinder is prevented by the hemispherical suppressors 
in the ducting, and a high-speed isolation valve will 
isolate this system from the rest of the plant in the event 
of an activation. A 20 mm h r d  suppressor prevents 
any flame propagation beyond this valve as it closes. 
Since an explosion could start anywhere in this , 
processing area, operation of either of the detectors > 
.will cause the whole suppression system to operate -  
thus ensuring complete plant protection.
Apart from the noise of the suppressors firing, the 
only indication of a suppressed explosion event to a 
plant operator is the automatic shut-down of the plant. 
The duration from ignition to suppression is typically 
less than 300 ms, and the only identifiable evidence of 
an explosion will be a small quantity of charred 
material in the processing plant, if dust was involved.
System  testing
The effectiveness of explosion suppression counter­
measures against both gas and dust explosions are 
determined in large test apparatus-typically of.
1-60 m3 volume. Figure 6 shows a 5 m3 test facility 
which is capable of withstanding 30 bar overpressure. 
Therefore it can contain unsuppressed explosions and 
the limits of effectiveness of explosion suppression ‘ 
measures, against quantified explosion severities, can . 
be fully explored. In particular, the effect of increasing 
the detection pressure, and the effect of reducing 
suppressant concentration, are studied in order to 
provide vital information for the engineer designing 
explosion suppression systems.
A series of collaborative trials were recently 
undertaken by UK/USA/German/Swiss and French 
members of a working group of the International 
Standards Organisation to assist in the formulation of 
an international code of practice for the application of 
explosion suppression systems to industrial plant. The 
effectiveness of three of the most commonly used 
explosion suppressants:
(a) Water
(b) Halon 1011 (chlorobromomethane CH2BrCl)
(c) Tropolar (ammonium phosphate powder)
against both gas and dust explosions was evaluated. 
These tests were undertaken using a double outlet 
20 mm h r d  suppressor, or alternatively a single outlet 
75 mm h r d  suppressor in a 1 m3 chamber, and two 
75 mm hrd  suppressors in a 3-8 m3 vessel. The results 
are summarised in table 1. The following observations 
can be made:
(a) Water is not an effective suppressant of gas 
explosions, but is effective against certain dust 
explosions.
(b) In general the 75 mm hrd  system is more effective 
than the double-outlet 20 mm hrd  system.
(c) More effective suppression was achieved in the 
larger test volume where more time was available to 
suppress the explosion.
(d) In general, Halon 1011 and Tropolar powder have 
similar levels of effectiveness. However, certain tests
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Figure  6 Graviner 5 m 3 explosion  
test apparatus
d e m o n s tra ted  th a t H alon  1011 can fail to  suppress the 
exp losion  if a high detection  pressure  is used.
System  design
W hilst testing  p rov ides v a luab le  in fo rm ation  on the 
effectiveness o f a lte rn a tiv e  exp losion  suppression  
m easures aga in st a range o f h a za rd o u s  m ateria ls , it is 
obv iously  im practica l to  va lid a te  each specific indus­
tria l system  design. In te rp re ta tio n  o f suppression  test 
d a ta  ob ta in ed  in one vo lum e to  an a lte rn a tiv e  volum e 
and  suppression  system  con fig u ra tio n  is n o t s tra ig h t­
forw ard . In  a la rg e r vo lum e the  p ressu re  b u ild -u p  is 
slower, th u s th ere  is m ore  tim e availab le  for su p ­
p ression ; b u t th e  exp losion  energy a t detection  is 
g rea ter and  the  su p p ressan t h as to  be th ro w n  further. 
In  a sm aller vo lum e th e  p ressu re  b u ild -u p  is m uch  
faster an d  any  in ertia  in the  explosion  suppression  
system  will be a  m ajo r facto r in the  system  
perform ance.
A ccoun t m u st be tak en  o f a  large n u m b er of 
p a ram ete rs  w hen design ing  explosion  suppression  
m easures for in d u stry  (see tab le  2). T he choice of 
d e tec to r and  o f su p p ressan t depends on the  type of 
in d u stria l p rocess. T he s tra teg y  ad o p ted  in the U K  and 
U SA  is to  seek to  c o n ta in  the  exp losion  w ithou t 
recourse  to  s tren g th en in g  the  p lan t s truc tu re . L iquid 
su p p ressan t is the  usua l choice for th is purpose, 
because o f its su p e rio r d ischarge  characteris tics . 
P a r tic u la r  ad v an tag es o f  th e  H a lon  sup p ressan ts  are 
th a t risk  o f p ro d u c t co n tam in a tio n  (which is p a r ti­
cu larly  im p o rta n t in the food and  p harm aceu tical 
industries) is m inim ised , and  th a t its nonflam m able  
v a p o u r persists in the  p lan t, p reven ting  any possibility  
o f re-ign ition . P o w d er su p p ressan ts  are  particu larly  
useful w here a  very vio lent exp losion  hazard  prevails, 
o r p lan t p rocessing  c o n d itio n s dem an d  very high 
de tection  pressures as a  p rerequ isite . F o r  such in sta l­
la tio n s it is necessary  to  stren g th en  the  in d ustria l p lan t 
such th a t it is shock  re sis tan t to  a p ressure  pulse of
1 bar. T his la tte r  stra teg y  is w idely ad o p ted  in 
G erm any.
E xplosion  su p press ion  m easures a re  designed and  
op tim ised  for each specific ap p lica tio n  w ith th e  a id  o f 
m a th em atica l m odels an d  c o m p u te r s im ula tion  tec h ­
niques. Such m ath em a tica l too ls m u st tak e  acc o u n t o f 
th e  n u m ero u s  facto rs th a t influence in d u stria l h a za rd s  
an d  suppression  system  p erfo rm ance  w hich are  listed 
in tab le  2. C o m p u te r m odelling  enab les the sim u la tio n  
of the  p re ssu re /tim e  and  fireball ra d iu s -tim e  h isto ries 
o f the  severest exp losions possib le  in a  p a rticu la r  p lan t 
and  hence a llow s th e  suppression  effectiveness o f a 
p ro p o sed  system  to  be pred ic ted .
C onclusions
A lthough  m uch  p rogress has been m ade, the  co m ­
plexities o f in d u stria l processes are such th a t  m uch  
m ore  research  is needed before we will u n d e rs tan d  the  
physics o f explosions, an d  o f th e ir su p p ression , suf­
ficiently to  be ab le  to  cope w ith  all types o f exp losion . 
T o  th is end, th e  in te rn a tio n a l c o o p era tio n , w hich is 
being  actively en co u rag ed  by g o v ern m en ts  an d  in d u s­
tries in several coun tries , is aim ed a t defin ing  precise 
s ta n d a rd s  for h aza rd  assessm ent and  su p press ion  
system  effectiveness.
As industries becom e m ore  aw are  o f th e  n a tu re  an d  
the causes o f exp losion  h aza rd s  new p lan ts  are  h av ing  
m o re  effective co u n te rm easu re s in co rp o ra te d  a t the  
design stage, and  are  h av in g  th e ir processes m odified  
to m inim ise the h azards. T he result is th a t th e  in d u s­
tria l en v iro n m en t is becom ing  increasingly  safer.
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P hys. T echno l., V ol. 10, 1979. P rin te d  in G re a t  B ritain
and a number of regional agencies for scientific and 
technical information (ARIST) which undertake 
technical studies on the state of development of 
products, survey technical literature, assist in 
developing new strategies, etc, in response to 
requests from firms.
In 1975 the MI set up a scheme of growth con­
tracts (contrats de croissance) whereby viable firms 
in sectors considered to be of particular economic 
significance receive aid in return for an undertaking
Apologies
to achieve targets concerning production, employ­
ment, exports and the domestic market share. By 
1977 contracts had been set up in four sectors: 
computer peripherals, scientific/medical instruments, 
electronic components and machine tools.
t  French Government Assistance fo r  Industrial 
Research and Development by J E Macrae and Dr 
M W Jones, Department of Industry ‘Science and 
technology abroad’ FRA 149.
In the September issue of Physics in Technology the article by Peter Moore on ‘Explosion suppression in 
industry’ (1979 10 202-7) was unfortunately printed with two tables missing. These are now reproduced 
with apologies for any inconvenience caused. Apologies are also made for the reversed figure 2 on 
pl97 in the article by W Hertz, and for the spurious reference to figure 6 (p221) in the article 
by L H Th Rietjens.
Table 1 Results o f  evaluation tests on three common suppressants fo r  gas and dust explosions. A, <0-3; B, 
0-3-1; C, 1-3; D, 3-Pmax;F, ^ P max(values in bar)
Suppressed explosion pressure
Explosible Explosion Detection V= 1 m 3 V— 1 m 3 F = 3 -8 m 3
fue l suppressant pressure {bar) 20 m m  h r d  system  75 m m  h r d  system  75 m m  h r d  system
Water
0 1 D D D
0-3 D D D
‘Propane’ Halon 0 1 F A A
gas 1011 0-3 F B B
Tropolar 0 1
A A A
0-3 B B B
W ater
0 1 B B A
0-3 D B A
Cellulose H alon 01 D B A
dust 1011 0-3 F C B
Tropolar
OT
0-3
B
C
B
B
B
B
Table 2 Parameters fo r  consideration when designing explosion suppression measures fo r  industry
N ature o f  hazard
Measured explosibility parameters: 
Most explosible concentration 
Maximum explosion pressure 
Maximum rate of pressure rise
Type of explosion:
Gaseous 
Dust cloud 
Liquid spray cloud 
Hybrid
The system
Advanced inerting requirements
Isolation requirements
The industrial process 
Volume and geometry of plant 
Maximum turbulence level 
Product throughput 
Plant operating pressures: 
Normal 
Maximum 
Plant strength
The detectors
Numbers, type and geometric 
location 
Sensitivity 
Response time
. The suppressors 
Numbers, type and geometric 
configuration 
Response time 
Discharge velocity, and mass 
discharge rate 
Spatial and temporal discharge 
profiles
The suppressant 
Droplet/particle size and 
shape distribution 
Evaporation rate 
Thermal capacity 
Chemical specificity
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La soppressione delle esplosioni nelle industrie.
P. E. Moore
Con i sensori opportuni ed un’attrezzatura ben progettata, esplosioni 
in teoria catastrofiche possono diventare semplici cause d’interruzione del- 
l ’impianto, con danno molto minore.
E comunemente noto che gas e 
vapori infiammabili possono formare 
miscugli esplosivi, se mischiati con aria; 
ma non si e ugualmente acquisito che 
molti materiali comuni, come farina, 
caffe e latte in polvere, possono for­
mare nubi di polvere esplosiva. Nel 
dicembre 1977, 54 persone morirono in 
una serie di esplosioni di polvere in un 
trasportatore di grano negli USA, e nei 
15 anni trail 1962 e il 1976 cifurono21 
morti e 601 feriti in 432 diversi incidenti 
nel Regno Unito, tutti causati originaria- 
mente da accensione di polvere. Inol- 
tre le attrezzature e gli stabili delle indu­
strie accusarono gravi e costosi danni. 
In alcuni casi l’onda d’urto propagan- 
tesi da un’esplosione localizzata ha per- 
turbato l’accumularsi di polvere dal pavi- 
mento, da longheroni, da travi, ecc.,
Peter Edwin Moore e Principal Research 
Scientist alia Graviner Ltd (Poyle Road, Coln- 
brook, Slough, SL30HA, England), una compa- 
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sioni e i processi di soppressione, e sta ora lavo- 
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sioni in attrezzature industriali. Egli e anche mem- 
bro di una delegazione inglese del comitato ISO/ 
TC21/SC5/WG3 della International Standards 
Organisation.
creando cosi le condizioni per un’ulte- 
riore esplosione di polvere, che si e poi 
propagata attraverso l’edificio. Le con- 
seguenze di un incidente di questo tipo 
sono mostrate in .fig. 1.
Le industrie manifatturiere e di lavo- 
razione sono tenute a compiere tutti i 
passi necessari per prevenire o ridurre 
la propagazione di esplosioni nelle at­
trezzature industriali. In molte aree di 
lavorazione ed immagazzinamento e 
impossibile impedire la formazione di 
nubi di polvere o vapore, e si devono 
quindi prendere misure di protezione 
per minimizzare l’effetto di un’esplo­
sione. L’attrezzatura di lavoro deve 
essere depurata con azoto per impedire 
cosi la formazione di miscugli esplosivi.
Altrimenti il raggiungimento di una 
pressione distruttiva nell’impianto si 
puo evitare o aprendo sfoghi o con 
procedure di soppressione dell’esplo- 
sione. Questi ultimi metodi sono effi- 
caci, poiche le esplosioni di nubi di 
vapore e polvere non sono incidenti 
istantanei. Di solito la fiamma inizia in 
una localizzata sorgente di accensione 
e si allarga sfericamente a velocita di
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Fig. 1. -  Conseguenze di un’esplosione secondaria di polveri: 5 morti (la fotografia e stata ottenuta
La fig. 2 mostra che il tempo disponi- 
bile a efficaci contromisure per l’esplo- 
sione e solo di qualche decina di milli- 
secondi per i piu piccoli volumi.
Prima di poter progettare misure di 
protezione per le esplosioni, e necessario 
verificare il grado di rischio di esplo- 
sione. In questo articolo si esamine- 
ranno i vari fattori che influenzano la 
gravita di un’esplosione e si espor- 
ranno alcuni dei problemi sulla valuta- 
zione del rischio. Dopo un breve cenno 
sul metodo di apertura di sfoghi, si 
fara una dettagliata descrizione delle 
misure per bloccare l’esplosione, usando 
sia polveri che liquidi, e si discuteranno 
i criteri di progettazione di sistemi per 
soppressione di esplosioni. Un reso- 
conto sulla rivelazione d’incendi ed 
esplosioni era stato dato in un articolo 
di un numero precedente di Physics in 
Tecnology (Ray 1978).
per gentile concessione del HMSO, Londra).
(l-i-10) m/s. Pertanto, piu grande e il 
recipiente, maggiore e il tempo neces­
sario a raggiungere una certa pressione.
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Fig. 2. -  Andamento temporale della pressione in 
esplosioni turbolente di polvere di cellulosa sop­
presse e no.
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1. Valutazione del rischio.
Per valutare il grado di rischio di 
un certo materiale e necessario stabi- 
lire qual’e la piu violenta esplosione 
che con esso si puo produrre. Di solito 
si quantizza la violenza di un’esplo­
sione in termini della massima pres­
sione di esplosione, P max, e della mas­
sima variazione di pressione, (dP/dl)max, 
alia concentrazione di combustibile mag- 
giormente esplosiva. Lo svolgersi del- 
l’esplosione sara influenzato dalla na- 
tura e dalla collocazione della sorgente 
d’accensione, dal livello di turbolenza, 
dall’omogeneita della miscela esplosiva, 
dalla geometria del contenitore, da fat- 
tori ambientali quali temperatura ed 
umidita.
La possibility di esplodere di un 
carburante viene determinata in un im- 
pianto standard di test. La pressione di 
esplosione misurata, P max, risulta indi- 
pendente dal volume V  del conteni­
tore, mentre la variazione massima di 
pressione, (d i3/d/)maI, obbedisce ad una 
legge cubica:
(d /,/d/)max V 1^  =  K  (costante della 
velocita di e- 
splosione).
Poiche non e possibile produrre una 
sospensione in equilibrio di polvere ed 
aria, si deve tener conto, in una pro- 
cedura sperimentale, del livello di tur­
bolenza a:
(dP/d/L^ =aI?)
dove K q e la costante di velocita di 
esplosione del combustibile in equili­
brio. Si e dimostrato sperimentalmente 
che la turbolenza puo fare aumentare 
(dP/d/)mai di un fattore 10. I parametri 
che definiscono la possibility di esplo­
sione in condizioni di equilibrio di 
molti solventi in fase di vapore e gas 
infiammabili sono riportati nella let- 
teratura. Sono riportati anche dati ri- 
guardanti molte polveri. Comunque, in 
pratica, si dovrebbe esaminare ogni 
specifica polvere industriale, dato che 
le dimension! delle particelle, la loro 
varieta di forma, il contenuto di 
umidita e le impurita sono tutti fattori 
che possono avere marcata influenza 
sull’esplosivita della polvere.
Fig. 3. -  Apparecchiatura di prova di Ilartmann.
La procedura comune nel Regno 
Unito e quella che esamina le polveri 
con un apparato standard di 1.23 dm3 
a tubo verticale del tipo di Hartmann 
mostrato in fig. 3. Studiosi tedeschi e 
svizzeri hanno dimostrato che il dispo- 
tivo di Hartmann sottostima l’esplosi- 
vita delle polveri almeno di un fat­
tore 2.5 e questo e in parte conseguenza 
del contenimento dell’esplosione alle pa- 
reti del tubo. Essi hanno suggerito di 
ottenere valutazioni dell’esplosivita in 
apparati di grande volume (molto mag- 
giori di 1 m3). L’autore ha dimostrato 
che i dati di Hartmann possono anche 
risultare errati, poiche l’esplosivita misu­
rata risulta dipendere dall’infiammabi-
100 P. E . Moore
lita della polvere. Cos! una polvere 
poco infiammabile avra un piccolo grado 
di esplosivita, secondo Hartmann, ma 
in un volume piu ampio con una sor- 
gente di accensione a maggiore energia 
la stessa polvere potrebbe esplodere 
violentemente. Un esempio di un tale 
materiale e il latte in polvere, che ha 
una costante del grado di esplosivita di 
4 bar- m/s ( =  400 kPa - m/s) misurato in 
un apparato di Hartmann e di 92 bar - m/s 
se misurato in un apparato piu ampio. 
II progetto di misure di protezione da 
esplosioni basato sulla determinazione 
di Hartmann potrebbe portare a pro- 
tezioni inadeguate. Recentemente si e 
dimostrato che 20 dm3 e il minimo 
volume di un apparato che dia risultati 
consistenti con quelli ottenuti in ap- 
parati piu grandi m3).
2. Sfoghi.
Aprire sfoghi di esplosione e un 
semplice mezzo di protezione. Leggeri 
pannelli di sfogo sono incorporati nella 
struttura delPattrezzatura industriale e 
la pressione generata dallo svilupparsi 
di un’esplosione rompe questi pannelli, 
limitando cosi il formarsi di pressioni 
distruttive nell’impianto. Con questo 
mezzo di protezione Tintera forza del­
l’esplosione viene distribuita nell’am- 
biente. Tali contromisure di sfogo ri- 
chiedono quindi un’ampia area di sicu- 
rezza che circondi ogni pannello, visto 
che il materiale che brucia puo espan- 
dersi fino a 10 o piu metri e la conside- 
revole deflagrazione sonora si sente in 
una zona molto ampia. I/area di sfogo 
consigliata viene definita in riferimento 
all’esplosivita del combustibile, che in 
Gran Bretagna si valuta comunemente 
con misure in apparati di Hartmann.
3. Soppressione dell’esplosione.
II poter sopprimere un’esplosione 
richiede che questa sia individuata im- 
mediatamente dopo il suo innesco e che 
si liberi neutralizzatore a sufficenza nel 
centro dell’esplosione per spegnerla o 
impedirla prima che la pressione di- 
struttiva si sviluppi nell’impianto. Molti 
impianti industriali non possono resi- 
stere a sovrappressioni molto mag- 
giori di 0.3 bar ( =  30 kPa). Contro­
misure tipiche per la soppressione di 
esplosioni possono contenere il for­
marsi di pressioni al di sotto di 0.2 
bar. L’esplosione viene contenuta al- 
l’interno dell’impianto e quindi si evi- 
tano i rischi ambientali prevalenti nel 
metodo di sfogo.
4. L’azione dei soppressori.
Si puo descrivere un’esplosione come 
un’onda di combustione che si propaga 
liberamente in una miscela infiamma­
bile di aria e combustibile. La velocita 
di propagazione si puo controllare fisi- 
camente o chimicamente. Per generaliz- 
zare, si deve considerare la cinetica 
della reazione di combustione per con­
trollare la velocita di propagazione della 
fiamma nell’esplosione di gas, mentre 
per controllare la stessa nell’esplosione 
di polveri occorre considerare il tra- 
sferimento di calore fra particelle. Per- 
tanto, per sopprimere un’esplosione di 
gas, si devono neutralizzare le reazioni 
di combustione, mentre per sopprimere 
la maggior parte delle esplosioni di 
polveri occorre estinguere l’onda di 
combustione. Tuttavia una cosi sem­
plice distinzione non sempre puo va- 
lere nella pratica.
L’effetto dovuto alio spruzzare li- 
quido o polvere di soppressione nel 
centro dell’esplosione e complesso. Si
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possono identificare vari processi, ognu- 
no dei quali puo risultare il principale 
responsabile della soppressione di un 
particolare tipo di esplosione. Alcuni di 
questi effetti sono:
a) Completa eliminazione -  le spe­
cie attive del soppressore neutralizzano 
le reazioni che propagano la catena di 
combustione.
b) Neutralizzazione avanzata -  la 
concentrazione di soppressore immesso 
nella miscela esplosiva incombusta puo 
renderla non infiammabile.
c) Estinzione termica -  raffredda- 
mento della zona e dei prodotti di com­
bustione.
d) Estinzione fisica -  si provocano 
le agglomerazioni di particelle o gocce 
non bruciate in modo che prevalgano le 
condizioni di non esplosione.
La velocita di evaporazione per 
unita di superficie, la specificita chimica, 
la capacita termica ed il tempo di per- 
manenza nella zona di combustione 
influenzano l’efficacia delle gocce di li- 
quidi e delle particelle di polveri come 
soppressori. I profili di scarica di sop- 
pressori, le distribuzioni delle dimensioni 
delle particelle o delle gocce e i livelli 
di concentrazione del soppressore sono 
tutti fattori che influiscono sull’efhcacia 
del metodo.
5. Rivelazione dell’esplosione.
E evidente dalla fig. 2 che, per con- 
tenere la pressione che si puo formare 
in un impianto fino, ad esempio, a 
0.3 bar, occorre rivelare l’inizio di un’e­
splosione prima che la pressione abbia 
superato 0.1 bar. Nella pratica indu­
s tr ia l  le esplosioni s’individuano per 
mezzo di misuratori di pressione o rive-
latori di radiazione. Per le esplosioni di 
polveri si sceglie di solito il rivela­
zione della pressione, poiche la radia-
Fig. 4. -  Strumenti per la soppressione delle esplo­
sioni : a) rivelatore, b) soppressore emisferico, 
c) soppressore ad alto potere di scarica.
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zione proveniente dal nucleo dell’esplo­
sione puo essere oscurata dalla nube di 
polvere. La fig. 4a) mostra un rivela- 
tore di pressione a soglia largamente 
utilizzato, tranne che in ambienti in cui 
le normali fluttuazioni di pressione pos­
sono temporaneamente superare il li­
vello di soglia corrispondente all’atti- 
vazione. Per tali applicazioni e per in- 
stallazioni in volumi minori e piu op- 
portuno un misuratore della velocita di 
aumento della pressione. Questo stru- 
mento ha anche una soglia superiore 
di pressione che si puo fissare per essere 
sicuri di rivelare anche le esplosioni piu 
lente.
La scelta del rivelatore e delle sue 
condizioni d’intervento dipende dalla 
natura del rischio, dalla stima della vio- 
lenza dell’esplosione, dalle condizioni 
di uso dell’impianto. Valori tipici dei 
punti di lavoro dei rivelatori a soglia e a 
velocita di aumento sono rispettiva- 
mente 0.035 bar e 0.8 bar-s-1.
6. Soppressori di esplosione.
Esistono molti tipi di apparecchia- 
ture a disposizione di chi deve proget- 
tare un sistema per la soppressione di 
esplosioni. La scelta dell’attrezzatura 
adeguata per una particolare applica- 
zione richiede non solo una valutazione 
del rischio, ma anche la conoscenza delle 
prestazioni dell’apparecchiatura.
La fig. 4b) mostra un soppressore 
ad emisfero che pud liberare liquido di 
spegnimento entro 5 ms dalla rivela­
zione e con una velocita di scarica ini- 
ziale superiore a 200 m/s. L’urto idrau- 
lico generato da una carica esplosiva ac- 
cesa elettricamente nel centro del 
soppressore distrugge la cupola prein- 
cisa e forza il liquido nell’ambiente. 
Questi soppressori sono disponibili nelle
dimensioni volumetriche di 0.5, 1 e 
5 dm3. Dovendo essere fissati nell’im­
pianto, non sono adatti per i processi 
industriali ad alte temperature. II sop­
pressore ad emisfero e estremamente 
veloce, ma ha una portata limitata, di 
solito minore di 2.5 m. Risulta parti- 
colarmente adatto per applicazioni in 
condotti e contenitori di piccolo volume.
I soppressori ad alta velocita di 
scarica (HRD) che possono liberare 
liquidi o polveri sono disponibili con 
capacita variabili tra 4 e 70 kg. Esi­
stono sul mercato sistemi ad apertura 
singola di 75 mm, 20 mm e a doppia 
apertura di 20 mm. II soppressore e 
contenuto in un recipiente ad alta pres­
sione di azoto ((20-f-120) bar). La fig. 4c) 
mostra uno dei soppressori HRD con 
apertura da 75 mm per liquidi. L’urto 
idraulico generato da un detonatore in- 
nescato elettricamente rompe un disco 
posto nell’orifizio di uscita ed il liquido 
viene evacuato dal contenitore dall’azoto 
compresso. Un diffusore disperde il 
liquido a nebbia nell’impianto. Questo 
tipo di soppressore presenta di solito 
ritardi di (10-1-15) ms fra il momento 
dell’attivazione e la fuoriuscita del li­
quido dal distributore. La velocita di 
uscita del liquido e circa 50 m/s e la 
portata in massa e circa 100 kg/s per i 
primi 25 ms, poi tende a diminuire. La 
scelta della pressione della sostanza che 
agisce da propulsore influenza la presta- 
zione di un soppressore HRD. Tanto 
maggiore e la pressione, tanto piu alta 
e la velocita di scarica, ma risulta an­
che maggiore l’incremento di pressione 
provocato nell’impianto come conse- 
guenza della scarica del liquido. Sistemi 
a polvere utilizzano pressioni delle so- 
stanze agenti da propulsore maggiori 
che i sistemi a liquido, e questo per ot- 
tenere un’efficace dispersione della pol-
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vere. I soppressori HRD sono usati in 
installazioni di grandi dimensioni dove 
il tempo per la soppressione e mag­
giore, data la minor velocita di au­
mento della pressione, ma e richiesto 
un getto maggiore di soppressore.
7. II sistema di soppressione di 
esplosioni.
Sebbene siano disponibili procedure 
generali, le installazioni per la sop­
pressione di esplosioni devono essere 
accuratamente progettate per ogni ap- 
plicazione. L’intera protezione dell’im- 
pianto puo includere alcune valvole 
d’isolamento ad alta velocita ed ade- 
guate contromisure atte a limitare il 
passaggio del fuoco nei condotti di con- 
nessione. Un’unita centrale controlla con 
continuita i circuiti esterni e puo far 
cominciare la chiusura dell’impianto in 
caso di esplosione.
7 5 m m  HRD 20 m m  HRD
DI
c i c l o n e
v a l v o l a .  
d ' i s o l a m e n t o  
a d  a l t a  
v e l o c i t a
7 5 m m  HRD
‘v a l v o l a  r o t a n t e
Fig. 5. -  Misure di protezione dall’esplosione per 
un sistema. macina-ciclone. Chiave: D - rivelatore 
di esplosioni, H - soppressore emisferico, HRD - 
soppressore ad alto grado di scarica.
La fig. 5 mostra un’apparecchiatura 
tipica per la soppressione di esplosioni 
in un sistema di lavorazione macina-
ciclone. La macina e il condotto sono 
protetti da soppressori ad emisfero. 
Un’esplosione nella macina sara rive- 
lata dal rivelatore DI e neutralizzata dai 
soppressori emisferici nella macina. Ha­
lon iniettato nel condotto impedira al- 
l’incendio di propagarsi nel ciclone. Ana- 
logamente un’esplosione nel ciclone sara 
rivelata dal rivelatore D2 e bloccata dai 
soppressori HRD. La propagazione di 
fiamma nella macina viene impedita dai 
soppressori emisferici nel condotto e la 
valvola d’isolamento ad alta velocita 
isola questo sistema dal resto dell’at­
trezzatura in caso di attivazione. Un 
soppressore HRD da 20 mm impedisce 
la propagazione della fiamma oltre la 
valvola quando essa e chiusa. Poiche 
un’esplosione potrebbe iniziare ovun- 
que in questa area di lavorazione, 
l’azione di ciascuno dei rivelatori pro- 
voca il blocco del sistema, assicurando 
cosi una totale protezione dell’impianto.
Eccettuato il rumore dell’accensione 
del soppressore, la sola indicazione 
dell’avvennta soppressione di esplosio­
ne e la chiusura automatica dell’impian­
to. II tempo che trascorre dall’inne- 
sco alia soppressione e in genere mi- 
nore di 300 ms e l’unica prova iden- 
tificabile di un’esplosione sara una 
piccola quantita di materiale carboniz- 
zato nell’impianto di lavorazione, se 
era presente della polvere.
8. Prova del sistema.
L’efficacia di contromisure per la 
soppressione di esplosioni sia di gas 
che di polveri viene determinata in 
apparati di prova di grandi dimensioni, 
tipicamente di (1-^60) m3 di volume. 
La fig. 6 mostra un’attrezzatura di 
prova di 5 m3 in grado di sopportare 
sovrappressioni di 30 bar, percio puo
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contenere esplosioni non soppresse e si 
possono esaminare dettagliatamente i 
limiti di efficacia delle misure di sop­
pressione di esplosioni rispetto alia 
grandezza della gravita dell’esplosione.
Fig. 6. -  Apparecchiatura Graviner da 5 m3 di 
prova di esplosione.
In particolare si studiano l’effetto di 
un aumento del valore della pressione 
rivelata e l’effetto di riduzione della con­
centrazione di soppressore alio scopo di
fornire informazioni vitali al progettista 
di sistemi di soppressione.
E stata recentemente intrapresa una 
serie di esperimenti in collaborazione 
(Gran Bretagna, USA, Germania, Sviz­
zera e Francia) nell’ambito di un gruppo 
di lavoro della International Standards 
Organisation per giungere alia formula- 
zione di un codice di uso internazionale 
per l’applicazione di sistemi di soppres­
sione di esplosioni per impianti indu­
striali. E stata valutata l’efficacia di tre 
neutralizzatori di esplosione sia di gas 
che di polveri fra i piu comunemente 
usati:
a) acqua,
b) Halon 1011 (clorobromometa- 
no CH2BrCl),
c) Tropolar (fosfato di ammonio 
in polvere).
Queste prove sono state condotte 
usando un soppressore HRD a doppia 
uscita da 20 mm o, in alternativa, uno a
T a b e l l a  I.
Combustibile
esplosivo
Soppressore 
di esplosione
Pressione di 
rivelazione (bar)
Efficacia della soppressione
V  =  1 m3 
sistema HRD 
da 20 mm
P = l m 3 
sistema HRD 
da 75 mm
V  =  3.8 m3 
sistema HRD 
da 75 mm
Gas propano Acqua 0.1 D D D
0.3 D D D
Halon 1011 0.1 F A A
0.3 F B B
Tropolar 0.1 A A A
0.3 B B B
Polvere di cellulosa Acqua 0.1 B B A
0.3 D B A
Halon 1011 0.1 D B A
0.3 F C B
Tropolar 0.1 B B B
0.3 C B B
A  - pressione dell’esplosione soppressa <  0.3 bar;
B - pressione dell’esplosione soppressa (0.3—1.0) bar;
C  - pressione dell’esplosione soppressa (1.0q-3.0) bar;
D  - pressione dell’esplosione soppressa (3.0-bPmax) bar;
F  - pressione dell’esplosione soppressa >  P mai.
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singola uscita di 75 mm in una camera 
di 1 m3 e due soppressori HRD da 
75 mm in un contenitore di 3.8 m3. I 
risultati sono indicati nella tabella I.
Si possono fare le seguenti osser- 
vazioni:
a) l’acqua non e un efficace neu- 
tralizzatore di esplosioni di gas, ma 
risulta tale per alcune esplosioni di 
polveri;
b) in generale il sistema HRD 
da 75 mm e piu efficace di quello a 
doppia uscita da 20 mm;
c) si e conseguita una soppres­
sione piu efficace nel volume di prova 
piii ampio in cui era disponibile un 
tempo maggiore per bloccare l’esplo- 
sione;
d) in generale l’Halon 1011 e la 
polvere Tropolar hanno livelli simili di 
efficacia. Comunque alcune prove hanno 
dimostrato che l’Halon 1011 puo risul- 
tare inefficace se si usa un’alta pres­
sione di rivelazione.
9. Progetto del sistema.
Mentre le prove forniscono' valide 
informazioni sull’efficacia di svariate mi­
sure per la soppressione di esplosioni 
per un certo numero di materiali peri- 
colosi, non b chiaramente pratico veri- 
ficare ogni specifico progetto di sistema 
per l’industria. L’estrapolazione dei 
dati delle prove ottenuti in un volume 
ad un’altro volume o ad un’altra con- 
figurazione del sistema di soppressione 
non b sempre semplice. In un volume piu 
ampio l’aumento di pressione b piu 
lento e c’b quindi piu tempo disponibile 
per la soppressione,. ma l’energia di 
esplosione all’atto della rivelazione b 
maggiore e il neutralizzatore deve es­
sere iniettato a maggiore distanza. In
un volume minore la pressione au- 
menta piu velocemente e l’inerzia del 
sistema di soppressione di esplosione 
sara il fattore piu importante nel detef- 
minare le prestazioni del sistema.
Nel progettare misure di soppressione 
di esplosioni per l’industria si deve tener 
conto di molti parametri (vedi tabella II).
Tabella II.
Natura del rischio
Parametri dell’esplosivita misurata: .
a) concentrazione maggiormente esplo- . 
siva,
b) valor massimo della P  di esplosione,
c) massima velocita di aumento di P.
Tipo di esplosione:
a) gassosa,
b) a nube di polvere,
c) a nube di vapore di liquidi,
d) ibrida.
II processo industriale
Volume e geometria dell’impianto.
Massimo livello di turbolenza.
Presenza di prodotto.
Pressioni esistenti nell’impianto:
a) normale,
b) massima.
Resistenza dell’impianto.
I  neutralizzatori 
Tipo.
Distribuzione delle dimensioni e delle forme 
delle gocce/particelle.
Grado di evaporazione.
Capacita termica.
Specificita chimica.
I  soppressori
Numero, tipo e configurazione geometrica. 
Tempo di risposta.
Velocita di scarica e quantita di massa sca- 
ricata.
Profili spaziali e temporali della scarica.
I  rivelatori
Numero, tipo e collocazione geometrica. 
Sensibilita.
Tempo di risposta.
II sistema
Esigenze di neutralizzazione avanzata. 
Esigenze d’isolamento.
La scelta del rivelatore e del soppressore 
dipende dal tipo di processo industriale. 
II metodo adottato in Gran Bretagna e 
negli USA e cercare di contenere l’esplo- 
sione senza rinforzare la struttura del­
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l’impianto. II soppressore liquido e 
quello di solito usato per questo scopo 
date le sue migliori caratteristiche d’inie- 
zione nell’impianto. II soppressore Ha- 
lon ha il particolare vantaggio di mini- 
mizzare il rischio di contaminazione 
del prodotto (cosa particolarmente im- 
portante nelle industrie alimentari e far- 
maceutiche); inoltre il persistere del 
suo vapore non infiammabile nell’im­
pianto previene ogni possibility di rein- 
nesco. I soppressori a polveri sono parti­
colarmente utili quando sussiste il ri­
schio di un’esplosione molto violenta o 
le condizioni di layorazione nell’im­
pianto richiedono pressioni di rivela- 
zione molto alte. Per tali installazioni e 
necessario rinforzare le strutture del- 
l’impianto in modo che esse possano 
sopportare impulsi di pressione fino 
ad 1 bar. Quest’ultimo metodo e lar- 
gamente usato in Germania.
Le misure di soppressione di esplo- 
sione sono progettate ed ottimizzate per 
ogni specifica applicazione con l’aiuto 
di modelli matematci e di tecniche di 
simulazione al calcolatore. Questi stru- 
menti matematici devono tener conto 
dei vari fattori che influenzano i rischi 
industriali e le prestazioni del sistema di 
soppressione che sono indicati in ta- 
bella II. II modello al calcolatore per- 
mette la simulazione di andamenti tem- 
porali della pressione e del raggio della 
sfera di esplosione delle piu gravi esplo-
sioni possibili in un particolare im- 
pianto e dunque consente di predire 
l’efficacia del sistema proposto.
10. Conclusioni.
Nonostante siano stati fatti molti 
progressi, la complessita dei processi 
industriali e tale che occorrono ancora 
molte ricerche prima di comprendere la 
fisica delle esplosioni e della loro sop­
pressione fino ad essere in grado di af- 
frontare ogni tipo di esplosione. A  
questo scopo, la cooperazione interna- 
zionale, che e stata largamente incorag- 
giata dai governi e dalle industrie di 
svariate nazioni, deve definire precisi 
standard di valutazione del rischio e 
dell’efficacia del sistema di soppres­
sione. Poiche le industrie divengono 
piu consapevoli della natura e dei rischi 
di un’esplosione, le nuove attrezzature 
hanno incorporate contromisure piu ef- 
ficaci in stadio di progetto ed i pro­
cessi sono stati modificati per minimiz- 
zare i rischi. II risultato e che l’ambiente 
industriale diventa via via sempre piu 
sicuro.
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